> This does not contradict diminishing marginal utility.  DMU 
> proposes that
> for a given good, after some amount, extra amounts yield ever 
> diminishing
> extra utility.

My use of "contradiction" was misleading. Here I have no dissent to Fred. 

> If a particular threshold of income is needed in order to get 
> utility from
> a good (i.e. having more than the neighbor), marginal utility 
> theory is not
> contradicted but simply does not apply.  

> The implication is that after the 
> threshold, one
> would strive to get more income until extra neighbor-beating 
> has the same
> utility as extra other goods or extra leisure.

My point is that justification of redistribution simply with the common argument of 
diminishing marginal returns of income over the complete range of income is not so 


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