[Cross-posted from the [email protected] mailing list - if you haven't
subscribed, it might be worthwhile doing so.]
Hello all,
As a current member of APNIC as well as the RIR community, I strongly support
the much-needed review of the Internet Coordination Policy-2 document, and I do
support the RIR Governance Draft document. This review would definitely have to
be in the top 10 (if not the top 5) most important undertakings to strengthen
not just the Internet Numbers Registry System, but the wider Internet ecosystem
as a whole. I do, however, have some recommendations which may be of a benefit
to the NRO in shaping a final policy document.
Article 1: Definitions and Interpretation
This is a rather minor one, it may be worthwhile explicitly defining that an
"MoU" means "Memorandum of Understanding". As Memorandums of Understanding do
play a vital role in the document, I believe this should be clearly defined.
Article 3: Recognition
When it comes to the determination of community support for the establishment
of the Candidate RIR, ICANN should be able to independently verify this
support. This is ultimately designed to prevent the Candidate RIR from
providing information that could be construed as misleading. The oberse of this
would require that the majority of members within an economy that would
potentially fall within the service region of the Candidate RIR do not object
to the formation of the Candidate RIR, or their economy falling within the
service region of the Candidate RIR.
Prior to the acceptance of an application from a Candidate RIR to become a
recognised RIR under the terms of the RIR Governance Document, the Candidate
RIR must demonstrate it has the capacity and capability to operate the required
functions of an RIR.
Article 4: Ongoing Requirements
Under 4.1(b) regarding the operation as a not-for-profit entity, this should be
further clarified so that if a jurisdiction in which an RIR is located or a
Candidate RIR intends to be located does not have the provisions within the
economies' laws for operation of a not-for-profit entity, that a default or
uniform set of rules and policies should apply (such as dividends not being
paid out to members, board members cannot receive financial remuneration for
their services unless a vote by the member body has passed, the division of any
assets between other entities who operate in a similar manner, etc).
I note that under 4.2 it states that an RIR must participate in and cooperate
with periodic or ad hoc audits conducted by an external and independent auditor
appointed by ICANN. I feel that we should take this one step further, and make
this external audit mandatory once every 12 months with the resulting reports
to be published. As a result of the audit being mandatory at a global level,
the cost of this shall be covered by ICANN.
Article 5: Derecognition
I believe that the RIR Governance Document should accommodate for the emergency
seizure of an RIR's services by ICANN, in the event an RIR becomes
uncooperative or does not have the legal ground to facilitate a derecognition.
My reason for this view is if an RIR is going to be derecognised and the RIR
becomes uncooperative with the transition of the RIR functions or the RIR takes
actions which can be considered malicious, then there needs to be a mechanism
that allows for operational control to be seized to prevent further disruption
or detriment to the wider Internet community.
Organisations will attempt to exploit the RIR communities for their own
benefit. This is not a matter of if, it's a matter of when. We must be prepared
and the review is an important step to ensure the safety and integrity of the
Internet Numbers Registry System.
Regards,Christopher Hawker
_______________________________________________
APNIC-talk - https://mailman.apnic.net/[email protected]/
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
