On Sun, Jul 21, 2013 at 10:32:45PM -0700, John Johansen wrote: > Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Wow, another awesome looking cleanup.
Some comments inline.
> ---
> parser/parser.h | 6 ++
> parser/parser_yacc.y | 191
> +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
> 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/parser/parser.h b/parser/parser.h
> index 8199f43..ab57db9 100644
> --- a/parser/parser.h
> +++ b/parser/parser.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ extern int parser_token;
>
> typedef enum pattern_t pattern_t;
>
> +struct prefixes {
> + int audit;
> + int deny;
> + int owner;
> +};
> +
> struct flagval {
> int hat;
> int complain;
> diff --git a/parser/parser_yacc.y b/parser/parser_yacc.y
> index 433bb6d..27e6c58 100644
> --- a/parser/parser_yacc.y
> +++ b/parser/parser_yacc.y
> @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void add_local_entry(struct codomain *cod);
> struct cond_entry *cond_entry;
> int boolean;
> struct named_transition transition;
> + struct prefixes prefix;
> }
>
> %type <id> TOK_ID
> @@ -210,8 +211,10 @@ void add_local_entry(struct codomain *cod);
> %type <boolean> opt_owner_flag
> %type <boolean> opt_profile_flag
> %type <boolean> opt_flags
> +%type <boolean> opt_deny
> %type <id> opt_namespace
> %type <id> opt_id
> +%type <prefix> opt_prefix
> %type <transition> opt_named_transition
> %type <boolean> opt_unsafe
> %type <boolean> opt_file
> @@ -498,6 +501,16 @@ opt_owner_flag: { /* nothing */ $$ = 0; }
> | TOK_OWNER { $$ = 1; };
> | TOK_OTHER { $$ = 2; };
>
> +opt_deny: { /* nothing */ $$ = 0; }
> + | TOK_DENY { $$ = 1; }
> +
> +opt_prefix: opt_audit_flag opt_deny opt_owner_flag
> + {
> + $$.audit = $1;
> + $$.deny = $2;
> + $$.owner = $3;
> + }
> +
> rules: { /* nothing */
> struct codomain *cod = NULL;
> cod = (struct codomain *) calloc(1, sizeof(struct codomain));
> @@ -508,58 +521,42 @@ rules: { /* nothing */
> $$ = cod;
> };
>
> -/* can't fold TOK_DENY in as opt_deny_flag as it messes up the generated
> - * parser, even though it shouldn't
> - */
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag TOK_DENY opt_owner_flag rule
> +rules: rules opt_prefix rule
> {
> PDEBUG("matched: rules rule\n");
> - PDEBUG("rules rule: (%s)\n", $5->name);
> - if (!$5)
> + PDEBUG("rules rule: (%s)\n", $3->name);
> + if (!$3)
> yyerror(_("Assert: `rule' returned NULL."));
> - $5->deny = 1;
> - if (($5->mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) && ($5->mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE))
> + $3->deny = $2.deny;
> + if (($2.deny && ($3->mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) &&
> + ($3->mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE)))
> yyerror(_("Invalid mode, in deny rules 'x' must not be
> preceded by exec qualifier 'i', 'p', or 'u'"));
> + else if (!$2.deny && ($3->mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) &&
> + !($3->mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) &&
> + !($3->nt_name))
> + yyerror(_("Invalid mode, 'x' must be preceded by exec
> qualifier 'i', 'p', 'c', or 'u'"));
>
> - if ($4 == 1)
> - $5->mode &= (AA_USER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS |
> AA_USER_PTRACE);
> - else if ($4 == 2)
> - $5->mode &= (AA_OTHER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS |
> AA_OTHER_PTRACE);
> + if ($2.owner == 1)
> + $3->mode &= (AA_USER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS |
> AA_USER_PTRACE);
