HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK --------------------------- STRATFOR
Al Qaeda, Geopolitics and the Crisis of U.S.-European
Relations
29 April 2002 Summary The U.S. response to Sept. 11 has generated a deep rift with Europe. As the world's only remaining superpower, the United States already presides over an asymmetrical international system, and this has generated substantial unease in Europe and elsewhere. Washington's ruthless focus on al Qaeda has intensified this unrest. European leaders cannot understand the focus of U.S. foreign policy, and they cannot tolerate the extent of U.S. power. The United States cannot understand Europe's seeming unwillingness to bear the burdens of the struggle and criticism of its own efforts to defend itself. With a U.S.-EU summit looming on May 2, the growing tensions are likely to be aired but not defused. Analysis U.S. President George W. Bush and the president of the European Union, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, will meet May 2 in Washington. Aznar will be accompanied by EU Commission President Romano Prodi and Javier Solana, who is in effect the EU's foreign minister. Any number of technical issues will be on the table, but the basic topic of discussion will be the deepening division between the United States' perception of the world and that of Europe. Different perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis already have been noted as one of the symptoms of the crisis in relations. The real issue is the fundamental divergence in U.S. and European interests since Sept. 11. The subtext of U.S.-European relations has remained constant since the United States emerged as a global power at the beginning of the 20th Ccentury. European states have viewed the United States as an upstart, both immature and provincial, whose power outweighs its judgment. The United States, in turn, has viewed the European countries as clever rather than wise -- constantly becoming entangled in disasters or potential disasters and then requiring rescue. Such discussions were common at this year's annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in New York, particularly among Europeans commenting on U.S. policies in response to the al Qaeda attacks. As with all caricatures, these exaggerations are mixed with some truth. Europe and the United States have always deeply needed, but also deeply misunderstood, each other. This has been less of a problem for foreign policy and global business elites, who engage in daily discourse and often may have more in common with each other than with their own countrymen. This basic misunderstanding, however, has arisen from issues that have riveted public attention and involved matters of fundamental national interest. Issues that are significant enough both to involve basic national interests and to energize broad public participation also have typically generated distrust and unease. Culture, of course, plays a role in this, but it would be a mistake to dismiss the tension in this way. Underlying and driving the cultural schism is a deep and ongoing divergence of geopolitical interests: Europe and the United States have very different interests, and al Qaeda has made those differences ever clearer and more understandable. A fundamental geopolitical setting predates and undergirds the al Qaeda issue. Since the fall of Soviet Union, the United States has been and remains the world's sole superpower. The term "superpower" has certain specific meanings. First, the United States is the only power able to project military force globally and in several directions at once. Second, it matches its global military reach with equally robust and global economic reach. Third, these two realities give the United States global political clout: It has the ability to intrude on local and regional affairs the world over. At times, its very existence causes the intrusion, unintentional though it may be. Finally, the United States is a united political entity, with a coherent administrative structure and a fairly broad political consensus on its core policies. No other nation in the world has this degree of power. Several great powers have regional influence or global reach that includes one of the strands of power -- military, political or economic -- but no other at the moment has the comprehensive power architecture of the United States. As a result, the international system is inherently asymmetrical and unbalanced. The United States' overwhelming strength creates international tension by its very existence; it also gives Washington a substantial margin of error. The United States can make mistakes and recover from them, but this makes it dangerous to less powerful countries that find recovery more difficult. More important, in pursuing policies that are in its interest, the United States can harm the interests of other countries that are incapable of resistance. Therefore, the overriding concern of the rest of the world is dealing with this superpower. Each country has two natural tendencies: first, to control U.S. behavior by forming coalitions with other nations in efforts to create a successful counterweight; but at the same time, to benefit from having a close relationship with the United States. This dualist response has undermined the natural balancing process of the international system. The pressure of a single, great power normally generates a coalition of smaller powers to counterbalance it. In this case, however, the asymmetry is so substantial that the normal process of coalition-formation is not occurring -- at least not yet. It is extraordinarily difficult to construct a coalition powerful enough to control U.S. behavior -- the coalition would have to be so large that it probably would not hold together. Moreover, many nations use the threat of coalition formation to extract benefits from Washington. Thus, rather than correcting the asymmetry, the international system is leaving it in place. This asymmetry in the international system is now compounded by an asymmetry in U.S. foreign policy, which was radically redefined after Sept. 11. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington's prime mission has been managing the international system to minimize conflict. That changed on Sept. 11, when the primary goal became defense against al Qaeda. The protection of the homeland came to dwarf all other interests. Compounding this over the succeeding months was the realization that it was not inconceivable that al Qaeda had obtained, or was in the process of obtaining, weapons of mass destruction. Washington's primordial fear is that al Qaeda could accumulate sufficient nuclear weapons to create a nuclear Sept. 11. While the probability of this happening is low, it has to be measured against the catastrophic nature of such an event -- with casualties in the hundreds of thousands or even greater -- suddenly and unexpectedly overwhelming the United States. Therefore, U.S. foreign policy has shifted to a two-track approach. First and above all else is the commitment to protect the United States from attack. All other foreign policy considerations come second. Thus, the leading global power has as its core interest a global war against a paramilitary group whose distribution is both global and sparse. Al Qaeda's numbers are few, and they must be hunted everywhere. The United States therefore must intrude deeply into each country in which al Qaeda militants might reside. Secondary considerations are considered trivial. The U.S. military strategy, by comparison, has three facets: 1. Strike into every country where al Qaeda might be found. Do this with the cooperation of the host government but, if necessary, against the wishes of a reluctant or even hostile government. The goal of this operation is not only to destroy al Qaeda but also, in the shorter term, to so disrupt al Qaeda's network that weapons of mass destruction could not safely and with high confidence be transported to the United States. 2. Identify all WMD facilities -- particularly nuclear -- that might be accessible to al Qaeda either because of a government's policy or because the government is unable to ensure effective controls. Force governments to take effective and transparent responsibility for those sites or, failing this, attack and destroy the sites. If needed, use nuclear weapons to attack the sites. 3. Deal such a stunning blow to al Qaeda that countries will be unwilling to risk allowing successor organizations to form. Fear of al Qaeda has generated a strategy that requires the United States to launch stunning, overwhelming and near-simultaneous attacks wherever the group is located, as well as on weapons sites wherever Washington feels threatened. In effect, the United States intends to drive deep into the social fabric of countries from whence al Qaeda deployed. It will do this with the cooperation of governments, as is happening in Pakistan, or without it. Also, it is prepared to destroy WMD sites and topple governments, like Iraq's, that stand in the way of a permanent solution. It was this fear and this strategy that led Bush to make his famous "axis of evil" speech and statements about the first use of nuclear weapons. It was also this fear and strategy that led to the backlash from Europe. From the European viewpoint, the U.S. response to al Qaeda is disproportionate to the threat. The Sept. 11 attacks, while terrible and tragic, cannot be allowed to completely disrupt the functioning of an orderly international system. While European leaders understand that the possibility of al Qaeda's use of nuclear weapons is not trivial, they also feel a potential threat cannot allow the United States to initiate even limited nuclear warfare against suspect nations. Iran is a case in point. From Washington's view, Iran presents two serious problems: Al Qaeda is using it for transit, and the country may be developing or already have developed WMD. Given the struggle between President Mohammad Khatami and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it is not clear whether Khatami controls these sites. Therefore, they may have to be destroyed at the same time as U.S. covert and overt operations against al Qaeda. To Europeans, this is an appalling overreaction. They see the problem of al Qaeda in particular, and of terrorism in general, as requiring a long-term solution, a process that could take years if it succeeds at all. Part of that process is the liberalization of Iran: As Iran evolves, its incentive to work with al Qaeda will decline; as the incentive declines, terrorism will decline. More commercial, cultural and political ties with the Khatami government are the means for this evolution. Europe claims that labeling Iran as an evil state accomplishes nothing and is counterproductive. Washington's counterclaim is that European governments do not want to see their lucrative economic ties with Iran jeopardized. European leaders are willing to risk American lives for European profits. Moreover, while there might be truth to the claim that increased ties with Iran will help liberalize that country, such a metamorphosis will only come about in the long run. The United States cannot