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> Le Monde diplomatique > > ----------------------------------------------------- > > December 2001 > > ORTEGA 'A FRIEND TO UNITED STATES ENEMIES' > > Wasted sacrifices > > by our special correspondent RAPHA�LLE BAIL * > > Nicaragua's isolated northern regions have a vital place > in Nicaragua's collective imagination. They were heroic > during the anti-imperialist struggles of the 1920s, they > were called "Nicaragua's forgotten frontiers". During the > 1980s they saw the fiercest fighting between the > Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and the National Resistance > the counter-revolutionaries or Contras. Las monta�as were > the backdrop to a war in which brother fought brother. > The forests of this sparsely vegetated mountain region, > mutilated by random tree felling, the ground blackened by > slash-and-burn agriculture, now provide a home to > ex-combatants from both sides. They have returned to the > land. They cultivate small plots and still waiting for > the homes, schools and health centres they were promised > more than 10 years ago. > > War broke out here shortly after Anastasio Somoza was > ousted and the Sandinista National Liberation Front > (FSLN) took power in 1979. The semi-proletarian rural > population and the landless embraced the revolution. But > the peasants who were both traditional and Catholic had a > hard time when the Sandinistas launched their major > projects. The literacy campaign was tolerated. But > several factors drove them towards the > counter-revolutionary war machine financed by US > president Ronald Reagan: the 1981 agricultural reform, > the agricultural cooperatives and state farms, the price > controls not to mention the "atheist marxism of the FSLN" > (which, at the time, had three priests in its government) > and compulsory military service. > > The war ended in 1990 after lengthy negotiations and the > electoral victory of Violeta Chamorro's National > Opposition Union (UNO). The costs were high: 57,000 > victims, including 29,000 dead (the remainder wounded or > disabled) (1), and 350,000 displaced persons out of a > total population of 3.8m. The strength of the forces on > the ground (Contras: 22,413, army: 86,810 (2)) shows the > scale of the demobilisation. Though generous when it came > to pouring millions of dollars into its war effort, the > United States showed scant interest in rebuilding the > country. A lack of political will and resources meant > that in the post-war period tens of thousands of > combatants were left without a role, without dignity, > despite having been involved in one of the most > significant episodes of Nicaraguan and probably 20th > century revolutionary history. > > In Jinotega, the headquarters of the Nicaraguan > Resistance Party (PRN) reverberate with the complaints of > the former "mercenaries". Well-disciplined, the Contras' > former comrades-in-arms wait their turn to speak. They > still hope that their past commitment will bring them > sustenance in the present. All voice the belief that they > fought against "totalitarianism" and that their country > is not doing right by them. "Once we were demobilised, we > all expected a better life", says a voice from the back > of the room. "We thought Nicaragua would offer us a real > future." > > Demobilisation was overseen by the United Nations > Observer Group in Central America (Onuca) and the > International Commission of Support and Verification of > the Organisation of American States (CIAV-OAS). The aim > was to guarantee peace and the successful reintegration > of the Contras. One idea was to create "poles of > development", reflecting the needs of the former soldiers > 71% of them peasants (3). Land, tools and the resources > necessary to restart production, as well as housing, > schools and health centres, all formed part of the > proposed infrastructure. > > Despite the 500,000 hectares of land distributed by the > National Institute for Agricultural reform (INRA) between > 1990 and 1992, the current situation leaves much to be > desired. Former Contras are still voicing the same > complaint. "Very few of us have been given any land, and > those who have don't possess the title deeds", explains > Oscar Rojas, from Quilali, birthplace of the Contras. "In > those circumstances, we can't go to the banks for loans > to buy tools and start work." > > The level of war pensions is laid down by law, and the > men consider them no better than charitable handouts. The > highest rate of pension (paid to disabled ex-soldiers) is > a mere 400 cordobas (about $28), a fifth of the basic > minimum they need to survive. "Living conditions are > worse than they were 10 years ago. The only positive > thing is that we are no longer at war. But frankly, I > don't know whether poverty is any better than war". That > is the view of Roberto, a peasant who looks back with > nostalgia. Roberto is disabled, one of Reagan's former > "freedom fighters". He is guaranteed a roof over his head > and a pair of new boots every two months. > > Without an ideology > > By 1990 all Nicaragua's former combatants were soldiers > without a war, but the EPS veterans were also bereft of > ideology. The Sandinista dream had mobilised a whole > generation and created powerful, lasting bonds of > solidarity. For these compa�eros, it was a bitter pill. > How can they, like the former Contras, cling to the idea > that the war was worthwhile when a succession of > right-wing governments has been telling them for the past > 10 years that they were the pawns in a senseless, bloody, > outdated venture? "We went to teach the peasants to read > and write, we cut the coffee and fought the CIA, but > after the 1990 elections, the counter-revolution swept > all that under the carpet," says Jorge Montoya. He is > angry. He joined up at 18 and is closely involved in the > Association of Former Soldiers (AMIR). "Our kids today > don't have the first idea how wonderful the literacy > campaign was!" It is disconcerting and painful to feel > that you sacrificed yourself for a regime that is no more > than a distant memory, as you struggle to get by. > > According to former Sandinista chief-of-staff Joaquin > Cuadra, " the process of stream-lining the military was > traumatic, in both human and material terms. We tried to > be as fair as possible to our men; we gave them what we > could." But when, in 1990, in a Nicaragua bled dry and > devastated by war, the army downsized, it did so > radically. Within just a few months, it sent home 66,000 > conscripts and between 1990 and 1993 dismissed 8,000 > officers. The army shrank from 97,000 men in 1989 to > 12,000 in 2000. Despite the $500m invested in the > operation and the