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Can Democracy be Constructed Based on Terror & Fraud?
-
The BHHRG Report on the Kosovo
'Elections,' 17 November 2001
[This report was prepared by
Dr. David Chandler. It is Posted with the kind permission of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 28 November 2001. For some quite interesting
Further Reading,
go to end of page.]
=======================================
Faking
Democracy and Progress in Kosovo
1.
Background
“This was an extraordinary
election.”[i] The pronouncement of US Ambassador Daan Everts,
OSCE Mission chief, running the elections was very apt. These elections
were truly extraordinary in many respects.
One extraordinary aspect is
that they were held in a legal vacuum. Kosovo is neither an independent
state nor any longer under the government of Serbia or the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The question of statehood is to be postponed to
the indefinite future while the United Nations assumes the responsibility
for governing the province, through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
headed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SGSR) the former
Danish foreign minister, Hans Haekkerup.
The provincial government
elected on 17 November reflects this lack of international legal
framework. The new post-election arrangements are outlined in a document
titled ‘A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo’.[ii] This is not a constitution but a ‘framework’ for
a constitution and not self-government but ‘provisional’ self-government.
The ill-defined legal and political status of the former Yugoslav
province, reflects Western powers’ diminished respect
for state sovereignty and the crumbling formal framework of
international legal and political equality. (1)
Kosovo is an
‘extraordinary’ political experiment because the system of ‘dual power’ of
an international governing administration alongside a subordinate,
domestically-elected administration, which developed in an ad hoc manner
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is here for the first time officially
institutionalised. The new framework for a ‘constitution’ of Kosovo, is
the first modern political constitution to explicitly rule out democracy.
The preamble states that the ‘will of the people’ is to be relegated to
just one of many ‘relevant factors’ to be taken into account by the
international policy-makers.[iii]
The
executive and legislative powers of the UN Special Representative remain
unaffected by the new constitutional framework. Chapter 8 of the framework
lists the powers and responsibilities reserved for the international
appointee, which include the final authority over finance, the budget and
monetary policy, customs, the judiciary, law enforcement, policing,
external relations, public property, communications and transport,
housing, municipal administration, and the appointment of regulatory
boards and commissions. And, of course, the power to dissolve the elected
assembly if Kosovo’s representatives do not show sufficient ‘maturity’ to
agree with his edicts.[iv]
2. Sham
Elections
Many international
plenipotentiaries, including US President George Bush, Nato
Secretary-General Lord George Robertson and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, urged the Kosovo public to turn out to vote,
particularly the Kosovo Serbs. When it emerged that around 60% of the
Albanian and 50% of the Serb voters had taken part, the elections were
loudly hailed by the international organisers and observers to be a
‘glorious day in the history of Kosovo’ and as a ‘huge success’.[v] The question of why the international community
chose to spend millions of dollars holding elections for a provincial
administration with token office-holders with highly circumscribed powers
was, unfortunately, rarely asked.
These elections were
extraordinary in the importance attached to them, not just because of the
lack of power awarded to the victors, but also the fact that the results
were largely irrelevant once the electoral ‘engineering’ of the OSCE and
UNMIK was taken into account. The largest party, the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, which won 46% of the votes, would not
have been able to form the government even if they had won a land-slide
victory. This was because the seats in the seven-member presidency and
positions in the new ministries were already divided in a fixed ratio in
advance. For example, the largest party and second largest party, the
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Hashim Thaci, with 25% of the
votes, were to have two seats in the presidency with the third party
holding one seat, the two remaining seats were reserved for Serb and other
minorities. This system of dividing the seats before the elections made
the international pressure on Belgrade to encourage Kosovo Serbs to vote,
in order that they might have more of a say in the future of the province,
rather bizarre. The Serb community was already guaranteed 10 reserved
seats in the 120 seat assembly, a seat on the presidency and at least one
of the nine ministries, regardless of whether any Serbs voted at all.