> + else if ($2.owner == 2)
> + $3->mode &= (AA_OTHER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS |
> AA_OTHER_PTRACE);
> /* only set audit ctl quieting if the rule is not audited */
> - if (!$2)
> - $5->audit = $5->mode & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
> + if (($2.deny && !$2.audit) || (!$2.deny && $2.audit))
> + $3->audit = $3->mode & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
>
> - add_entry_to_policy($1, $5);
> + add_entry_to_policy($1, $3);
> $$ = $1;
> };
>
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag opt_owner_flag rule
> - {
> - PDEBUG("matched: rules rule\n");
> - PDEBUG("rules rule: (%s)\n", $4->name);
> - if (!$4)
> - yyerror(_("Assert: `rule' returned NULL."));
> - if (($4->mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) &&
> - !($4->mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) &&
> - !($4->nt_name))
> - yyerror(_("Invalid mode, 'x' must be preceded by exec
> qualifier 'i', 'p', 'c', or 'u'"));
> -
> - if ($3 == 1)
> - $4->mode &= (AA_USER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS |
> AA_USER_PTRACE);
> - else if ($3 == 2)
> - $4->mode &= (AA_OTHER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS |
> AA_OTHER_PTRACE);
> - if ($2)
> - $4->audit = $4->mode & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
> -
> - add_entry_to_policy($1, $4);
> - $$ = $1;
> - };
>
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag opt_owner_flag TOK_OPEN rules TOK_CLOSE
> +rules: rules opt_prefix TOK_OPEN rules TOK_CLOSE
> {
> struct cod_entry *entry, *tmp;
> + if ($2.deny)
> + yyerror(_("deny prefix not allowed"));
> +
> PDEBUG("matched: audit block\n");
This PDEBUG() isn't entirely accurate; it could also be an owner block.
> - list_for_each_safe($5->entries, entry, tmp) {
> + list_for_each_safe($4->entries, entry, tmp) {
> entry->next = NULL;
> if (entry->mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) {
> if (entry->deny &&
> @@ -569,66 +566,30 @@ rules: rules opt_audit_flag opt_owner_flag TOK_OPEN
> rules TOK_CLOSE
> !(entry->mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE))
> yyerror(_("Invalid mode, 'x' must be
> preceded by exec qualifier 'i', 'p', or 'u'"));
> }
> - if ($3 == 1)
> + if ($2.owner == 1)
> entry->mode &= (AA_USER_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS
> | AA_USER_PTRACE);
> - else if ($3 == 2)
> + else if ($2.owner == 2)
> entry->mode &= (AA_OTHER_PERMS |
> AA_SHARED_PERMS | AA_OTHER_PTRACE);
>
> - if ($2 && !entry->deny)
> + if ($2.audit && !entry->deny)
> entry->audit = entry->mode & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
> - else if (!$2 && entry->deny)
> + else if (!$2.audit && entry->deny)
> entry->audit = entry->mode & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
> add_entry_to_policy($1, entry);
> }
> - $5->entries = NULL;
> + $4->entries = NULL;
> // fix me transfer rules and free sub codomain
> - free_policy($5);
> + free_policy($4);
> $$ = $1;
> };
>
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag TOK_DENY network_rule
> - {
> - struct aa_network_entry *entry, *tmp;
> -
> - PDEBUG("Matched: network rule\n");
> - if (!$4)
> - yyerror(_("Assert: `network_rule' return invalid
> protocol."));
> - if (!$1->network_allowed) {
> - $1->network_allowed = calloc(get_af_max(),
> - sizeof(unsigned int));
> - $1->audit_network = calloc(get_af_max(),
> - sizeof(unsigned int));
> - $1->deny_network = calloc(get_af_max(),
> - sizeof(unsigned int));
