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An extremely reactionary article, making propaganda precisely for the wrong, innefective and discrediting methods of struggle for the Palestinians. Therefore interesting. This article should be read "upside-down". "Gal Luft is a *former* Lieutenant Colonel in the Israel Defense Forces, the into text says. A "former"? I don't think so. Rolf M. Malm�, Sweden At 12:59 2002-06-22 -0400, you (Miroslav Antic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>) wrote: ><HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK>HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK >--------------------------- > >The Palestinian H-Bomb: Terror's Winning Strategy >By Gal Luft > > > > > ><http://www.foreignaffairs.org/Search/printable_fulltext.asp?i=20020701FAComment8514.xml>print > >this article | ><http://www.foreignaffairs.org/ReaderServices/mailto.asp?i=20020701FAComment8514.xml>send > >to a friend > > > >On newsstands July 1, the JULY/AUGUST 2002 issue of Foreign Affairs will >feature: > >Gal Luft is a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Israel Defense Forces and >the author of The Palestinian Security Forces: Between Police and Army. > >Never in Israel's history, to paraphrase Churchill, has so much harm been >inflicted on so many by so few. Since the onset of the second intifada in >late September 2000, dozens of exploding humans -- Palestinian H-bombs -- >have rocked the Jewish state and transformed the lives of its people. As >little as a year ago, suicide bombings were seen as a gruesome aberration >in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an expression of religious fanaticism >that most Palestinians rejected. But in recent months a new, unsettling >reality has emerged: the acceptance and legitimation of the practice among >all Palestinian political and military factions. > >Increasingly, Palestinians are coming to see suicide attacks as a >strategic weapon, a poor man's "smart bomb" that can miraculously balance >Israel's technological prowess and conventional military dominance. >Palestinians appear to have decided that, used systematically in the >context of a political struggle, suicide bombings give them something no >other weapon could: the ability to cause Israel devastating and >unprecedented pain. The dream of achieving such strategic parity is more >powerful than any pressure to cease and desist. It is therefore unlikely >that the strategy will be abandoned, even as its continued use pushes the >Middle East ever closer to the abyss. > >FROM MORTARS TO MARTYRS > >The Palestinian endorsement of suicide bombings as a legitimate tool of >war was not hasty. At the start of the second intifada, the Palestinians' >preferred method of fighting was based on the strategy that Hezbollah used >to drive the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) out of southern Lebanon after 15 >years of occupation -- a mix of guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, >drive-by shootings, and attacks on IDF outposts. It was thought that the >"Lebanonization" of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would cause the >Israeli public to view these territories as security liabilities (as they >had with southern Lebanon), and to pressure the government to withdraw >once more. > >Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat's division of labor was clear. His >political wing, Fatah, authorized its paramilitary units, spearheaded by >the Tanzim militias along with segments of the security services of the >Palestinian Authority (PA), to carry out a guerrilla campaign against >Israeli settlements and military targets in the West Bank and Gaza. The >militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, meanwhile, were given the liberty >to carry out attacks against civilian targets inside Israel. > > From the Palestinian perspective, however, the results of the guerrilla > campaign in the first year were poor, especially considering the duration > of the fighting and the volume of fire. Palestinian forces launched more > than 1,500 shooting attacks on Israeli vehicles in the territories but > killed 75 people. They attacked IDF outposts more than 6,000 times but > killed only 20 soldiers. They fired more than 300 antitank grenades at > Israeli targets but failed to kill anyone. To demoralize the settlers, > the Palestinians launched more than 500 mortar and rocket attacks at > Jewish communities in the territories and, at times, inside Israel, but > the artillery proved to be primitive and inaccurate, and only one Israeli > was killed. > >Israel's response to the guerrilla campaign, moreover, was decisive. Using >good intelligence, the Israeli security services targeted individual >Palestinian militants and destroyed most of the PA's military >infrastructure. Israeli soldiers also