I was monitoring the Kosovo
elections on behalf of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group with the
official international observation mission of the Council of Europe. It
did not take long to see why the extravagant hype had taken over from the
mundane reality of the elections. At the start of the Council of Europe
observer training, Lord Russell Johnstone, the President of the Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, put the elections in the broader context of
international intervention today. ‘The international community needs to
prove that intervention was benign [in Kosovo and East Timor] and will
create better conditions. These elections are a proving exercise.’ Lord
Johnstone is probably correct to see the November elections as little more
than a ‘proving exercise’ for the international institutions involved in
the violation of Yugoslav sovereignty and the promotion of ‘military
humanitarianism’ in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This would seem to be
confirmed in the stated concern of the OSCE organisers to achieve an
election that made the international mission appear ‘legitimate and
credible’.[vi]
Bearing in mind the
international importance of the ‘success’ of the Kosovo elections, the
‘independent’ observation mission of the Council of Europe claims that the
provincial elections were ‘free and fair’ should not necessarily be taken
at face value.[vii] It is highly doubtful that these elections would
have been passed as ‘free and fair’ had they taken place outside the
international supervision of the OSCE. The election conditions, in which
there was a complete absence of freedom of movement for minority
communities, and many of the OSCE election regulations covering the media
and political parties, failed to meet basic internationally accepted
standards, such as those laid out in the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen
Declaration on Democracy and Political Pluralism.[viii] The following
sections compare the claims of the OSCE against the reality of Kosovo in
more depth.
3. Creating
Multi-Ethnic Society?
Without visiting the region
it is difficult for outside observers to imagine the depth of fear and
insecurity which pervades the province despite more than two
years of government by the international community’s expansive
‘peace-building’ mission. (2) There
has been a highly restricted number of Serb and minority returns to
Kosovo, and the UNHCR estimates that since the UNMIK administration took
over more minorities may have left the province than returned.[ix] One reason for this is that Serb and other
ethnic minorities still have no freedom of movement in Kosovo. The lack of
movement could be seen when we visited the allegedly multi-ethnic ‘zone of
confidence’ in Mitrovica, which has no Serb minority and is basically a
Bosnian Muslim settlement policed by a 24-hour UNMIK armed guard. Or when
we walked further along the Ibar to the uninhabited ruins of the Roma
‘Malhalla’, formally the largest Roma settlement in the Balkans, destroyed
after the war. It is not yet possible for any of the 7,000 former
residents to return in safety.
The ethnic-apartheid ruled over
by UNMIK (3) also had a direct impact
on the election campaign and election monitoring. The Council of Europe
election observation teams were told not to enter minority Serb or
Albanian areas within their allocated municipalities because it would be
too dangerous for their drivers and interpreters. Apart from indicating
the complete separation of the Serb and Albanian communities, this
instruction also meant that the ‘independent’ observers had a highly
restricted view of the elections. One further impact of the lack of
security for ethnic minorities was the fact that the voters’ list, the
basic tool to guide election campaigning, was considered to be sensitive
information. The voters’ list was not available to be used by political
parties and could only be consulted if no notes or photographs were taken,
making full transparency impossible.[x]
Far from admitting to the
failures of the Nato intervention or the subsequent ‘peace-building’
programmes of the UNMIK administration, and the ethnic-apartheid, which is
in place, the OSCE had boasted that the elections were overcoming ethnic
divisions. One reason for this statement was that there were allegedly
minority members on the polling station committees.I was observing in the north of the
Mitrovica area, in Leposavic, a moderate-dominated Serb area, I saw no
minority committee members and asked an OSCE polling station supervisor if
the policy had been dropped. He replied that the polling station committee
were all minority community members as they were all Serbs. Classifying
mono-ethnic polling station committees as minority ones makes the OSCE
election organisation look artificially multi-ethnic. This artificial
‘engineering’ to create multi-ethnic institutions on paper is also
promoted as an important outcome of the elections themselves. Every level
of government, including the Presidency, the Ministries and the Assembly
will have reserved places for minority community members. These minority
members will be bussed in to meetings from minority enclaves under heavy
military guard. Multi-ethnic government will be created by edict, but this
will not reflect the divided society, nor help to break down inter-ethnic
barriers. The insecurities of minority and majority communities are not
caused by ignorance or irrational prejudice but by rational concerns that
the artificial and temporary nature of the current settlement imposed by
UNMIK can not be sustainable.
