> ref Tideman and Tullock, 1976, A New and Superior Process > ..., JPE 84 (Dec). > > T&T note that demand revelation is not perfect. For example > coalitions can > distort the results. The coalition benefit would vary with > the square of the > number of members. But majority voting also suffers from a > large numbers > problem. There is thus a case in either method for keeping > the number of > participants relatively small. >
> Fred Foldvary Thanks for a lot of explanation, Fred. But I wonder if there are any small homeowner associations, or service clubs, or any group, who actually have used this method for allocating the group budget? I have this strong feeling the answer is no, no technocratic run cities, no homeowners, not even any group of economists (like an econ dept. of a university). This gives me a feeling of speculative irrelevancy, despite the possible improvements (though not as much as imagining the US like a corporation with shares). On the other hand, I understand some cities HAVE used a land-value tax. Aren't there any good empirical studies of before & after -- and even reversion? I think I recall reading that some cities tried it, and then abandoned it as too complex, or maybe too unfair. But I don't know the details and I'd be interested in them. Again, thanks for insights, Tom Grey