moved back into "Area A," the >territory that had been turned over as a result of the Oslo peace >negotiations to exclusive Palestinian control, to raze suspected mortar >activity sites. At first these incursions met with international rebuke, >even from the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, >denounced the first foray into Gaza in April 2001 as "excessive and >disproportionate." But over time the temporary incursions became such a >common practice that the international community stopped paying attention. >Stung by the lack of progress in the struggle, at the end of 2001 Arafat >tried a final gambit, attempting to smuggle in a cache of Iranian weapons >on board the Karine-A. But Israeli naval commandos seized the ship and >turned his ploy into a shameful diplomatic disaster. Thus ended >Palestinian emulation of the "Hezbollah model." > >Unlike the guerrilla strategy, meanwhile, the terror campaign carried out >by Hamas and Islamic Jihad was showing results. The Islamic movements >managed to kill or maim more Israelis in 350 stabbings, shootings, and >bombings inside Israel than the mainstream Palestinian organizations had >in more than 8,000 armed attacks in the West Bank and Gaza. The strongest >impact came from 39 suicide attacks that killed 70 Israelis and wounded >more than 1,000 others. If one compares this bloodshed with the limited >damage caused by the 39 Scud missiles Saddam Hussein launched at Israel in >1991 -- 74 fatalities, most of them caused by heart attacks -- it is not >hard to understand why the new methods caused such intoxication. > >Palestinians are fully aware of what they have suffered at the hands of >the Israeli military in response to the terror campaign, but most view it >as a great success nevertheless. They derive comfort and satisfaction from >the fact that the Jews are also suffering. The Palestinians view the >campaign's greatest achievement as not just the killing of so many >Israelis but the decline of Israel's economy, the destruction of its >tourism industry, and the demoralization of its people. According to a >mid-May poll, two-thirds of Palestinians say that the second intifada's >violence has achieved more for them than did the previous years of >negotiations. > >LEGITIMIZING TERROR > >Before the outbreak of the second intifada, Palestinians distinguished >among attacks on settlers, on Israeli military targets, and on civilians >inside Israel. Now, however, those distinctions are disappearing. Although >after the Israeli incursions this spring support for attacks against >civilians inside Israel dropped 6 points to 52 percent, opposition to >arresting those carrying out such attacks rose 10 points to 86 percent -- >a figure close to the 89 percent and 92 percent support for attacks on >Israeli settlers and soldiers in the territories, respectively. > >In the post-9/11 era, however, when deliberate attacks against innocent >civilians are anathema to most people, embracing terrorism as a strategy >has required the Palestinians to persuade themselves, and others, that >what they are doing is legitimate. They have therefore created what they >see as a moral equivalence between Israel's harm to the Palestinian >civilian population and Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians, >including children. > >They have also developed a creative interpretation of what terrorism is, >one that stresses ends rather than means. Thus, in December 2001, more >than 94 percent of Palestinians told pollsters that they viewed Israeli >incursions into Area A as acts of terror, while 82 percent refused to >characterize the killing of 21 Israeli youths outside a Tel Aviv disco six >months earlier that way. And 94 percent reported that they would >characterize a hypothetical Israeli use of chemical or biological weapons >against Palestinians as terrorism, whereas only 26 percent would say the >same about Palestinian use of those weapons against Israel. Interestingly, >the new definition extends beyond the conflict with Israel. Only 41 >percent of Palestinians, for example, viewed the September 11 attacks as >terrorism, and only 46 percent saw the Lockerbie bombing that way. > >The more enchanted Palestinians have become with the achievements of their >"martyrs," the more Fatah has found itself under pressure to adopt the >suicide weapon. Last year, fearing a loss of popular support if the >"street" perceived the Islamists' methods as more effective than Fatah's >tack, Fatah leaders decided they had to follow suit. The part of Arafat >that wanted to show solidarity with the United States and that was >determined to avoid any association with terror against civilians, in >other words, succumbed to the anti-Israel rage and political calculations >of his lieutenants and the members of what Palestinian pollster Khalil >Shikaki has called the "young guard" >of