wait for this process to take place. The threat it faces is timed in a matter of days, weeks or months, not years. Therefore, the European solution would place the United States at risk while protecting European interests. Long-term solutions are not viable. The European states view the United States in this context as naive and simplistic; Washington views Europe as duplicitous. In a sense, both are right. U.S. leaders have boiled the problem down to its essence, and that often appears simplistic. European leaders are pursuing European interests while maintaining good relations with the United States, and that appears duplicitous. Yet neither view is valid. The United States is far from being the naive, simplistic lout of European caricature, and Europe is far from the avaricious and sanctimonious meddler of U.S. portrayal. Both the United States and Europe are geopolitical entities pursuing geopolitical interests: Washington places its physical security above all other considerations, while Europe is prepared to take greater risks with it. That makes perfect sense. The issue returns to overwhelming U.S. power. Whatever European leaders may think, they cannot help but cooperate with Washington. They need the United States, and the threat of al Qaeda could also spread to them. The dual asymmetries of the international system -- U.S. power and the American elevation of the war with al Qaeda over all other considerations -- remain the dominant features of the international system. Tensions between the United States and Europe are quite real, but so long as Europe remains highly fragmented and militarily weak, it cannot effectively counterbalance the United States, and therefore the Europeans will cooperate -- while grumbling. Indeed, this kind of complaining is a mark of the system's asymmetry, but it also can mark a road to increasing European integration and power. Colombian Rebels Fighting for Control in Venezuela The fighting between the FARC and ELN factions reportedly broke a written agreement between both guerrilla groups to conduct joint kidnapping operations inside Venezuelan territory and share ransoms of between $2 million and $4 million per victim. The 10th Front is currently suspected of holding at least 16 kidnapped Venezuelan ranchers, El Tiempo reported. The 10th Front is also seeking to consolidate its control of a narcotics and arms-smuggling corridor in a 250-square-mile area where the Venezuelan states of Apure, Tachira and Zulia border the Arauca River, which divides both countries. The group's narcotics shipments into Venezuelan territory are reportedly netting the FARC at least $2 million a month. While the ELN leadership is currently in Havana discussing a peace deal with Bogota, the recent fighting could benefit the Colombian army if it triggers confrontations between FARC and ELN forces in other areas of Colombia. Fighting between the FARC and ELN likely will force both organizations to deploy assets against each other and away from attacks against economic infrastructure and military forces. However, it's also likely to intensify armed conflicts and civilian casualties on both sides of the border between Colombia and Venezuela. In fact, the FARC-ELN border war has already caught the attention of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary, which reportedly is deploying forces from Casanare toward the area where the fighting between the 10th Front and Domingo Lain column has been heaviest. The AUC likely will seek to decimate both guerrilla groups in order to disrupt the arms supply corridor from Venezuela and seize control of the narcotics trade in the Apure-Tachira-Zulia region, where Colombian military intelligence sources claim at least 116 clandestine air strips have been identified. Given the nearly total absence of a Venezuelan military presence in the area where the 10th Front and Domingo Lain column are operating, the AUC also may offer its services in training Venezuelan paramilitaries financed by cattle ranchers who are fed up with their government's inability to secure the border with Colombia. Sources with the cattle ranching federations of Apure, Tachira and Zulia states told STRATFOR April 29 that some of their members have already started to finance training and equipment for private security forces to protect their property and families. Indonesia Torn Between Stability, U.S. Appeasement The international war on terrorism has placed Indonesia -- a secondary target of the United States in its hunt for elements linked to Osama bin Laden -- in a precarious situation. Jakarta's lack of central control and various ties to militants prevent the government and military from cracking down on extremist threats and allaying the concerns of its neighbors and the United States. Appeasing both the external and internal factions is proving a difficult act for Indonesia, which is simply trying to keep all the balls in the air as long as possible until the situation inevitably explodes. Analysis The high level of Islamic militancy in Indonesia, and the government's refusal to do anything about it, is bringing criticism from Jakarta's neighbors and putting the country at the top of the list of U.S. targets. It now faces a difficult decision. Cooperating with the United States could prove extremely detrimental to influential powers in the country and anger a significant portion of its large Muslim population, throwing domestic security into a tailspin. Jakarta is playing a tricky game, keeping its populous content and secure while staving off possible U.S. intervention. The government and military are