> Thus, suppose I get a $10 direct expressive benefit from voting for tons > of useless health care spending, and the probability of decisiveness is > 1-in-a-million. I don't see how any demand revelation mechanism is > going to help. > Prof. Bryan Caplan
If someone states a value of $10 not because he wants the health care spending but because he enjoys stating that value, then it seems to me that the person is willing to pay that amount even if for that odd reason, and so his statement of value would be just as significant as one who actually values the health care. If the average cost, say for mosquito abatement, would be $5, and that person states he would pay up to $10 for it, then he is knowingly contributing to the total stated value, and if the total value exceeds the cost, is willing to pay the $10, regardless of his reason. All we really should care about is how much he is willing to pay. There can be all sorts of reasons why one would favor a program. One could, for example, favor a freeway because he thinks it helps birds navigate, even if in fact it does not. No matter, he is willing to put up bucks, and that is what counts. The whole point of demand revelation is that one's true subjective value is unknown, and so is the reason for it. All we can know is the stated value, and that is sufficient, and makes it superior to majority voting. After all, someone could vote for a Democrat candidate because he likes the sound of the candidate's name, so there are odd reasons why people vote in any system. Fred Foldvary ===== [EMAIL PROTECTED]