Palestinian nationalism. > >Fatah's official espousal of "martyrdom" operations took place on November >29, 2001, when two terrorists blew themselves up together on a bus near >the Israeli city of Hadera. One, Mustafa Abu Srieh, was from Islamic >Jihad; the other, Abdel Karim Abu Nafa, served with the Palestinian police >in Jericho. But the bond of blood with the Islamists did not last long, >and soon Fatah's al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Islamists found >themselves engaged in a diabolical contest over which group could perfect >the use of the suicide weapon and be viewed as most valuable to the war >effort. Al Aqsa has capitalized on the Islamists' opposition to the >participation of women and established squads of willing female suicide >bombers named after Wafa Idris, the Palestinian woman who blew up herself >and an Israeli man in Jerusalem in January. Islamic Jihad, for its part, >has recruited children as young as 13 for suicide missions. > >Both Islamists and secular Palestinians have come to see suicide bombing >as a weapon against which Israel has no comprehensive defense. To counter >the Iraqi Scuds, Israel developed and deployed the Arrow, a $2 billion >ballistic missile defense system. Against Palestinian H-bombs, Israel can >at best build a fence. The suicide bombers are smarter than Scuds, and >Palestinians know that even though in Israel today there are more security >guards than teachers or doctors, the bomber will always get through. > >MILITARY BLINDERS > >If history is any guide, Israel's military campaign to eradicate the >phenomenon of suicide bombing is unlikely to succeed. Other nations that >have faced opponents willing to die have learned the hard way that, short >of complete annihilation of the enemy, no military solution will solve the >problem. > >But the Israeli authorities are deeply reluctant to accept this reality. >Israeli society seeks absolute security and adheres to the notion that >military power can resolve almost any security problem. If the >Palestinians put their faith in Allah, Israelis put theirs in a tank. >Whether consciously or not, their belief in the utility of force -- >evident in the popular "Let the IDF Win" campaign, which advocated a freer >hand for the army -- reflects a strategic choice to militarize the >conflict rather than politicize it. The IDF's senior leaders repeatedly >claim that the smart application of military force can create a new >reality on the ground that, in turn, will allow the government to >negotiate political agreements under more favorable terms. > >It is true that when the IDF was finally allowed to "win," Israel achieved >impressive tactical results. Operation Defensive Shield this past April >eliminated an entire echelon of terrorist leaders in the West Bank, >crippled the PA's financial and operational infrastructure, and reduced PA >arsenals. But as at other times in its history, Israel failed to convert >its tactical achievements into strategic gains. Its intensive use of >military instruments earned it international condemnation, further >radicalized Palestinian society, and created an environment of anger >conducive to more terrorist activities. By May, unsurprisingly, the >suicide bombings had started again. > >IDF simulations before the second intifada had predicted that a military >reentry into major Palestinian cities would lead to hundreds of Israeli >casualties. In fact, however, the incursions into territories under >Palestinian control proved to be almost painless. Following the >assassination of Israel's tourism minister, Rehavam Ze'evi, in October >2001, the IDF launched a broad assault on the PA, entering all six major >West Bank cities. Palestinian resistance was negligible, and only six >Israeli soldiers were wounded. Operation Defensive Shield, the second big >incursion into Area A, also met relatively weak resistance. Aside from the >struggle in the Jenin refugee camp, in which 23 Israeli soldiers were >killed, Israeli forces conquered six Palestinian cities and dozens of >smaller towns and villages while suffering only three fatalities. > >The IDF has interpreted the Palestinian lack of resistance in the cities >as a sign of weakness rather than a strategic choice. Israelis view with >disdain the Palestinian "victory" celebrations after each incursion comes >to an end. They are puzzled by the fact that their enemy fires more >bullets into the air than at Israeli troops. What Israel fails to >comprehend is the paradigm by which the Palestinians are choosing to >conduct their war. > >Acknowledging their perpetual conventional inferiority, Arafat's people >feel no need to demonstrate strong resistance to Israeli forces. They >simply wait for the storm to pass while preparing another batch of >"martyrs." Families of suicide bombers now receive more than double the >financial