fabio guillermo rojas wrote:
> I think that applications of MVT are very, very sloppy. Four
> criticisms:
>
> 1. You seem to assume that policy responds quite well to public
> opinion. You assume that if opinion shifts, policy will quickly follow.
> I believe that policy is very "sticky" with respect to public
> opinion. To make it econo-talk, I think policy is not very
> elastic with respect to changes in the median voter.
Elasticity and stickiness are different concepts. But in any case,
there is little evidence that policy preferences shift rapidly. When
they do markedly shift, we usually see that politicians change a lot by
the next election. Very often the existing politician preemptively
changes his position to avoid giving his opponents' the opportunity to
attack him for being "out of touch."
> 2. Institutions are designed to prevent policy from being overly
> sensitive to public opinion. Ie, we don't have elections every
> day. We create rules that allow policy makers to resist
> every whim of opinion. Examples: rules for changing the constitution,
> judicial dependence on precedents, etc. In a sense, institutions
> play the role that contracts do in the labor market - set
> practices over some time period (ie, you've bought labor
> at price X and the employee can't leave just because the price
> is now more than X).
Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much.
The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a
couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely.
In theory, I don't deny that this could matter. In practice, though, I
see little evidence. Again, if you can't name the unpopular policies,
what reason do we have to think that institutional constraints are
binding? They mostly constrain us from doing stuff that the median
voter doesn't want anyway.
> 3. When people (ahem, Mr. B.C.) say "look - puzzle - people want
> X but we get Y" - the poll that measures opinion is probably
> a random sample of adults, or maybe voters. But as I've argued
> before, this might not be the relevant group. Maybe it's
> party activists, or party-rank and file. Policies may have
> select audiences and there is no puzzle until you show that
> the relevant audience does in fact strongly oppose a policy.
Curiouser and curiouser. Re-read this point. Out of context, it sounds
like a *defense* of the MVT! You seem to be saying "There is no puzzle
for the MVT if the electorate is not the relevant group politicians must
appeal to." Fine. I am saying that "There is no puzzle if existing
politician match the median preference." Also true. In other words,
you seem to be giving the MVT an extra line of defense.
Since I don't think that's your intent, I need clarification.
> 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that
> many people are only willing to get worked up over a small
> # of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and
> the dedicated might add their favorites like gun control
> or affirmative action. Therefore, it's no risk to screw
> the voter on an issue as long as you don't do it on certain
> big issues. Therefore it's easy to get a list of dozens
> of issues and find a descrepancy - what's so puzzling about
> that?
My point, again, is that there are few such discrepancies! It's NOT
easy to make a list of issues and find deviations.
I will agree that it is safer for politicians to deviate from the MVT on
small issues that few people care about. But this does not mean that
big deviations on small issues are frequent. So far, there is still a
scarcity of examples. It is also worth mentioning that under $1 B is
spent on campaign contributions, suggesting that special interests
haven't been able to buy much of value.
Of course, if the median voter is *indifferent* on an issue, all
observed policies satisfy the MVT.
> So my beef isn't the MVT per se, but the knee jerk use of it.
Knee jerk use is appropriate in this case. The theoretical objections
are weak, and the empirical evidence in favor is strong.
> Fabio
--
Prof. Bryan Caplan
Department of Economics George Mason University
http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one
would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not
necessary that anyone but himself should understand it."
Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
