HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK ---------------------------
Subject: Text: NSC Official Outlines U.S. Strategy for the Balkans Text: NSC Official Outlines U.S. Strategy for the Balkans (National Security Council's Greg Schulte at Georgetown Univ.) (1660) The U.S. vision for the future of the Balkans, as articulated by President Bush last year, is one of continuing peace and full integration into European and transatlantic institutions, according to Greg Schulte of the National Security Council (NSC). "A few years ago, this vision would have seemed fanciful. Today, that vision is more in our reach," Schulte said March 20 at Georgetown University in Washington. He outlined the Bush administration's strategic objectives for the region: to integrate the Balkans into a Europe whole, free and at peace; to shift responsibilities to Europe while helping it to succeed; to hasten the day that peace is self-sustaining and NATO can withdraw its military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo; and to ensure that the region does not become a safe haven for global terrorism. Schulte, the NSC senior director for Southeast Europe, said the greatest threat to the stability of the Balkans today "comes not from states but from their inadequacies -- the inability of the new democracies to control borders, to promote rule of law, and to respond to the needs and insecurities of their citizens." The crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was the first test of the administration's Balkans policy, he said, briefly discussing the administration's response. Schulte said the United States will continue to encourage and assist the countries of the Balkans to move closer to the rest of Europe by promoting political, economic and military reform, and will encourage European institutions such as NATO and the European Union to help with these reforms and "to keep their doors open." "As we make progress, we can remove some of the extraordinary arrangements that we erected to buttress the peace," he said. "In Bosnia, the international structures can be increasingly 'Europeanized.' Kosovo need not remain an international protectorate in perpetuity. And NATO need not retain standing military forces in Bosnia and Kosovo for the indefinite future." Following is the text of his presentation: (begin text) U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE BALKANS Presentation by Greg Schulte National Security Council Senior Director for Southeast Europe Georgetown University Washington, D.C. March 20, 2002 When President Bush took office a year ago, European leaders watched the new Administration nervously. Was the United States still prepared to play a role in the Balkans? Would we pull our soldiers out of NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Kosovo? Would we declare the Balkans a problem for Europe and not the United States? The President's Vision and U.S. Strategic Objectives In June, the President met with allied leaders at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and assured them that, with respect to the Balkans, "we had gone in together and we would go out together." One month later, at Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, he offered a new vision for the region. It was not the usual vision of war and suffering, but a vision of the Balkans that is fully part of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. A few years ago, this vision would have seemed fanciful. Today, that vision is more in our reach. - The Balkans is governed by leaders who are democratically elected, who are committed to good relations with their neighbors, and who aspire to join the European Union and NATO. - At the center of the region, Serbia is increasingly a partner and a source of stability, rather than a source of war. While democratic reforms are far from complete, Serbia's former dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, is standing trial in The Hague. - Finally, Europe and its institutions are increasingly capable of leading the diplomacy, reform, and international structures necessary to keep the peace. Keeping in mind the President's vision, as well as the terror of September 11th, the Administration has a clear set of strategic objectives for the region: - Integrate the Balkans into a Europe whole, free and at peace. - Shift responsibilities to Europe while helping it to succeed. - Hasten the day that peace is self-sustaining and NATO can withdraw its military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo. - Ensure that the region does not become a safe haven or way station for global terrorism. But there are obstacles. Ten years ago, we worried about states like Serbia and Croatia and political leaders like Milosevic and Tudjman as the primary cause of conflict and war. Today, the greatest threat to stability comes not from states but from their inadequacies -- the inability of the new democracies to control borders, to promote rule of law, and to respond to the needs and insecurities of their citizens. One year ago, these same inadequacies were exploited by violent extremists who nearly succeeded in causing another Balkan war, this time in Macedonia. The crisis in Macedonia was a first test for the Administration's strategy for the region. The Crisis in Macedonia -- A First Test for the Strategy When this Administration came to office, it had a full national security agenda. The