trying to sustain this house of cards as long possible, because, should that house collapse, the country's stability could disintegrate. Rebel groups within Indonesia have ties to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network and other militant organizations including Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah. The U.S. government has expressed no qualms about taking action against nations that harbor terrorists. Eliminating such elements in the archipelago, however, would prove a long, arduous and possibly impossible task for the United States. With an eye toward ensuring its capabilities in the region, should the need for action in Indonesia arise, Washington is expanding its military presence in Singapore, Australia and the Philippines, where U.S. military engineers may be setting up a forward operations base on the southern island of Basilan. Washington has strategically placed forces should push come to shove. Jakarta could use military cooperation with Washington to prevent U.S. aggression in its territory. But in a country of 200 million Muslims, this might provoke a violent internal backlash severe enough to destabilize the government. So Indonesia faces a dilemma, and must weigh the cost of appeasing Washington's desire to destroy al Qaeda against maintaining internal security. The lack of central control in Indonesia is a main factor in the light treading of the government and military. No single faction has control, merely influence. The military's ability to keep the country stable gives it much power among the country's lawmakers. The government is also fragmented by numerous, bickering groups. Consequently, a loose coalition of conflicting interests, instead of a unified force willing to rid the nation of threatening factors, leads Indonesia. The lack of central control also allows al Qaeda elements to operate with impunity and use Indonesia as a base of operations. Sympathizers within the government, elite and military permit these groups to exist as long as they do not threaten internal security. Members of the military are even allegedly paying Islamic rebels -- such as from the Laskar Jihad -- to quash opposition groups, including ethnic separatists. Even those in the government who favor a tighter crackdown on extremists worry about the effect on the country. Though most of the population is not extremist, many see the U.S. war against terrorism as a war against Islam. The political opposition could ride the wave of protest over cooperation with Washington in an attempt to overthrow the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri. A big benefit to collaborating with the U.S. military could be more money and weapons for the Indonesian military, which it greatly needs to quell several separatist movements. The U.S. government is already holding a carrot in front of the military by going ahead with plans to give Indonesia $8 million for training and equipping domestic peacekeepers confronting ethnic, religious and separatist violence, as well as an additional $8 million to help train Indonesian counter-terrorism units. The United States has also discussed renewing military ties with the Indonesian military that were cut following the independence referendum violence in East Timor in 1999. Holding joint military exercises of some caliber with the United States could also prevent future aggression from Washington. Though the military does not want Washington dictating its movements or taking charge of stability in the archipelago, it could maintain public credibility and some control should the United States decide to act. But Indonesia cannot maintain its current status quo of refusing to go after terrorist elements within its borders. While an operation in Indonesia would prove extremely difficult, should the United States suffer another terrorist attack of considerable proportions, it likely will not hesitate to use force in the Southeast Asian country if necessary. Indonesia has not decided which route it will take and is currently trying to keep all of its options open. Whether or not it decides to take aggressive action against al Qaeda-linked groups in the territory, Jakarta in any case faces a likely threat to its security and already uncertain control over the rest of the country. This has not prevented the government from doing damage control ahead of time. The minister of justice and human rights, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, suggested a presidential pardon for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the Jakarta Post reported April 26. Singapore accuses Ba'asyir of having links with al Qaeda and being a leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. While Singapore and Malaysia have both cracked down on extremist elements within their borders, Indonesia has repeatedly refused to detain alleged terrorists due to lack of evidence. Pardoning Ba'asyir will further anger Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. Jakarta could be refusing to jail Ba'asyir to show the populace that it is not anti-Muslim, in the event it needs to cooperate with the U.S. military. But pleasing both sides will prove very difficult for Indonesia, which is delaying the choice between its own people and a war-driven United States. Integration and Disintegration in Yugoslavia Competing forces are driving events in Yugoslavia: Internally, the conflicts between integration and disintegration along ethnic and historical lines hold sway; externally, the unclear commitment to the Balkans on the part of the United States and Europe exacerbates internal