Two notes on organ donation the second more economic than the first.
Organ donation is not prohibited by Hinduism. There are in fact a
number of Hindu stories that lend support to organ donation.
Economists typically see the organ donation issue as a problem of price
controls (price fixed at zero creating a shortage) but this is not the
only economic perspective. In a paper in my book Entrepreneurial
Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science
(www.EntrepreneurialEconomics.org) I suggest that the problem can also
be seen as a tragedy of the commons. Today, by law, everyone has equal
access to an organ should they need one - i.e. the supply of organs is
treated as a commons and the commons is therefore ill-maintained and
stocked. Now what is the solution to a commons problem? - privatize
it. I suggest that the only people who should be entitled to an organ
are those who sign their organ donor cards - the supply of organs thus
becomes the property of the organ donor card signatories. Alternatively
conceived, signing your organ donor card is the premium one pays for a
policy that offers insurance in case one of your organs goes bad. Some
advantages of this "no give - no take" rule is that most people think it
is moral and fair - unlike the reaction of most people to buying and
selling organs. In addition, the policy will increase the supply of
organs because there is now an incentive to sign your organ donor card.
Indeed the policy is essentially as efficient as pricing organs.
Some quick responses to obvious objections - children wouldn't be
restricted until they had a choice to sign their cards at say age 16. A
1 year moratorium would cover last minute signers. Medical criteria
would continue to play a role and rather than literally forbidding
non-signers to get an organ you could give points to those who had
previously signed their organ donor cards that moved them up the list.
Some other elements are covered in my paper. Entrepreneurial
Economics also includes a paper by Barnett, Blair and Kaserman that is
one of the best pieces on pricing organs.
Alex Tabarrok
--
Dr. Alexander Tabarrok
Vice President and Director of Research
The Independent Institute
100 Swan Way
Oakland, CA, 94621-1428
Tel. 510-632-1366, FAX: 510-568-6040
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