compensation than do the families of those killed by other >means. Nurturing an ethos of heroism fundamentally opposed to that of the >Israelis, the Palestinian war of liberation has elevated the suicide >bomber to the highest throne of courage and devotion to the national cause. > >FENCING LESSONS > >Israelis' misunderstanding of the new Palestinian way of war may come back >to haunt them. Their perception of their enemy's weakness is likely to >embolden them and encourage more broad punitive operations in response to >future attacks. But Israel's military responses will eventually exhaust >themselves, whereas the Palestinians will still have legions of willing >"martyrs." > >In fact, despite defiant Israeli rhetoric insisting that there will be no >surrender to terrorism, one can already see the opposite happening. >Israelis are willing to pay an increasingly high economic and diplomatic >price for increasingly short periods of calm. As a result, more and more >people support panaceas such as unilateral separation -- the building of >walls, fences, and buffer zones to protect Israel's population centers >from Palestinian wrath. > >Unilateral separation would no doubt make the infiltration of suicide >bombers into Israel more difficult, but it would also increase their >prestige in the eyes of many in the region. The bombers would be viewed, >correctly, as the catalyst that drove the Israelis out of an occupied >territory yet again, and the years of agony Palestinians have endured >would be sweetened by a genuine sense of victory. Israel's wall policy, >perceived as withdrawal, would reassure the Palestinians that war >succeeded where diplomacy failed. > >As currently conceived, moreover, walling off the territories would not do >much to reduce Palestinian grievances. No matter how long the fence, for >example, dozens of Jewish settlements scattered on the hills of the West >Bank would necessarily remain beyond it. Two-thirds of Israelis, according >to recent polls, support the removal of such isolated and indefensible >settlements to make the separation more feasible. But despite such views, >Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has reiterated his refusal to >dismantle a single settlement. "The fate of Netzarim is the fate of Tel >Aviv," he said recently, referring to the tiny, isolated, and fortified >Gaza Strip settlement that has been the target of repeated Palestinian attacks. > >DEFUSING THE BOMB > >Israel finds itself, therefore, at a crucial turning point in its history, >but one from which no path seems particularly attractive. It must find >some way of defending itself against an enemy so eager to inflict pain >that it is willing to bring suffering and death on itself in the process. >Retaliation is unlikely to work, but retreat is likely only to bring more >of the same. > >If there is any way out of this dilemma, it may lie in convincing the >Palestinian public that its constructive goals can be achieved only by >relinquishing its destructive strategy. Israel should therefore embark on >a policy that rewards the Palestinians for genuinely fighting terrorism >and avoid any policy that feeds the perception that terrorism works. > >The rewards will have to be tangible and meaningful. Israel could, for >example, offer the PA the removal of a number of small hilltop settlements >in exchange for a period of non-belligerency and unequivocal renunciation >of suicide bombing. This cooling-off period could then set the stage for >renewed talks on a final-status agreement. Such an approach would indicate >to the Palestinian population that Israel is serious about peace and ready >to pay the necessary price for it, not only in words but in deeds. Most >important, showing that Israel is prepared to confront and rein in its own >radical rejectionists would put the onus on the Palestinian leadership to >do the same. > >Before this intifada, a large majority of Palestinians opposed attacks >against civilians inside Israel. They hoped to achieve their aspirations >for independence without resort to terror. Figuring out how to make that >happen is not only the right thing to do, but it is also the best way to >ensure Israel's security. Unless that hope can be revived, the fate of Tel >Aviv could indeed become that of Netzarim -- which would be a tragedy for all. > >Details of the poll and survey methodology are available at the Web site >of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (www.pcpsr.org). > > ><http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/Luft0702b.html>http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/Luft0702b.html > >--------------------------- >ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST --------------------------- ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.bacIlu Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
