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Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye
No. 10
2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

RUSSIA SURROUNDED WITH US MILITARY BASES

Moscow still doesn't know whether this is good or bad 

By Mikhail KHODARENOK     
     
     In spite of Moscow's really emotional protests, the United 
States and NATO, which have now established a bridge-head in 
Central Asia, continue to expand their military presence on 
former Soviet territory. The geo-political importance of some 
CIS countries is too great during the forthcoming re-alignment 
of the South-West Asian and Mideastern balance of forces. 
That's why the concerned parties are in no mood to heed the 
objections of Russia, which has seriously depleted its 
military-economic potential over the last decade.
     
           Central Asia -- The Intermediate Result  
   
  The Central Asian heart-land has never seen such a multi- 
national US-European troop contingent ever since the epic 
expeditions of Alexander the Great. A tactical group of the 
third British mechanized division (400 soldiers, all told) is 
now stationed in Kabul. A tactical group of a German airborne 
brigade numbering 200 soldiers is also located there. Add to 
this units of an Italian infantry regiment (100 soldiers), a 
300-strong French armored-cavalry regiment, a Spanish military 
unit numbering 50 soldiers, a joint 150-strong German-Dutch 
unit, as well as up to 300 US Marines. Apart from that, US and 
NATO military units are stationed in Kandahar. The US Army's 
101-st air-assault division has contributed 1,000 soldiers. A 
1,500-strong expeditionary USMC (United States Marine Corps) 
battalion is also staying there. Moreover, 100 British and 300 
Canadian soldiers are stationed in Kandahar. 100 soldiers 
serving with US special forces have settled down in Herat; yet 
another 200-strong American SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) 
unit is based in Shindand. Meanwhile 400 soldiers from the US 
Army's 10-th light-infantry division, as well as a 600-strong 
battalion of British Marines, are stationed in Baghram. All in 
all, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in 
Afghanistan  comprises the following national troop contingents 
-- Great  Britain, 2,000 soldiers; France, 500 soldiers; 
Germany, 900 soldiers; Norway, 100 soldiers; Italy, 100 
soldiers; Turkey, 200 soldiers; Denmark, 200 soldiers; Jordan, 
500 soldiers. As of today, about 12,000 soldiers, including 
8,000 Americans and about 1,000 Canadians, are involved in the 
Afghan counter-terrorist operation.
     US and NATO military installations on the territory of 
former Soviet Central Asian republics are instrumental in 
providing logistics support for multi-national forces and their 
operations. As is known, the United States and NATO have 
reliably asserted themselves at Uzbek, Kirghiz and Tajik bases, 
i.e. Manas (Bishkek), Karshi, Kulyab, Kokaidy and Termez. All 
these airfields were to have been used for re-supply missions, 
for transporting humanitarian relief aid and for deploying 
search- and-rescue units. However, the first few French 
Mirage-2000 fighters have landed in Manas not so long ago. 
Until then, reconnaissance aircraft, including Predator drones, 
used to operate rather actively from all bases in the interests 
of the US-NATO air-force formation being used against Al-Qaeda 
units.
Moreover, ranger units, AWACS-type aircraft, psychological- 
warfare and reconnaissance planes were deployed there.
     The appearance of Mirage-2000 fighters is seen as yet 
another US-NATO military build-up phase in this region. One has 
every reason to believe that this move is not some isolated 
occurrence, and that it highlights a certain trend instead. Few 
obstacles impede now the conversion of former Soviet military 
bases into full-fledged Western outposts. Among other things, 
the stockpiling of aircraft fuel and weapons is seen as the 
most labor-consuming process, which requires more time to 
complete than all other processes. Nonetheless, all local 
airfields could be used for sustaining the most determined 
attacks, once this process is complete.
     It should be emphasized that Central Asian countries 
themselves consider US military presence quite profitable. The 
configuration of their borders, which had been arbitrarily 
drawn by the Bolsheviks, is always fraught with the danger of 
bloody inter-ethnic wars, which would inevitably entail the 
uncontrollable massacre of civilians, causing a multitude of 
people to flee their native parts. The latter would lead to 
absolutely unpredictable consequences. Besides, not a single 
post-Soviet republic has sufficiently powerful armed forces 
capable of rectifying the hypothetically unfavorable regional 
situation.
     Even Uzbekistan, which has weighty reasons to aspire for 
regional leadership, has a rudimentary army, which, at best, 
can accomplish only a limited range of objectives. 
Consequently, Central Asia simply can't do today without a 
powerful "sergeant of the relief," or "neighborhood cop." 
Therefore one can safely say that US-NATO military presence is 
perceived as a regional blessing and a guarantee of sorts 
against terrible blood-baths in the struggle to control land, 
water and other natural resources.
By the way, such terrifying clashes had already taken place in 
the early 1990s. 
     
