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>By Amos Harel >HaaretzDaily.com >12-19-1 > >After 15 months of intifada violence, Israeli security officials see >little cause for optimism. Palestinian terror groups have become >more sophisticated and menacing, they say; and the use of terror has >become the vogue across almost the entire organized Palestinian >political map in the territories. > >While increasing numbers of Palestinian militants view terror as >their solution, Israeli security officials are growing increasingly >candid about the absence of a military solution to terror. > >Briefing reporters yesterday in Tel Aviv, a senior security officer >shed the diplomatic wrapping which his colleagues ordinarily use to >describe the situation in the territories. "All of the anti-terror >measures which we've implemented during the past year can be >compared figuratively to trying to empty the sea by using a spoon," >he admitted, in one disarmingly frank moment. > >The official, who has 30 years of experience fighting terror under >his belt, then proceeded to prick and pop the bubbles of hot-air >cliches which politicians adore. > >"When you look at the general picture," he said, these anti-terror >measures are "just drops in the ocean. We're talking about an entire >terror infrastructure located on Palestinian Authority territory, >about a large network for the production and smuggling of weapons, >including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. It is clear to all >of us that there is no military solution to terror. Nowhere in the >world have such situations been solved via military action. You can >reduce terror; but you certainly can't eliminate it." > >After 15 months of violence in the territories, at a moment of >relative quiet, Israeli security officials are stepping out of the >situation to make interim assessments. With the help of the army, >the Shin Bet security service has in recent weeks notched up a >highly impressive series of successes on the anti-terror front. Its >efforts have led to arrests of hundreds of terrorists, and physical >blows to (or the deaths of) major suspects. > >Nonetheless, some 400 "heavy" terrorists (members of Hamas, Islamic >Jihad, and also Fatah and the Popular Front and Democratic Front >groups) are still at large, operating out of the Gaza Strip. These >are men whose sole preoccupation is to harm Israelis. A similar >number of terrorists roam the West Bank. And for each "military" >operative (meaning those who bear arms, assemble bombs, or plan >violent strikes), there are several others who act on a logistical >and political level. > >Both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, conventional definitions >and classifications of militant nationalist fighters have become >blurred or irrelevant. The highest echelons of a number of >organizations, some of which have not been associated with armed >activity in the past, are now galvanizing forces for strikes against >Israel. Top officials from the Palestinian Authority's security >apparatus are involved in terror attacks. > >Non-Islamic organizations do not today shun suicide strike activity. >A Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine operative blew >himself up in a military jeep on the Gaza border. Fatah men help >suicide strikers infiltrate Israel, and help lay bombs against >targets located within the Green Line; sometimes the Fatah men >themselves perpetrate gunfire attacks in the heart of Israeli >cities, knowing that they won't be alive when the smoke clears. > >Israel has no "textbook solution" for this quagmire. Briefings with >reporters expose disagreements in the security system, differences >of opinion which separate the various branches of the system from >one another, and which divide officials within the same particular >branch. > >"Is it that he [Yasser Arafat] doesn't want to do the job, or is it >that he can't do the job?" one security official wondered aloud. >"What stops the PA Chairman from carrying out his pledges to war >against terror?" > >Such questions vex Israeli officials. No consensus has emerged in >response to them. > >"The PA Chairman is a survivor," says one security official. "Most >of his energy is invested in his efforts to keep afloat. He doesn't >have the ability to make tough decisions. As time passes, his hands >are tied by public opinion, as the public's hatred of Israel is >steadily on the rise. I am very pessimistic about Arafat; I don't >think that he will change his stripes. And there are places on the >West Bank where Arafat would not be able to impose his authority, >even were he to decide to [crack down on terror]. > >"Despite the tremendous pressure which has been exerted on Arafat," >the official concludes, "he won't assent to the demands, since they >entail engaging Hamas in a civil war." > >In the same briefing, a second security official, of comparable rank >and experience, propounded a different thesis about Arafat. The PA >chairman's current lack of authority derives from a deliberate >policy decision, the official asserted. Arafat, he continued, has >the