> - $1->quiet_network = calloc(get_af_max(),
> - sizeof(unsigned int));
> - if (!$1->network_allowed || !$1->audit_network ||
> - !$1->deny_network || !$1->quiet_network)
> - yyerror(_("Memory allocation error."));
> - }
> - list_for_each_safe($4, entry, tmp) {
> - if (entry->type > SOCK_PACKET) {
> - /* setting mask instead of a bit */
> - $1->deny_network[entry->family] |= entry->type;
> - if (!$2)
> - $1->quiet_network[entry->family] |=
> entry->type;
> -
> - } else {
> - $1->deny_network[entry->family] |= 1 <<
> entry->type;
> - if (!$2)
> - $1->quiet_network[entry->family] |= 1
> << entry->type;
> - }
> - free(entry);
> - }
> -
> - $$ = $1;
> - }
> -
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag network_rule
> +rules: rules opt_prefix network_rule
> {
> struct aa_network_entry *entry, *tmp;
>
> PDEBUG("Matched: network rule\n");
> + if ($2.owner)
> + yyerror(_("owner prefix not allowed"));
> if (!$3)
> yyerror(_("Assert: `network_rule' return invalid
> protocol."));
> if (!$1->network_allowed) {
> @@ -647,14 +608,25 @@ rules: rules opt_audit_flag network_rule
> list_for_each_safe($3, entry, tmp) {
> if (entry->type > SOCK_PACKET) {
> /* setting mask instead of a bit */
> - $1->network_allowed[entry->family] |=
> entry->type;
> - if ($2)
> - $1->audit_network[entry->family] |=
> entry->type;
> -
> + if ($2.deny) {
> + $1->deny_network[entry->family] |=
> entry->type;
> + if (!$2.audit)
> +
> $1->quiet_network[entry->family] |= entry->type;
> + } else {
> + $1->network_allowed[entry->family] |=
> entry->type;
> + if ($2.audit)
> +
> $1->audit_network[entry->family] |= entry->type;
> + }
> } else {
> - $1->network_allowed[entry->family] |= 1 <<
> entry->type;
> - if ($2)
> - $1->audit_network[entry->family] |= 1
> << entry->type;
> + if ($2.deny) {
> + $1->deny_network[entry->family] |= 1 <<
> entry->type;
> + if (!$2.audit)
> +
> $1->quiet_network[entry->family] |= 1 << entry->type;
> + } else {
> + $1->network_allowed[entry->family] |= 1
> << entry->type;
> + if ($2.audit)
> +
> $1->audit_network[entry->family] |= 1 << entry->type;
> + }
> }
> free(entry);
> }
> @@ -662,19 +634,13 @@ rules: rules opt_audit_flag network_rule
> $$ = $1;
> }
>
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag TOK_DENY mnt_rule
> - {
> - $4->deny = $4->allow;
> - if ($2)
> - $4->audit = $4->allow;
> - $4->next = $1->mnt_ents;
> - $1->mnt_ents = $4;
> - $$ = $1;
> - }
> -
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag mnt_rule
> +rules: rules opt_prefix mnt_rule
Extra space here..
> {
> - if ($2)
> + if ($2.owner)
> + yyerror(_("owner prefix not allow on mount rules"));
> + if ($2.deny)
> + $3->deny = $3->allow;
> + if ($2.audit)
> $3->audit = $3->allow;
> $3->next = $1->mnt_ents;
> $1->mnt_ents = $3;
> @@ -691,19 +657,18 @@ rules: rules change_profile
> $$ = $1;
> };
>
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag TOK_DENY capability
> +rules: rules opt_prefix capability
Extra tab here...
> {
> - $1->deny_caps |= $4;
> - if (!$2)
> - $1->quiet_caps |= $4;
> - $$ = $1;
> - };
> + if ($2.owner)
> + yyerror(_("owner prefix not allow on mount rules"));
>
Incorrect error here, these are capability rules, not mount rules.
> -rules: rules opt_audit_flag capability
> - {
> - $1->capabilities |= $3;
> - if ($2)
> - $1->audit_caps |= $3;
> + if ($2.deny)
> + $1->deny_caps |= $3;
> + else
> + $1->capabilities |= $3;
> +
> + if (!$2.audit)
> + $1->quiet_caps |= $3;
> $$ = $1;
> };
Thanks
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