               The Second Asian Wave
     
     Quite possibly, after gaining a foot-hold in Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kirghizia, the United States will be sorely 
tempted to spread its military presence over Kazakhstan, which 
looms over the whole of Central Asia like some kind of a 
tremendous horse-shoe. The US side will, most likely, establish 
control over former Soviet air-force bases in Taldy-Kurgan, 
Zhangiz-Tobe, Semipalatinsk, Zhana-Semei and the Alma-Ata 
airfield junction (i.e. the south-eastern axis), for openers. 
The Americans will most likely be acting in line with 
time-tested methods; if necessary, US specialists will upgrade 
the local tarmac, subsequently improving radio-technical 
landing aids and beacons in line with NATO standards. Kazakh 
airfields will then be used by NATO cargo aircraft, with 
military planes arriving later on.
     A paradoxical and hitherto unthinkable situation can shape 
up, when Russian military installations in Kazakhstan, i.e. an 
early-warning radio-technical facility on cape Gulshad (Lake 
Balkhash), the Saryshagan ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) testing 
range, as well as state-run testing range No. 5 in Baikonur, 
find themselves surrounded with NATO military bases. Moreover, 
it can't be excluded that Russia might have to coordinate all 
military shipments to these facilities with both local 
authorities, as well as US and NATO representatives. Some 
people may think this forecast is too fantastic and pessimistic.
However, it should be reminded that some Kremlin high-placed 
officials had also perceived any possible US military presence 
in Central Asia as an non-viable hypothesis not so long ago.    
 
            A Scenario for Tbilisi
     
    Right now, a relatively small US troop contingent is 
stationed in Georgia. Technically speaking, US servicemen would 
be expected to render military-technical assistance in 
organizing several Georgian SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) 
battalions.
Tbilisi subsequently intends to use such units for fighting 
terrorist groups and in order to enhance Georgia's territorial 
integrity. How feasible is this task? Our article doesn't aim 
to discuss this issue; however, several world-class units 
boasting state-of-the-art weaponry might eventually constitute 
the new Georgian army's nucleus.
     One should also keep in mind that Georgian society aims to 
restore the country's territorial integrity, regarding this as 
a top-priority national goal. As is known, the end justifies 
the means. Georgia could even forsake part of its sovereignty 
in favour of a powerful ally that would help it suppress the 
separatist movement. Given these realities, one should say that 
the Georgian leadership is acting in a well thought-out manner, 
expressing priority national interests; such actions can also 
be long-term. By all looks, official Tbilisi intends to 
radically solve the problem of its rebellious territories, 
before their self-determination process goes too far, and 
before it becomes irreversible. 
     It's therefore hardly surprising that the Georgian 
infrastructure will be used by the United States and NATO, 
which continue their crusade against international terrorism at 
this stage. Geo-politically Georgia plays the part of a bridge 
for the transit of Central Asian crude oil and other mineral 
resources.
Consequently, the leadership of this young independent republic 
can obtain numerous advantages as a result of its foreign- 
political maneuvers. Moreover, one should not under-estimate 
Georgia's territory as a convenient bridge-head for waging a 
war against Iran and Iraq. Incidentally, the United States has 
already announced its decision to fight such a war rather 
loudly.
Therefore possible US control over this Trans-Caucasian 
republic would apparently benefit Tbilisi and Washington alike.
     The Georgian leadership's aspirations therefore tally with 
the US diversification theory, which implies that Kazakh and 
Central Asian natural resources should be delivered along 
different routes. Georgia is therefore becoming a natural US 
ally. Consequently, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that 
US Air Force and NATO bases will be deployed in Georgian 
territory soon after the arrival of first several hundred US 
servicemen.
Such bases might well appear at former Soviet airfields, which 
had belonged to the former Soviet 34-th air army and the USSR's 
air-defense force -- Marneuli, Vaziani, Senaki (Mikha 
Tskhakaya) and Gudauta. After that, Turkish military units 
might well be deployed there; by the way, Ankara has already 
hinted that this is theoretically possible. There is no 
doubting the fact that the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
would be predetermined, after this happens. In that case, 
Moscow, which has repeatedly advocated Georgian territorial 
integrity, and which boasts a limited military potential, would 
merely be able to observe the outcome of a brief conflict.
     