wherewithal to transform the situation, should he desire to do >so. > >"True," this official explains, "there are some non-governable >islands in the territories, like areas in the Rafah refugee camp, or >neighborhoods in Khan Yunis. But if Arafat decides to shoot persons >[who oppose a cease-fire policy], he'll gain control. The question >is whether he's willing to pay the price." > >Ultimately, this Israeli security official claims: "There's no real >challenge to Arafat's authority. He is the leader. Despite its >new-found strength, Hamas still does not perceive itself as an >alternative to Arafat's rule. Right now, not all of the power and >authority possessed by the PA leadership is being exploited .... >Arafat has an interest in the continuation of attacks against us. >The attacks keep the Palestinian issue alive in terms of >international public opinion. In their absence, within a week's time >it won't interest anyone." > >Though assessments and predictions touted by Israel's security >officials differ in tone and content, there is one common >denominator uniting all of the discussion. The overall picture is >bleak. > >The pessimists draw sustenance from an abundance of new data. >Israeli security officials say that Hezbollah fingerprints are found >increasingly in the territories. They talk about one of Arafat's >guards, a graduate of Shin Bet and CIA training courses, who rigged >up bombs in an effort to attack the IDF chief of staff's convoy. >They allude to an Islamic Jihad terror cell which planned to blow up >a truck containing a quarter ton of explosives next to a bus packed >with Israeli soldiers. And they say that Hamas has "top caliber >bomb-makers," whose expertise is starting to rival that of >counterparts in modern armies. > >Professional know-how comes to the terrorist groups from outside >sources, from engineering faculties on campuses in Arab capitals, >from Hezbollah, even from Afghanistan. Hamas is spiking bombs by >adding nitroglycerin and other dangerous chemical compounds; and it >is planning synchronized terror attacks (Mahmud Abu-Hanud was >plotting such simultaneous attacks when he was killed). > >For the first time, Islamic Jihad is improving the quality of its >explosives; the recent strike against the bus in Wadi Ara >exemplified this weapons upgrade. All of the militant organizations, >especially Hamas, are attracted by the scenario of assassinating >leading Israeli figures, and perpetrating devastating attacks that >"will change the rules of the game." > >Israeli security officials agree about one other matter: Up to now, >they say, PA counter-terror efforts have been "one big show." >Anti-terror declarations have yet to translate into concrete action >on the ground, they charge. By keeping terror suspects locked up in >secret PA detention cells, the Palestinian leadership is doing no >more than delaying terror strikes. The PA is doing nothing >substantive to eliminate the attacks completely, say the Israeli >officials. > >Similarly, "selective" Israeli strikes, i.e. assassinations, and >also arrests and interrogation of suspects, are far from perfect. >"Each time we've caught a terror suspect," one Israeli security >official admits, "a new one has arisen to take his place." > >"Assassinating one man will not eliminate Hamas," says one Shin Bet >official. "It's an illusion" to imagine that assassinations offer a >comprehensive solution to terror, he adds. > >Speaking yesterday to the "Herzliya Conference" for national >security matters, former Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon, added a moral >element to this critique of the assassinations policy. Instead of >delivering definitive conclusions, Ayalon raised a number of >questions and provided food for thought. Addressing an audience of >security professionals, who typically speak in one, unified voice, >Ayalon articulated a fresh perspective, speaking in a different, >skeptical voice. > >Referring to the assassinations issue, the former Shin Bet head >said: "There's no moral dilemma about killing someone whose death >will save the lives of dozens of civilians. But there should be >strikes against someone who dreams about killing you, or wants to >kill you. Killing should be used as a method only when there's no >way of arresting [a suspect]. "You cannot "kill ideologies by >killing leaders," Ayalon continued. > >"It's easy to prove that under circumstances of negotiations and >political hope and expectation, selective killing of a terrorist >will lead some away from the terror side, and bring them to the >discussion sphere. But when there is no political expectation [of a >peace agreement], assassinations do the opposite. Terrorists turn >into suicide strikers. The time it takes for a man to turn himself >into a suicide striker is shortened - what once took months, takes a >few hours. The situation is in the politicians' hands. They have to >understand the way it is." > > >http://www.haaretzdaily.com/h > > > > >MainPage >http://www.rense.com ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9WB2D Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