financial compensation, land and > housing allocated, reintegration failed, as in the case > of the Contras, because of the failure to issue title > deeds to land and the lack of training and reintegration > programmes. > > The EPS soldiers were considered to be more urban and > educated, and it was claimed they would have no problem > adjusting to peacetime conditions. "Wrong", says AMIR > member Sergio Ortega, "there was no national > reintegration programme for those who left the army. We > tried to launch our own initiatives, but we compa�eros > are living in very difficult conditions. More than 60% of > us are unemployed and many have emigrated to Costa Rica > or the United States." Some are also taxi-drivers in the > streets of Managua, proud to relate their years of > fighting; others are (heavily armed) security guards in > stores. That is the occupation most like the war they > find hard to leave behind. > > Nicaragua's former combatants feel abandoned by the > government, the army and the international community. A > cruel twist of fate means that Contras and Compas (4) are > today demanding the same rights and denouncing the same > injustices. They all belong to a section of the > population that lacks recognition and leads a precarious > existence. In a country that remains politically divided, > their shared plight eases their resentment. > Reconciliation among the people of Nicaragua (an aim > elevated to mythical status by former president Chamorro) > is being achieved as a result of discreet joint > initiatives by former combatants. > > In San Rafael del Norte, the Democratic Union of the EPS > and the Resistance (UDER) is using a number of > reintegration programmes to help 500 ex-combatants get > over their disillusionment together. Former EPS officer > and UDER president Di�genes D�az tells the story of how > the organisation came into being with the humour of a man > who has seen far worse. "One day, we exchanged our AK-47s > for baseball bats and decided to set up our own league. > Baseball is Nicaragua's favourite sport, and that is how > we re-established a sense of brotherhood." The legacy of > a decade of civil war, the men's suspicion of each other > gradually faded. It probably counts for less than their > shared frustration at the failure of the post-war > institutions to make proper provision for them. > > According to sociologist Orlando Nu�ez, reintegration > failed because the challenges Nicaragua faced in the > post-war period had neither international nor > institutional implications. "Nicaragua thought it would > get international support, something like the Marshall > Plan, but the CIAV came to supervise demobilisation > without considering the next steps". In fact, a curious > silence shrouds the situation in Nicaragua. When the US > and USSR confronted each other over the shell of what had > been a genuinely popular revolution, hundred of reporters > were covering the war. Since then, Nicaragua, one of the > world's poorest countries, has been forgotten. > > During the 1990s Nicaragua was rocked by a return to > violence, with many groups rearming. Kidnappings, > roadblocks and the settling of old scores were used to > get the government to fulfil the promises it had made in > 1990. That violence was the work of both recontras > (former Contras who had taken up arms again) and recompas > (former Sandinistas) and even revueltos (groups made up > of both recontras and recompas). > > "Some ex-fighters turned violence into a way of life. > We've seen assaults, bank robberies, kidnappings and what > is popularly described as delinquency. Behind all of them > are unresolved military issues." That is the view of > Orlando Nu�ez. "It's clear that the uneducated and > unskilled ex-fighters are the victims of the economic and > social situation, but they are also making it worse." The > men have often been manipulated, by both the FSLN and the > hard right, in pursuit of economic objectives, but their > action has had the effect of revealing the exasperation > of a whole swathe of the population. The demands of the > Andr�s Castro United Front (FUAC), the only recompas > movement still active in the Mining Triangle region (in > north-eastern Nicaragua), have a clearly defined > ideological content. They seek genuine agricultural > reform, cooperatives (to be given to the former > combatants) and basic services, such as education and > health care, for the whole of the rural population. > > The FUAC regularly condemns the "pact" between the FSLN > and the liberal party in power. Concluded in August 1999 > with President Arnoldo Alem�n, these "governability > accords" have enabled both sides to obtain key posts > within the Supreme Court, the Electoral Council and the > Comptroller General's Office (the only governmental body > to have gained credibility as a result of its fight > against corruption). The effect is de facto > marginalisation of other political players or groups. The > pact may be a strategy designed to regain power or a base > manoeuvre on the part of some Sandinista leaders who want > to preserve the economic interests they acquired after > 1990, making them into a "new privileged group" alongside > the traditional elite. In any event, it has aroused > strong feelings and divided public opinion. > > The FUAC may be the spark that triggers revolution or > simply a movement of people thrown into despair. But it > has the virtue of shaking Nicaragua from its lethargy. It > has highlighted the total failure to reintegrate the > former combatants; the fact that some Sandinista leaders > have strayed from their roots; and the ruin of a country > that managed to escape oppression. > ____________________________________________________ > > * Journalist > > (1) Roberto J. Cajina, Transici�n politica y reconversi�n > militar en Nicaragua, 1990-1995, CRIES, Managua, 1996. > > (2) The statistics for Sandinista fighters are reliable, > but those relating to the Contras differ from one source > to another. For example, though the figure of some 20,000 > men is frequently cited, the International Commission of > Support and Verification of the Organisation of American > States (CIAV-OAS) counted only 13,800 irregular troops at > the time of demobilisation in 1990. > > (3) Zoilam�rica Ortega, Desmovilisados de guerra en la > construcci�n de la paz en Nicaragua, Centro de estudios > internacionales, Managua, 1996. > > (4) Diminutive of compa�eros. > > > > Translated by Julie Stoker > > > ____________________________________________________ > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED � 1997-2001 Le Monde diplomatique ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9WB2D Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
