http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/grand1
Project Syndicate/Europe’s World
January 21, 2010
Sarkozy’s Three-Way NATO Bet
Camille Grand
-France ’s re-integration into NATO is, in fact, the final stage in a process
that has seen the French military play an increasingly important role in the
alliance’s operations. France has been aligning itself with the military
structures of a NATO that has progressively abandoned the practices that were
at the root of General Charles de Gaulle’s decision to quit, most notably the
placement of all NATO forces under a single command, even in times of peace.
-The EU has since 2003 begun to assert itself operationally as well, carrying
out 23 ESDP missions, six of which have been significant military operations.
It has engaged in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, as
well as South-East Asia with its Aceh peacekeeping mission, and more recently
in the Caucasus and in the Indian Ocean.
PARIS: France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure after a 43-year
absence last year brought to an end one of the exceptions françaises. It also
helped frame the growing debate over whether to develop European defense more
effectively or to seriously reform the Atlantic alliance.
At first glance, it may seem that France chose NATO at the expense of the
ten-year-old European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). But that
interpretation takes too pessimistic a view of ESDP’s achievements over the
past decade, and is based on a flawed understanding of the relationships
between NATO and the European Union.
Indeed, France’s return to NATO is far from a U-turn that reflects
disenchantment with ESDP. Rather, it is the product of a 15-year process of
rapprochement with NATO – and of the real progress being achieved in European
defense.
France ’s re-integration into NATO is, in fact, the final stage in a process
that has seen the French military play an increasingly important role in the
alliance’s operations. France has been aligning itself with the military
structures of a NATO that has progressively abandoned the practices that were
at the root of General Charles de Gaulle’s decision to quit, most notably the
placement of all NATO forces under a single command, even in times of peace.
Sarkozy’s NATO policy is thus more of a follow-up on decisions and developments
in the 1990’s than a radical U-turn from the policies of his predecessors.
Where Sarkozy does distinguish himself is in adopting a more openly
pro-Atlantic stance.
Beyond the often partisan and quintessentially French polemics about Sarkozy’s
NATO decision, it is possible to discern what might best be termed a three-way
wager by the French president. The first concerns building European defense in
harmony with NATO, rather than in opposition to it. Ending the exception
française in NATO has removed the suspicion that French support for developing
European defense was really aimed at competing with the alliance or weakening
it.
Whether this suspicion had any truth or not, the message for many allies is
clear: the developments the French want for ESDP are compatible with its full
and complete membership of NATO. American support for the European Union’s
efforts to play a greater role in defense and security – a stance apparent
since 2007 and confirmed by the arrival of the Obama administration –
consolidates this approach.
The second part of Sarkozy’s wager concerns reforming and renewing the
alliance. France’s full engagement will increase the pace of reform in NATO and
make the alliance a tool better adapted to twenty-first-century crises by
paring down its cumbersome bureaucracy. France could not become an active
player in this debate without being part of the alliance. Following the
appointment of French officers to a number of key NATO posts, France can, along
with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and a few other NATO allies, begin to
implement much-needed reforms.
The last and perhaps most difficult part of the wager is “Europeanizing” the
alliance. France can help to give NATO more balance by spreading political and
military responsibilities more evenly among Europeans and Americans. Now that
the right political conditions exist in the United States, it is up to
Europeans to make the political decisions on budgets and resources that will
enable them to strengthen their role in NATO.
There is no guarantee, of course, that the three parts of this wager will pay
off. The forces of inertia are always strong, and when it comes to resources
the current economic crisis favors neither ambitious reforms of the alliance
nor serious intensification of ESDP. It will be a few years yet before we can
determine whether these ambitions have borne fruit.
The most serious criticism of France’s return to the alliance has been that it
places the European defense project at risk, or at least endangers the
ambitious vision of the EU as a leading strategic player. If that were the
case, Sarkozy’s decision, regardless of the advantages to NATO or France, would
clearly be open to question.
If France had returned fully to NATO’s military structures 10 or 15 years ago,
before ESDP existed, this would indeed be a serious and well-founded objection.
But the fact that the EU has become a politico-military player since 1998 has
radically changed the stakes. In just a few years, the Union built a framework
for managing civilian and military crises, however imperfect or incomplete
these tools may still be.
The EU has since 2003 begun to assert itself operationally as well, carrying
out 23 ESDP missions, six of which have been significant military operations.
It has engaged in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, as
well as South-East Asia with its Aceh peacekeeping mission, and more recently
in the Caucasus and in the Indian Ocean.
These operations have varied widely in scale, ranging from a few dozen
observers, police officers, or civilian advisors to several thousand soldiers.
Although they have mostly been on land, operation “Atlanta” off the coast of
Somalia saw the EU’s first naval operation. All were launched autonomously,
relying either on national command arrangements or on making the most of
command arrangements with NATO known as Berlin-plus.
In these circumstances, France’s full involvement in NATO, far from burying the
European project, looks like a vital tool for furthering it. Sarkozy's decision
has put France in a position to gain influence in the alliance and increase the
pace of NATO’s reform, while at the same time strengthening the ESDP.
===========================
Stop NATO
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stopnato
To subscribe, send an e-mail to:
[email protected]
Archives:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stopnato/messages
http://lists.topica.com/lists/ANTINATO/read
==============================