Balkans was one of the last areas that the new Administration wanted to tackle. But fighting in Macedonia meant that it had to be one of the first. Before last spring, observers of the Balkans regularly held up Macedonia as a model of democracy and ethnic harmony in the Balkans. But that changed with the sudden outbreak of violence between ethnic Albanian insurgents and Macedonian police and paramilitary groups. Fighting drove people from their homes, tore at ethnic coexistence, and created a risk of widespread ethnic conflict. We worried about worst case scenarios, in which escalating fighting and refugee flows would destabilize the region and threaten our interest in European security. Former officials and think tank analysts called for the President to send a "special envoy" to take charge of the diplomacy or for the US to lead a NATO force to stop the fighting and separate the belligerents. The Administration was fully conscious of the risks but also of our objectives. Thus we took a different approach. -- First, rather than intervening militarily, we worked to bolster the multi-ethnic government and to cut off political and material support for the insurgents. KFOR sent troops along the border with Macedonia to disrupt the insurgent's supply lines. And we sent a clear message to Albanian leaders in Albania and Kosovo that supporting violence in Macedonia would hurt Albanian interests across the region. -- Second, rather than trying to impose a peace settlement made in America, we worked with the EU and President Trajkovski to facilitate negotiations among the elected political representatives of the two ethnic groups. This resulted in signature last August of a Framework Agreement that addressed legitimate grievances of the Albanian minority while protecting the unity of the Macedonian state. We encouraged the EU to take the lead in implementation and gave our full support. -- Third, rather than sending in a large NATO force to enforce the settlement, we sent in a small NATO task force to oversee the voluntary disarmament of the insurgents. A second, smaller NATO task force is now providing protection to the EU and OSCE observers overseeing the return of multi-ethnic police to former areas of conflict. We welcomed the willingness of European allies like the UK and Germany to provide the leadership and forces for those task forces, while reassuring them that the US would be there in case of emergency. Taking this approach, we succeeded in avoiding civil war and keeping Macedonia whole and at peace. We avoided another extended deployment of NATO military forces to conduct a mission more appropriate for police. And we advanced our regional strategy of integrating the Balkans into Europe with the Europeans increasingly in the lead. Implementing the Strategy At the heart of our regional strategy are twin requirements. -- The first requirement is to encourage and assist the countries of the Balkans to move closer to the rest of Europe. This entails promoting democratic governance, free markets, and rule of law through political, economic, and military reform. -- The second requirement is to encourage European institutions like the EU and NATO to help the countries with reform and integration and to keep their doors open to the countries from the Balkans. Key institutional mechanisms are the EU's Stabilization and Association Process and NATO's Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan. How the United States deals with the countries is crucial. We no longer start meetings with Bosnia's leaders by pressing them to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords; instead, we ask how they are doing in preparing for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. And during recent negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro, we politely told the leaders involved that the EU's Javier Solana was the international negotiator and had our support. Organizing for Success How we organize international engagement is also important. Over the last six years, as we managed one crisis then another, we created a patchwork of ad hoc international structures to protect the peace. In Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative leads implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. In Kosovo, the UN is in charge of setting up provisional self-government. And in Macedonia, both the EU and OSCE play lead roles in implementing the Framework Agreement. As we pursue our regional strategy of Euro-integration, the EU and NATO are increasingly the key mechanisms for international engagement and the prime movers for reform. And as we make progress, we can remove some of the extraordinary arrangements that we erected to buttress the peace. In Bosnia, the international structures can be increasingly "Europeanized." Kosovo need not remain an international protectorate in perpetuity. And NATO need not retain standing military forces in Bosnia and Kosovo for the indefinite future. Conclusion The road ahead will be hard. In traveling through the Balkans, there are many opportunities for detours and ambushes. But we have a vision and a strategy to guide our progress and to increasingly make southeast Europe a peaceful part of Europe. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) NNNN --------------------------- ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9617B Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