The lack of refugee return
and poor treatment of non-Albanian minority communities, was one reason
for the low turn-out in some minority areas of Kosovo, particularly in the
Serbian enclave north of the Ibar river which divides the town of
Mitrovica. At some polling stations turn-out was under 10%.[xi] In Leposavic around a third of the 6,500
population were refugees. I visited the refugee centres for Roma and Serbs
displaced from southern Kosovo. I spoke to Gushanig Skandir the head of
the Roma camp, who showed us around the overcrowded and poorly funded
site, where large families were forced to share single rooms and use
outside toilet and washing facilities despite the winter cold.He told me that after waiting three years
their centre had received a new roof 20 days ago, he believed this
international aid was because he encouraged the adults in the camp to
register to vote and to encourage the Roma refugees to vote on election
day. He was sceptical about the elections but felt the Roma might receive
more aid from the international community if they voted. The following day
I saw him at the polling station in the local school. Gushanig may have
made the pragmatic choice to vote but many other refugees and displaced
people in similar situations told us that voting could make no difference
especially as the leading Serb representatives would have seats in the
Assembly anyway.
In an attempt to portray
the low turn-outs as unconnected to the lack of freedom of movement and
alienation of minority communities, Daan Everts declared: ‘The only thing
which marred what was a glorious day in Kosovo’s history was that some
Serbs in the north of Kosovo were too intimidated by other people in their
own community to come out and vote’.[xii] This claim was
repeated on BBC World television, in international press headlines and in
the post-election International Crisis Group report, which stated that
‘the intimidation of would-be Serb voters marred the election in
Serb-controlled region north of the Ibar river’.[xiii] The intimidation
claims were news to the independent observers in the region. I attended
the Mitrovica area debriefing for the Council of Europe observers after
the elections and intimidation was not mentioned, the observation team for
the north Mitrovica municipality received not one report of intimidation.
At a post election party for internationals the mystery was clarified when
I spoke to the OSCE regional trainer for the Mitrovica area who told me
that his boss’s claims of intimidation were based on highly dubious
allegations ‘of people staring outside polling stations and looking inside
them’.
4. Political
Pluralism, Free Press and Civil Society?
The OSCE and UNMIK regard
the Kosovo political parties as a hindrance rather than a help in
addressing the problems of the province. They are seen to be lacking
maturity and in need of ‘continuous support from the OSCE Democratization
Department to enhance their organisational capacity and to increase their
political and social possibilities to advocate for democratic changes’.[xiv] Daan Everts argued that the political parties
were so out of touch that the international community was, in effect, more
democratic and more representative of popular opinion. He stated that the
OSCE needed to inform the political parties of the concerns of the people
and to encourage them to respond to the demands of the electorate.[xv]
As part of the process of
making political parties more ‘accountable’ there are a host of
restrictive regulations of the political sphere. These include the fining
of newspapers if they favour a major political party. Epoka e Re was fined
DEM 1,000 for ‘a clear bias in favour of the PDK in its election political
reporting’ while Bota Sot was fined DEM 2,750 for coverage which was
favourable to the LDK.[xvi] I asked Lucia Scotton, the Council of Europe’s
Mission in Kosovo’s media monitoring officer, how these fines squared with
the OSCE’s claim to be encouraging a free and independent media. Her view
was that although it was an international norm for a free press to take a
political position favouring a particular party in election campaigns, the
fines were ‘reasonable’ because the press in Kosovo was not professional
or mature enough to act freely and independently yet.[xvii]
The OSCE Code of Conduct
for political parties also breaches internationally accepted democratic
norms by holding political parties responsible for the actions of their
supporters.[xviii] I asked Adrian Stoop, the Chief Commissioner of
the OSCE Election Complaints and Appeals Commission about whether this
regulation complied with international standards.[xix] He replied that ‘In
Holland this law would be unthinkable.’ He explained that the
internationally-appointed Commissioners supported regulations which they
would not accept in their own countries because the international
administrators found it hard ‘to get a grip on what is happening’ and
‘didn’t speak the language’. In order to give the international regulators
greater control, the rules had to be more pragmatic and flexible to try to
influence the political parties and the political climate.