            Baku and Counter-Terrorist Plans
     
     Azerbaijan, which borders on Iran, is regarded as a 
convenient air-force base for tactical US and NATO warplanes, 
that is, if Washington and Brussels decide to go ahead with a 
possible counter-terrorist operation, attacking Iran in the 
process. As of today, Washington considers Iran to be the 
bulwark of international terrorism. In this case former Soviet 
first-category air-force bases in Kyurdamir and Nasosnaya 
(Pumping Station) will prove to be a highly valuable asset for 
the United States. Surely enough, their current state leaves a 
lot to be desired. However, the US side, which boasts 
tremendous resources, can upgrade these two bases in no time at 
all. If necessary, the United States and NATO could also use 
the international airport in Baku. However, all these airfields 
can accommodate no more than 90-100 tactical aircraft, 
reconnaissance planes and flying tankers. Nonetheless, even 
this number is enough to conduct limited air strikes and to 
seriously threaten theoretical enemies from the northern axis.
     The distance between Azeri bases and vital Iranian 
facilities is negligible; moreover, one should keep in mind 
that warplane pilots have every chance of ejecting to safety 
over the Caspian Sea, if their aircraft are damaged during 
combat missions. Search-and-rescue teams would fish them out 
from international waters with almost 100-percent chances of 
success just because the Caspian Sea lacks any hostile and 
fanatical population. The US side perceives this as a highly 
important factor.
     As a reward for possible collaboration Azerbaijan may be 
offered substantial US and NATO support in settling the Nagorny 
Karabakh conflict. It's an established fact that the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is unable 
to deblock this conflict. Official Baku links any possible 
withdrawal from the Karabakh impasse with Washington and 
Brussels. This implies coinciding interests, and only such 
consensus provides real-life allies. Any project aiming to 
transport Caspian, Central Asian and Kazakh hydro-carbon 
resources elsewhere would seem a bit far-fetched, unless 
Azerbaijan takes part in such projects.
     
             The Results
     
     On the one hand, Russia stands to gain a lot from that US 
blitzkrieg on Afghan territory. The Talib "thorn," which could 
have entailed "sepsis" and even "death" for the entire Central 
Asia, as well as utterly unpredictable consequences for the 
Russian Federation's southern flank, has now been almost pulled 
out. Analysts are inclined to think that extremist groups are 
highly unlikely to re-assert themselves in Afghanistan and 
newly independent Central Asian countries in the foreseeable 
future. On the other hand, though, there can be no power vacuum 
in regional politics. Moscow perceives Russia's withdrawal from 
the geo- political scene in the obtaining situation as a 
painful inevitability. Meanwhile the appearance of a new 
Central Asian leader is perceived as an objective necessity 
because regional countries might otherwise plunge into bloody 
small wars.
     It's becoming absolutely clear nowadays that many of the 
Russian leadership's extremely costly and painstaking projects 
had been false from the very outset, thereby leading us into a 
blind alley. Frankly speaking, the most far-sighted Russian 
analysts had warned about this back in the early 1990s. Quite 
possibly, the list of such projects includes the collective CIS 
peace-keeping forces, which have virtually become redundant 
today, as well as the protection of the CIS external perimeter. Russian
society apparently doesn't know that the latter idea 
has also lost its topicality; nonetheless, it had been the 
subject of heated debates, with the Russian treasury spending a 
lot of money on this project. The epoch of open borders within 
the CIS is also nearing its completion, upon benefiting most of 
our neighbors, rather than Russia itself. In fact, Russia is 
engulfed by millions upon millions of illegal migrants.
     In the obtaining situation, the United States has obtained 
more benefits than all other countries, virtually gaining 
access to the immense regional natural resources. And, most 
importantly, for today Moscow stands to gain from NATO's 
Central Asian military presence after the successful operation 
against the Taliban. However, such military presence would 
provide some dubious advantages in the foreseeable future. 
Washington acquires powerful leverage for influencing 
subsequent Russian political aspirations in line with any 
possible scenario, thus reducing Moscow's maneuvering room on 
the global political scene still further. Quite possibly, this 
constitutes the main result of America's penetration into this 
hitherto walled-in strategic region. 
     The second stage of expanded NATO military presence on 
former Soviet territory couldn't but evoke serious irritation 
on the Kremlin's part from the very outset. Washington then 
made some soothing statements. However, Moscow lacks any 
real-life military-economic leverage for influencing the 
situation.
Consequently, one has every reason to believe that the 
Kremlin's persisting imperial moods won't be enhanced. 
Naturally enough, Russia opposes the second stage of expanded 
US and NATO military presence in post-Soviet republics; the 
same can be said about a hypothetical third stage. Nonetheless, 
Moscow is so far unable to clearly formulate the relevant 
political goal of countering expanded US and NATO influence on 
CIS countries. The Kremlin merely says that it opposes such a 
policy. Any arguments in favour of this position don't sound 
convincing enough; meanwhile it's an open secret that the 
subordination of strategic goals and tasks to political goals 
constitutes a highly important military- strategy principle. It 
would be well-nigh impossible to implement specific 
Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian policies in line with 
long-term national interests, unless such political goals are 
explained to all strata of Russian society in an easy-to- 
understand language.

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