HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK --------------------------- South China Morning Post
Rising up the PLA ranks OLIVER CHOU Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'' Chairman Mao Zedong's famous dictum sums up the dilemma facing Beijing policy-makers as the transition to a younger leadership is expected to be made at the forthcoming 16th Party Congress. While reshuffles in regional civilian and military leaderships have been mostly completed, the most contentious item remaining to be settled is the line-up of the PLA on the Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the country's 2.5 million troops. The commission, despite its powerful status as the top PLA policy-setting body, has been traditionally oligarchical and opaque. It currently has 11 members, with President Jiang Zemin and Vice-President Hu Jintao at the top. The remaining members are the top generals who run the day-to-day operations of the vast military apparatus. Mr Jiang, who is widely believed to be retiring at the age of 76, is expected to relinquish all his civilian positions as head of state and the party to Mr Hu, 17 years his junior. The question occupying analysts at the moment is whether the President will also step down from the military position, or follow the precedent set by the late Deng Xiaoping, who, at the 13th Party Congress in 1987, continued to serve as the CMC chairman while officially in retirement. Some analysts believe Mr Jiang is likely to retain the post. But another school of thought speculates that Mr Jiang will seek to enter the history books as the first de facto party leader to hand over all vestiges of power to the succeeding generation, thus realising a smooth transition for the first time in the history of the communist regime - without invoking bloodshed or a palace coup. But Mr Jiang, who has been near or at the pinnacle of power since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, is not likely to do so without conditions. According to some reports, he has imposed conditions on his retirement. Among them was the appointment of his protege, Zeng Qinghong, as the most-senior CMC vice-chairman. The move would also enable Mr Zeng to be elevated to the post of state vice-president and a member of the elite Politburo Standing Committee, according to Open Magazine (Kaifang), one of the few remaining China-watching journals in Hong Kong. While a step up the ladder seems imminent for Mr Zeng, securing a slot on the CMC does not come automatically along with elevation to the rank of state vice-president. Mr Hu had to wait seven years after becoming vice-president before he was appointed to the commission. Mr Zeng, a 62-year-old Politburo alternate member, has been Mr Jiang's right-hand man since the President was Shanghai mayor and party secretary in the mid-1980s. His current position as head of the party's Central Organisation Department has put him in direct control of personnel dossiers of all party officials. His father, Zeng Shan, director of the now-defunct Internal Affairs Department, left him an important legacy - an invaluable personal network among party elders in the civilian and military sectors. A new axis involving Mr Zeng and Vice-President Hu has been viewed by many China analysts as a compromise leadership deal between major political factions. The deal, on one hand, meets the mandate handed down by Deng when he hand-picked Mr Hu at the 14th Party Congress in 1992 as a member of the core of the fourth-generation party leadership to succeed Mr Jiang in due course. It also paves the way for a graceful retirement for Mr Jiang from active duty. That there is so much speculation about whether Mr Jiang retires from the CMC post or appoints a proxy reflects a widespread belief that he will find it difficult to let go completely of all the power he holds. While Mr Hu has the blessing of Mr Jiang and party elders on his side, thanks to his anointment by Deng, his status is also rising on the international scene since his recent tours of Russia and Europe. Mr Hu's inaugural visit to the United States next week will be a crucial factor in whether his expected elevation goes ahead. Should he commit diplomatic gaffes or upset hardliners at home, his promotion could be jeopardised. Unless a major national crisis takes place which upsets Beijing's political priorities - such as escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait - it appears likely that Mr Hu is set to take over all three top state, party and military positions at the 16th Party Congress. Leadership of the CMC is likely to undergo a corresponding revamp to bring in younger generals for the next five-year term. Generals Fu Quanyou and Cao Gangchuan, both prime candidates to be the next CMC vice-chairmen, have had a close working relationship with Mr Hu. Mr Hu worked closely with General Fu during the Lhasa uprising in 1989-1990 when Mr Hu was Tibet's party chief and the general headed the Chengdu regional command with responsibility for martial law. Adding credibility to speculation about General Fu's promotion is the recent appointment of his former subordinate, Zhu Qi, as commander of Beijing Military Region, the most pivotal of all seven regional commands due to its responsibility over the security of the capital and northern China, including the Inner Mongolian plains. General Cao also worked closely with Mr Hu in 1998 when the latter was in charge of the daunting job of closing down thousands of PLA businesses on the President's orders. General Cao, in charge of defence industries and equipment, played an active role in aiding Mr Hu throughout the massive three-year drive to withdraw the PLA from its entanglement with business. More importantly, General Cao, like Mr Hu, is a protege of Deng and had at one point worked with the patriarch's son-in-law, retired general He Ping, at the Equipment Department under the General Staff Department. Mr He is now a senior executive of Hong Kong-listed Poly Group. Other CMC members are expected to come from new appointments to the four PLA general departments - operational, political, logistical and armament. Senior officers from two outfits, the General Staff and the General Political departments, were given extra positions on the CMC in 1999, a measure many believed was aimed at ensuring smooth transition and continuity. Generals Guo Boxiong, 59, and Xu Caihou, 58, both entered the CMC via this route at the same time as Mr Hu was appointed the ranking vice-chairman at the Fourth Plenum in September 1999. Unless for very exceptional reasons, such as ill health, these young generals would make their way up to more senior positions in Mr Hu's regime during the 16th Party Congress. There is speculation about the health of General Guo - he had been diagnosed with liver cancer, according to sources quoted by Open magazine - but there has been no indication whether this could affect his long-term working ability. These junior generals, along with generals Fu and Cao, would then likely comprise the nucleus of a CMC built around Mr Hu as the core leader of the fourth-generation leadership. More rejuvenation is expected to occur in the top PLA ranks. Those with exposure to foreign militaries and overseas training are likely to receive preferential consideration. An example in this category of officials is Rear Admiral Zhou Borong, former deputy commander of the Hong Kong Garrison and currently deputy chief of staff at Navy Headquarters. There is speculation among military analysts that Admiral Zhou, who attended the Royal College of Defence Studies in Britain in the 1980s, is set to be the next top PLA intelligence chief in the General Staff Department. However, the chances of him being appointed appear slim because of the relatively junior status of his current position in relation to the seniority necessary to become intelligence chief. The promotion, if it materialises, means he will replace General Xiong Guangkai who, at 63, has two more years before reaching the age of mandatory retirement. The PLA's intelligence tsar also liaises with foreign militaries. Western military chiefs were likely to warm to Admiral Zhou, with his experience in Hong Kong and his fluent English, says an analyst. But it largely depends on the prevailing official line in Beijing. Oliver Chou is a Hong Kong-based China analyst ([EMAIL PROTECTED]). --------------------------- ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9617B Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================ |