The OSCE election
‘engineers’ also sought to limit the influence of the political parties
once they got into power. Daan Everts stated at a training session for
Council of Europe observers that ‘these elections force a certain degree
of power-sharing’, undermining the power of the larger parties by
restricting their positions and influence in the new institutions.[xx]He added
that the OSCE had learnt from the municipal elections last year ‘to impose
a bit more’. The flexible ‘framework’ for a ‘constitution’ allows the line
between international and domestic responsibility to be easily blurred.
Firstly, UNMIK has established ‘international advisors’ for the President,
Prime Minister and ministers and each ministry will also be overseen by an
international ‘Principal Advisor’. Secondly, the functions reserved for
the UN’s Special Representative are so vaguely defined that they cover
much of the responsibilities ‘devolved’ to the nine ministries. However,
in the true spirit of transparency and accountability the UNMIK
spokesperson says that at this stage ‘it is hard to describe’ what powers
will be needed to carry out these reserved functions.[xxi]
While the political parties
were being restricted at least it appeared that one area of political life
was booming, civil society. The growing strength of civil society was
indicated by the fact that this year there was more than twice the number
of domestic observers as last year, representing 1% of the electorate.
Daan Everts described the elections as the ‘best monitored elections this
century’.[xxii] In fact, according to the OSCE, there ‘could be
the highest proportion of election observers to voters in the world’.[xxiii] One does not have to be a hardened cynic to
wonder why 1% of the population would be so keen to observe the elections.
I thought it would be interesting to find out. When I asked the NGO
observers more about how they got involved I was surprised to find out
that many did not know what ‘their’ NGO did or what its’ initials stood
for, and had got involved through being invited by a friend. This was
particularly true for those observing on behalf of one of the best
represented domestic NGOs, the KMDLNJ (Council for the Defence of Human
Rights and Freedoms) based in Pristina. The reason the KMDLNJ had so many
observers was probably because they were paying people DEM 80 to take
part. CeSID a Serbian-based NGO with close links to the OTPOR student
movement was paying people DEM 25 to observe. The other NGO observers were
paid somewhere between the two.
The dynamism of civil society, like every other
aspect of these elections was a fake. In the regional de-briefing back in
Pristina, all the observers noted that the domestic observers were rather
disinterested in the proceedings. It seems likely that the OSCE and its
international sponsors’ actions of buying-in civil society NGOs will have
little positive impact in the longer run. It hardly encourages people to
take communal responsibility for democracy if people are paid
half-a-month’s wages to ‘volunteer’ to be part of the democratic process.
The statistics for domestic observers may have looked good on paper but
the OSCE’s approach of artificially ‘engineering’ the effect it wanted may
only set back any genuine attempt to involve the Kosovo public in the
political process. If civic NGO involvement is promoted as an
election-related job, like interpreting and driving for the
internationals, then this undermines, rather than promotes, the idea of
voluntary civic engagement.
5.
Conclusion
The November 17 elections
in Kosovo were phoney in every major respect. They were phoney in that
under the fiction of multi-ethnic government they helped legitimise a
society that provides no normal existence for ethnic minorities, merely
imprisonment in ethnic enclaves and military escorts to visit family
cemeteries or former homes and villages. They were phoney in that through
the fiction of ‘staring’ Serbs the responsibility for the low turn-out in
some regions was seen to be the fault of minorities themselves, rather
than the ethnic segregation overseen by the international community. They
were phoney because under the guise of promoting media freedom and
independence, freedom of expression and political debate were further
restricted. They were phoney because under the guise of promoting
political pluralism, majority rule was replaced by a consensus imposed by
the UN’s Special Representative. They were phoney because under the
fiction of a vibrant civil society the OSCE and its partners corrupted the
process of encouraging civic engagement. Most importantly, they were
phoney because under the fiction of democratic autonomy for the people of
Kosovo, they legitimised a constitution that openly replaced the ‘popular
will’ with the unaccountable power of an international protectorate.
