Sorry about the blank message- damn "enter" key :) I have been thinking a good deal about the problem of pollution in an anarcho-capitalist society lately. It has lead to many quick dead ends, but provided a few thoughts that I can't shut the door on, yet.
What about a private EPA(s)? They would be private environmental regulatory agencies. This would help lower the trasaction costs and, with private law establishing contracts of rights to pollute/not be polluted on, this could help lead to a Coasian solution. The private EPA would make money by offering a service of testing for environmental degradation and then arbitrating with the polluters. It would be held in check (i.e. not arbitrating for every little degredation) because arbitration costs. There may be many problems with this, but one that jumps out is the question: Does the Coase Theorem apply to externalities that are public bads/goods? I mean, while people could bargain for an optimal solution IF tranaction costs were zero, would this happen for a public good? Wouldn't there still be the freerider problem? Any thoughts? Jason DeBacker