divisions. Although U.S. and European leaders share a desire to permanently disengage from the region militarily, Brussels will have no choice but to take over the Balkan peacekeeping mission for its own practical security and as a proving ground for EU military ambitions. Vacillation on Balkan policy -- and new battles to redraw the map -- will increase the likelihood of new flare-ups and pose a tremendous test for European security ambitions. Analysis The North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced plans in early April to significantly reduce the number of peacekeeping troops in the Balkans beginning this summer. Various NATO sources estimate the 40,000 troops in Kosovo will be reduced by between 5,000 and 10,000, according to Agence France-Presse, and the 18,000-troop deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be shaved by one-third. With more pressing concerns in other parts of the world, the United States - and NATO by extension -- is seeking to disengage permanently from the Balkans. Washington's calculation is that the risk of new flare-ups has been reduced sufficiently to justify a major troop downsizing, especially in the face of the al Qaeda threat, and also that European countries must begin to take over the external policing that is still necessary. That puts the onus on Europe to take full responsibility for its fragile southern flank. After a decade of war followed by a tenuous, NATO-enforced peace, the nations that once made up Yugoslavia remain in various states of instability and lawlessness. Driving that instability are the forces of integration and disintegration -- the breaking-up and rebuilding of nations along ethnic and historical lines -- that constantly compete in the region. Internal instability wrought by these competing forces is made worse by external forces. Washington and Brussels have failed to establish a clear roadmap for the Balkans, probably because they themselves lack a coherent vision for the region's future. Instead, NATO has seized on short-term solutions to halt Yugoslavia's disintegration into the independent republics of Serbia and Montenegro, while promoting that same independence in Kosovo. That lack of coherence on the part of the EU and United States -- as well as their struggle over engagement versus disengagement -- fuels uncertainty in the minds of Balkan leaders as to how to respond to the West. Moreover, this Western behavior encourages more radical policies that will further destabilize the region and make it difficult for the United States or EU to permanently withdraw their forces. The potential for ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia remains the core concern, with implications extending to Macedonia and Bosnia. None of these issues will be grave enough to keep the United States from pulling out its troops, leaving Europe in charge of keeping a lid on the Balkans. These issues will be enough to test the commitment and ability of European leaders to step out of the shadow of the United States and NATO and create a true European Security and Defense Policy. If Europe falters and conflict erupts again, the United States reluctantly will retake the lead. That would spell the end of any meaningful security and defense coordination through the EU and place an even greater global burden on the U.S. military. The Cauldron Simmers Although the shooting has largely stopped in the Balkans, the painful process of ethnic disintegration continues. Kosovo has graduated to quasi-independent status, with an ethnic Albanian government that is led by the former insurgents of the Kosovo Liberation Army and protected by a United Nations administration. That government, elected in March and led by President Ibrahim Rugova, immediately broached the subject of full independence from Yugoslavia. And even though the U.N.'s Kosovo administrator, Michael Steiner, has sought to quell such talk, he also made it clear early on that the U.N. will not tolerate interference from Belgrade in Kosovo's affairs. The impact on Serbia from the loss of Kosovo should not be underestimated, nor should Belgrade's long-term acquiescence to the Kosovars' drive for independence be assumed. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic has cast himself as the pro-Western leader who eventually will bring Serbia into the European fold. He gained praise abroad and repute at home for delivering former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to the U.N. war crimes tribunal at The Hague and by promising further extraditions in return for much-needed aid. This has not played well at home in Serbia, where Djindjic is hugely unpopular and increasingly vulnerable to a more nationalist breed of politician. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica has led the nationalist charge, using Western demands for extradition in his fierce battle to wrest control of Serbia from Djindjic. Kostunica regularly denounces The Hague tribunal -- viewed as a humiliation by many in Serbia -- as anti-Serb. He is part of a chorus led by Milosevic, who has used his trial in The Hague as a bully pulpit to hammer NATO and stir up Serbian nationalist sentiment. The trial is the most closely watched event in Serbia right now. The Yugoslav parliament's passage April 11 of a measure allowing the extradition of suspected war criminals to The Hague -- after giving them three days notice -- was a clever move by Kostunica to play both sides of the extradition issue. It allowed him to sidestep Western accusations that he personally impeded extraditions while putting the responsibility for