The OSCE and UNMIK are
celebrating the elections as a major international success. They may have
secured some international legitimacy for their tin-pot protectorate and
won kudos for their ‘success’ in encouraging ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ in
Kosovo. However, phoney elections can only create phoney consultation
bodies. The reduced election turn-out among the Albanian voters and the
low turn-out for the Kosovo Serbs suggests that the domestic legitimacy of
the international protectorate may be the real sticking point for the
future.
This report
was compiled by Dr David Chandler, Policy Research Institute, Leeds
Metropolitan University. He is the author of Bosnia Faking Democracy After
Dayton (Pluto Press, 1999, 2000) and From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights
and International Intervention (Pluto Press, March 2002). He can be
contacted at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[i] ‘First Official Results in Kosovo Election
Announced’, OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 19
November 2001.
[ii] ‘A Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo’, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001.
[iii] ‘A Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo’, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001, p.4.
[iv] For further background information on the
framework for provisional self-government, read: Simon Chesterman, Kosovo
in Limbo: State-Building and “Substantial Autonomy”, International Peace
Academy, August 2001. Available from: <http://www.ipacademy.org/>;
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow-Up: Why
Conditional Independence? September 2001. Available from:
<http://www.kosovocommission.org/>; International Crisis Group,
Kosovo Landmark Election, November 2001. Available from:
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
[v] ‘Kosovo’s Election Hailed a Huge Success’,
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November
2001.
[vi] International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark
Election, Balkans Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001,
p.1.
[vii] ‘Kosovo Assembly Elections Bring Democracy
Forward and Strengthen regional Stability’, Council of Europe Election
Observation Mission in Kosovo Press Release, Pristina, 18 November
2001.
[viii] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE. Available from:
<http://www.osce.org/docs>.
[ix] Interview with Leonard
Zulu, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR, Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[x] Information provided
by Peter Urban, Director of Elections, OSCE, Council of Europe Training
Programme, Pristina 13 November 2001.
[xi] Information provided by OSCE Spokesperson
Claire Trevena, 21 November 2001.
[xii] ‘Kosovo’s Election Hailed a Huge Success’,
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November
2001.
[xiii] Nicholas Wood, ‘Serbs “Face Threats at
Polls”’, Observer, 18 November 2001; International Crisis Group, Kosovo:
Landmark Election, Balkans Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November
2001, p.i.
[xiv] Kosovo’s Concerns:
Voters’ Voices (Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xv] Daan Everts,
‘Foreword’, Kosovo’s Concerns: Voters’ Voices (Pristina: OSCE Mission in
Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xvi] ‘Fines Given for
Political Violence and Reporting Bias’, OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)
Press Release, Pristina, 10 November 2001; ‘Newspaper Sanctioned for
Photo’, OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 16 November
2001.
[xvii] Interview,
Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[xviii] ‘The Code of
Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions, Citizens’ Initiatives,
Independent Candidates, Their Supporters and Candidates’, Electoral Rule
No.1 1/2001, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Central Election Commission.
Available from: <http://www.osce.org/>.
[xix] At the Council of
Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[xx] Speech at the Council
of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[xxi] UNMIK-OSCE-EU-UNHCR
Press Briefing, 22 November 2001. UNMIK Unofficial Transcript.
[xxii] ‘Calls for Kosova’s Serbs to Vote’, RFE/RL
Newsline, Vol.5, No.214, Part II, 9 November 2001.
[xxiii] ‘Plea to Election Observers: Be Patient’,
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 9 November
2001.
