> On Feb 3, 2017, at 08:18 , Mike Burns <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi David,
>
> I am comparing Section 4 to Section 8 in toto, and bemoaning the growth of
> Section 8.
>
> As I am sure is obvious, I think that adding verbiage into Section 8 to
> address problems which have never been shown to exist is just a waste.
>
> These things conspire to protect against the fears of market manipulation
> which always seem to me to be at the root of these proposals:
>
> 1. IPv4 value will be zero after the IPv6 transition
Which does nothing to prevent speculative transactions placing bets
against this
transition through IPv4 market manipulation.
> 2. IP address transfers are publicly recorded so there can be no invisible
> move to control the market
Except that the public information is rather limited and there’s
nothing that guarantees a single
actor is visible as a single Organization.
> 3. IP address rights are subject to change by stakeholders
Within the limitations of the RSA which is rather rigid, actually.
> 4. RIPE has had a no-needs policy for quite a while with no evidence of
> manipulation
Simply not true. RIPE has a questionable needs policy IMHO, but it is
still a needs-based policy.
> 5. The IPv4 supply market has been fragmented by 30 years of distribution
Not sure how this contributes to preventing speculative transactions.
Many stocks are speculatively traded every day
which have been on the market for far more than 30 years. Companies
more than 30 years old have been subject of hostile
takeovers.
> I know that you are aware that there is no one-stop-shopping for large IPv4
> address blocks, and there are not now nor have ever been enough addresses on
> the market to come close to levels required for manipulation.
Manipulation of a market only requires gaining control of a substantial portion
of the market, not necessarily the total of all IPv4 addresses. Indeed your
statement here would support the idea that the small market is easier to
manipulate rather than more difficult.
> The whole thing is farcical in my mind, and as a broker of more than 350
> transfers I think I have as good a window on this market as anybody. So I
> just have to point out when we engage in this discussion that we are tilting
> at windmills and my posts are exaggerated eye-rolling attempts.
While I appreciate your colorful characterization of those of us with opposing
views as much as anyone else, I find your belief that the market is free of
manipulation or that there is no need to make efforts to prevent same to be
equally worthy of a donkey and substantial eye-rolling.
Owen
>
> Regards,
> Mike
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David R Huberman [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Friday, February 03, 2017 11:04 AM
> To: Mike Burns <[email protected]>
> Cc: 'Jason Schiller' <[email protected]>; [email protected]
> Subject: RE: [arin-ppml] 2016-3 Revisited
>
>
> Mike,
>
> For clarity, your last question - the final paragraph - what smooth section
> is that? Existing NRPM 8.5, or 2016-3 without the anti-abuse clause?
>
> David
>
>
> On Fri, 3 Feb 2017, Mike Burns wrote:
>
>> Hi David,
>>
>>
>>
>> I appreciate you trying to make me understand.
>>
>> So are you assuming in your example that you seek to purchase space that you
>> do not need for your business purposes.
>>
>> My argument is that organizations do not purchase space for which they
>> don’t feel there is a valid business purpose. Now it’s true that an
>> organization’s perception of need will vary from the one which is being
>> rigorously defined here, but there is an obvious brake on the purchase of
>> items for which there is not a business purpose.
>>
>>
>>
>> And for those whom we are imagining who are determined to somehow go around
>> policy to acquire un-necessary space, there are already plenty of
>> workarounds, the simplest of which is to acquire RIPE space.
>>
>>
>>
>> Am I missing something obvious that requires this additional complexity to
>> what was a nice smooth section of the NRPM?
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: David Huberman [mailto:[email protected]]
>> Sent: Friday, February 03, 2017 10:43 AM
>> To: Mike Burns <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Jason Schiller <[email protected]>; [email protected]
>> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] 2016-3 Revisited
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike,
>>
>>
>>
>> I buy a /13. I abuse the spirit of 2016-3, meant for smaller transfers as
>> our first attempt at no needs testing, by reiterating /16 transfers one
>> after the other.
>>
>>
>>
>> Market pricing doesn't stop this, and the ARIN community who participates in
>> public policy matters has made it clear that an incremental approach towards
>> needs testing is a good thing.
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>
>> On Feb 3, 2017, at 10:34 AM, Mike Burns <[email protected]
>> <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> If that approach still doesn't work can you suggest some other mechanism to
>> prevent abuse that does not prevent an organization who needs IP space from
>> using this policy?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>>
>>
>> Why are we ignoring the mechanism that prevents organizations from buying
>> un-needed anything? To wit, they have to pay money for these addresses. You
>> guys are spinning up unlikely scenarios and ignoring the 800lb. elephant in
>> the room… the cost of these addresses is the mechanism you seek.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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