capturing and delivering suspects directly on the shoulders of the Serbian government and Djindjic. With the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on its last legs -- Montenegro's continued push for independence is yet another force of disintegration -- Kostunica is maneuvering to take over the real position of power as head of the Serbian government. A key underlying issue in the battle for control of Serbia is one of national pride. His handling of the extradition issue gives him a decided advantage with the majority of the public as well as with key military figures. Kostunica has the momentum as his battle with Djindjic continues. The EU-led deal to change the FRY into a looser federation called Serbia and Montenegro, though not yet fully ratified, will hasten the election showdown. The emergence of a more nationalistic government in Belgrade would spell trouble for the region, especially with the planned repatriation of ethnic Serbs to northern Kosovo later this year. Serbian officials complain that Kosovo has done little to prepare for the repatriation. Belgrade could easily use the issue to cast itself as the defender of the rights of ethnic Serbs in the region. The return of Serbs to Mitrovica and other sensitive areas could be a flashpoint for ethnic violence. Crime also drives disintegration. Geography, a lack of economic opportunity and the region's general lawlessness have made it a crossroads for the smuggling of drugs, arms and people as well as a hotbed of organized crime. A great number of prostitutes and illegal aliens flooding eastward into Europe come through the Balkans, and Albanian gangs are a primary distributor of drugs in Europe. Organized crime corrupts large portions of the government and security forces in parts of Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, sapping central authority and leading to turf battles. These varied forces of disintegration conflict with counter-forces of integration -- those that seek to consolidate power along the lines of ethnicity and history. Hopes for a greater Serbia or greater Albania are alive in many parts of the Balkans, as are desires to regain lost territory. This could drive Serbian claims on parts or all of Kosovo or Montenegro, or Kosovar claims on ethnic-Albanian controlled territory in Macedonia. Nationalism in its various forms -- Serb, Albanian or other -- feeds on these desires. Europe's Conflicting Goals Left unchecked, these forces of integration and disintegration inevitably will clash, leading to crisis and conflict. Recognizing this, European governments cannot leave the Balkan countries to their own devices, no matter how much they may want to. The United States is a different story. The Balkans are hardly on Washington's radar screen, apart from the region's intersection with terrorism. Driven by the need to free up resources for its global war on terrorism as well as a general distaste for global policing, Washington will rapidly disengage from the Balkans, handing the baton first to NATO and then to the EU. Europe's situation is more complex. Like the United States, it seeks to limit its military commitments and use of scarce resources in the region. Likewise, public and political support for the Balkan peacekeeping missions varies widely across the continent and could decline rapidly if things heat up. On the other hand, Europe really doesn't have a choice. The immediate risks posed by drugs and illegal immigration demand the EU's attention, as does the longer-term threat of armed conflict. The EU also sees the Balkans as a testing ground for its own security and defense ambitions, apart from the United States. Brussels soon will take control of the 700-member force in Macedonia to protect international observers. In the longer term, discussions to combine peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia into one consolidated mission offer Europe a real opportunity to step out from under the shadow of the U.S. But this also will carry untold risks for Europe. The Balkans will be tough training ground for foreign policy coordination and military cooperation. From a policy perspective, Europe has shown a desire to seize on short-term solutions -- such as the somewhat hollow agreement on Serbia and Montenegro to avoid an immediate independence referendum in Montenegro. It has yet to communicate a long-term vision or coherent policy for the region. And, in many cases, Europe has failed to speak with a single foreign policy voice. Inconsistent messages will encourage rebellion and the testing of boundaries -- and that can be dangerous in one's own back yard. The EU's military hurdle will be even greater. Even the minor job of coordinating a 700-troop security contingent with a limited mandate in Macedonia will test the operational capability of the nascent European rapid reaction force. Already some EU states are demanding a written agreement that will allow the use of NATO infrastructure -- which the United States would strongly resist -- before they sign off on the operation. Washington is not going to pay for Europe to have an independent military. Moving from small and limited peacekeeping contingent in Macedonia to a Balkan-wide peacekeeping force would be a tremendous leap -- one that Europe may prefer not to take. But with U.S. attention diverted, the EU may be forced to make good on its military and foreign policy rhetoric. It will be a hazardous first mission. --------------------------- ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9617B Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================ |
