William Dickens wrote:
> 
> >This doesn't seem consistent with the usual story that big airlines want
> >slots allocated by competitive bidding, while small airlines don't.  If
> >the slots are the source of the monopoly power, competitive bidding
> >would lead to full dissipation of the rents, no?
> 
> Not at all. The network economies mean that the slots are a lot more valuable to an 
>established airline, and the differences in the extent to which airlines depend on 
>existing cities as hubs means that the value to one airline is going to be greater 
>than any of the others and so it will not lose all its rents to bidding.

Fair enough, though in the long-run your story is pretty superficial. 
The possibility of earning rents if an airport becomes another hub just
intensifies competition at the "competition *for* the hub" stage of the
game.

> But that misses the main point. Big airlines want competitive bidding for _new_ 
>slots, not existing ones. This will allow them to maintain the value of their 
>existing slots by strategically out-bidding potential competitors. At least that is 
>my understanding of their motivations. -- 
So it's basically predation?  Any evidence the big airlines are losing
money on the marginal slots they win bids for?

-- 
                        Prof. Bryan Caplan                
       Department of Economics      George Mason University
        http://www.bcaplan.com      [EMAIL PROTECTED]

  "[T]he power of instruction is seldom of much efficacy, except in 
   those happy dispositions where it is almost superfluous." 
   -- Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*

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