On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 09:10:37AM -0800, John Johansen wrote:
> Base support for network mediation.
>
> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
> [...]
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
> index 86103ce..96cf725 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
> +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
> [...]
> @@ -62,3 +64,5 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h :
> $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
> $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
> $(src)/Makefile
> $(call cmd,make-rlim)
> +$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
> + $(call cmd,make-af)
Please have this depend on $(src)/Makefile (like the others) so that when
the Makefile rules change, a rebuild of the .h file is triggered. Also,
please include comments at the generation to show what the sed mess
produces (like the others have).
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> index 38d6262..4267401 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> @@ -198,9 +198,15 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
> { }
> };
>
> +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
> + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_masking", 1),
You just want this to be a boolean, not a list?
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..3c7d599
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
> +/*
> + * AppArmor security module
> + *
> + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
> + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
Should update this to 2012.
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
> + * License.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __AA_NET_H
> +#define __AA_NET_H
> +
> +#include <net/sock.h>
> +
> +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
> + * @allowed: basic network families permissions
> + * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
> + * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
> + */
> +struct aa_net {
> + u16 allow[AF_MAX];
> + u16 audit[AF_MAX];
> + u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
> +};
> +
> +extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
> + int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
> +extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
> +
> +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
> +{
> + /* NOP */
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
> b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
> index 9e18e96..3f582a7 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> #include "capability.h"
> #include "domain.h"
> #include "file.h"
> +#include "net.h"
> #include "resource.h"
>
> extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
> @@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
> * @policy: general match rules governing policy
> * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
> * @caps: capabilities for the profile
> + * @net: network controls for the profile
> * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
> *
> * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile
> @@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
> struct aa_policydb policy;
> struct aa_file_rules file;
> struct aa_caps caps;
> + struct aa_net net;
> struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 3783202..7459547 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
> #include "include/context.h"
> #include "include/file.h"
> #include "include/ipc.h"
> +#include "include/net.h"
> #include "include/path.h"
> #include "include/policy.h"
> #include "include/procattr.h"
> @@ -621,6 +622,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
> *task,
> return error;
> }
>
> +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int
> kern)
> +{
> + struct aa_profile *profile;
> + int error = 0;
> +
> + if (kern)
> + return 0;
> +
> + profile = __aa_current_profile();
> + if (!unconfined(profile))
> + error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
> + NULL);
> + return error;
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
> + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
> + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket
> *newsock)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
> + struct msghdr *msg, int size)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
> + struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
> + int optname)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
> + int optname)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
> +}
> +
> static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
> .name = "apparmor",
>
> @@ -652,6 +751,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
> .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
> .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
>
> + .socket_create = apparmor_socket_create,
> + .socket_bind = apparmor_socket_bind,
> + .socket_connect = apparmor_socket_connect,
> + .socket_listen = apparmor_socket_listen,
> + .socket_accept = apparmor_socket_accept,
> + .socket_sendmsg = apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
> + .socket_recvmsg = apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
> + .socket_getsockname = apparmor_socket_getsockname,
> + .socket_getpeername = apparmor_socket_getpeername,
> + .socket_getsockopt = apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
> + .socket_setsockopt = apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
> + .socket_shutdown = apparmor_socket_shutdown,
> +
> .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
> .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
> .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..1765901
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
> +/*
> + * AppArmor security module
> + *
> + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
> + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
2012 again.
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
> + * License.
> + */
> +
> +#include "include/apparmor.h"
> +#include "include/audit.h"
> +#include "include/context.h"
> +#include "include/net.h"
> +#include "include/policy.h"
> +
> +#include "af_names.h"
> +
> +static const char *sock_type_names[] = {
> + "unknown(0)",
> + "stream",
> + "dgram",
> + "raw",
> + "rdm",
> + "seqpacket",
> + "dccp",
> + "unknown(7)",
> + "unknown(8)",
> + "unknown(9)",
> + "packet",
> +};
Should sock_type_names be generated too? Everything else is. The
users of it can check for NULL entries and generate the "unknown(NUM)"
stuff instead.
> +
> +/* audit callback for net specific fields */
> +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
> +{
> + struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
> + if (address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]) {
> + audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]);
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " \"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net.family);
This probably shouldn't have the leading " " since it follows "=".
> + }
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
> + if (sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]) {
> + audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]);
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad.net.type);
> + }
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad.net.protocol);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_net - audit network access
> + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
> + * @op: operation being checked
> + * @family: network family
> + * @type: network type
> + * @protocol: network protocol
> + * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
> + * @error: error code for failure else 0
> + *
> + * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
> + */
> +static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int
> type,
> + int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
> +{
> + int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
> + struct common_audit_data sa;
> + if (sk) {
> + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NET);
> + } else {
> + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
> + }
> + /* todo fill in socket addr info */
> +
> + sa.aad.op = op,
> + sa.u.net.family = family;
> + sa.u.net.sk = sk;
> + sa.aad.net.type = type;
> + sa.aad.net.protocol = protocol;
> + sa.aad.error = error;
> +
> + if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
> + u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net.family];
> + if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
> + !(1 << sa.aad.net.type & audit_mask)))
> + return 0;
> + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
> + } else {
> + u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net.family];
> + u16 kill_mask = 0;
> + u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad.net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
> +
> + if (denied & kill_mask)
> + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
> +
> + if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
> + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
> + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
> + return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
> + }
> +
> + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
> + * @op: operation being checked
> + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
> + * @family: network family
> + * @type: network type
> + * @protocol: network protocol
> + *
> + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
> + */
> +int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
> + int protocol, struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + u16 family_mask;
> + int error;
> +
> + if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
> + if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
> + return 0;
> +
> + family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
> +
> + error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
> +
> + return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
> + * @op: operation being checked
> + * @sk: sock being revalidated (NOT NULL)
> + *
> + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
> + */
> +int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + struct aa_profile *profile;
> + int error = 0;
> +
> + /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
> + * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
> + */
> + if (in_interrupt())
> + return 0;
> +
> + profile = __aa_current_profile();
> + if (!unconfined(profile))
> + error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
> + sk->sk_protocol, sk);
> +
> + return error;
> +}
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
> index 8b7febb..4be20c3 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
> @@ -748,6 +748,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
>
> aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
> aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
> + aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
> aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
>
> aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> index c7a6d03..ec03f42 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> @@ -191,6 +191,19 @@ fail:
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
> +{
> + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
> + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
> + return 0;
> + if (data)
> + *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
> + e->pos += sizeof(u16);
> + return 1;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
> {
> if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
> @@ -469,7 +482,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
> {
> struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
> const char *name = NULL;
> - int error = -EPROTO;
> + size_t size = 0;
> + int i, error = -EPROTO;
> kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
> u32 tmp;
>
> @@ -562,6 +576,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext
> *e)
> if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
> goto fail;
>
> + size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
> + if (size) {
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
> + /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
> + * never request
> + */
> + if (i >= AF_MAX) {
> + u16 tmp;
> + if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
> + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
> + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
> + goto fail;
> + continue;
> + }
> + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
> + goto fail;
> + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
> + goto fail;
> + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
> + goto fail;
> + }
> + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
> + goto fail;
> + /*
> + * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
> + * by IPC
> + */
Should this comment move below the current indent level?
> + }
> + profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
> + profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
> +
> if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
> /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
> profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
> --
> 1.7.9
>
>
> --
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--
Kees Cook
--
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