**********************************************
COMMENTS & FURTHER
READING:
**********************************************
Prepared by John Flaherty and Jared Israel, Emperor's
Clothes
1) UN Resolution 1244
guarantees that Kosovo will remain part of Serbia and Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, Bernard Kouchner, head of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
campaigned for the exact opposite during an earlier provincial
quasi-election. See "Solana
and Kouchner push Kosovo 'Independence'" by Jared
Israel at http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
* (Return to Report,
above)
2) In his informative
report on the Kosovo elections, posted above, Dr. Chandler writes that
Serbs have been subjected to a reign of terror in Kosovo "despite
more than two years of government by the international community’s
expansive ‘peace-building’ mission."
We in the NATO countries have been taught that our leaders
are basically decent, but make mistakes. We are told that if bad things
happen in countries undergoing NATO 'nation-building' it is in spite of,
not because of, NATO leaders.
But in Kosovo, the evidence on the ground is overwhelming.
Kosovo has suffered an unprecedented reign of terror by Albanian
secessionists because of - not in spite of - NATO and UN control.
Many articles on Emperor's Clothes document this with
abundant references from the mainstream media and from highly credible
observers. The following is a small but important sample:
* "TERRORISM AGAINST SERBIA IS NO CRIME"
Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff show how NATO and the
UN have gone 100% against the promise, made in UN Resolution 1244, to
prevent Albanian secessionist terrorism in Kosovo. Instead this terror
has been encouraged. Can be read at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
* 'What NATO Occupation Would Mean for Macedonia'. NATO's nightmarish control of Kosovo is documented in
interviews with three women from the town of Orahovac. They describe
NATO's lofty promises prior to taking over the province; NATO's actual
entrance, alongside the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army; the
transformation of Orahovac into a death camp for Serbs and 'Gypsies'
under NATO management. Can be read at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/misc/savethe.htm
* 'Women of Orahovac Answer the Colonel'. In
this interview, three Serbian women refute a Dutch Colonel's surreal
description of life in the brave new Kosovo town of Orahovac. Can be
read at http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/trouw.htm
* 'Driven from Kosovo: Jewish Leader Blames NATO - Interview
with Cedda Prlincevic'. Mr. Prlincevic was President of the Jewish
community in Kosovo in the summer of 1999 when NATO - and the terrorist
KLA - took over. Mr. Prlincevic, at the time the chief archivist of
Kosovo, describes how he and thousands of others were driven from their
homes by the Albanian terrorists with NATO's approval.
* For those of us in the West, who tend to give our leaders the
benefit of the doubt, it is amazing to consider the career of the Kosovo
Protection Corps. Formed by top leaders of NATO and the UN in the fall
of 1999, from the outset it was comprised of members of a terrorist
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The terrorist nature of the UN-sanctioned Kosovo Protection Corps is
documented in "How Will You Plead
at your Trial, Mr. Annan?' at http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
The use of the terrorist Kosovo Protection Corps to invade Macedonia
is documented in 'SORRY, VIRGINIA, BUT
THEY ARE NATO TROOPS, NOT 'REBELS'"
* (Return to Report,
above)
3) Dr. Chandler argues
that the West has introduced apartheid-like conditions in Kosovo. This is
discussed in the "Statement of President Slobodan
Milosevic on The Illegitimacy of The Hague 'Tribunal,'" which the
kidnapped and imprisoned Yugoslav leader tried to deliver when he appeared
before The Hague 'Tribunal' on 30 August 2001. We have all
been told that Milosevic is a demagogue whose speeches advocate religious
and ethnic hatreds, but how many have read his words? Whenever he tries to
speak at The Hague, they turn off his microphone. He can be read at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/aug30.htm
Speaking of Milosevic, the media campaign portraying him
as a monster began with a speech he gave in Kosovo in 1989. It is
described as inciting race war. Read it. He argues that Serbia's strength
is its ethnic diversity. 'What Milosevic Really Said at Kosovo Field (1989)' can be read at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/milosaid.html
* (Return to Report,
above)
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