Up to ten bombings and grenade attacks across Assam by the outlawed
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) on Sunday (January 22, 2006) have
disrupted operations in the gas, oil and power sectors in the state,
besides keeping the security establishment on tenterhooks ahead of
Republic Day, January 26. The 291 MW gas-based power plant at Kathalguri
in Dibrugarh District, 550 kilometres east of Guwahati, run by the North
Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) shut down completely,
shortly before midnight Sunday, after rebels blew up a six-metre stretch
of the main gas supply pipeline.
While B.C. Sharma, Managing Director of the Assam Gas Company Limited
(AGCL), that transports gas to the power plant, told this writer it
would take at least 48 hours for his engineers to restore gas supply,
power authorities said the state would face a shortfall of 100 MW due to
the shut down of the plant. Assam consumes 700 MW of power at any given
point, and a shortfall of 100 MW, therefore, is a huge reduction in
supply. "We shall be forced to cut power or ration supply until the
generation at the plant resumes," Subhash Das, Chairman of the Assam
state Electricity Board (ASEB), told this writer on Monday, January 23.
Indian oil major, Oil India Limited (OIL) has already felt the
impact. "We have closed down nine gas wells due to the disruption in gas
supply to the power plant," Nripen Bharali, an OIL spokesman told
South Asia Intelligence Review . This is because the power plant
at Kathalguri was lifting 1.4 million cubic metres of gas a day and its
shut down has left the gas produced by OIL (and transported through a
pipeline by AGCL) unutilised. AGCL authorities said the company would
stand to lose INR 2.8 million a day on gas transportation to the power
plant. Estimates of OIL losses due to the closure of its gas wells are
yet to be worked out.
Further, there has been disruption in crude movement through
pipelines in the Moran area of eastern Assam after some gas pipelines
were blown away in the vicinity. "Gas is used to run certain heaters
meant to ensure a smooth movement of crude oil through pipelines. The
blowing up of the gas pipelines has hit us because the heaters won't run
without gas," an OIL official explained.
While it has become a sort of ritual for the ULFA to engage in or
step up its violence in the run up to important days in the national
calendar, such as Republic Day and Independence Day, the rebel group's
actions this time round has come at a time when its hand-picked
representatives are engaged in 'exploratory' peace talks with New Delhi.
Assamese writer Indira Goswami, who is heading the 11-member People's
Consultative Group (PCG), feels that the ULFA could be getting restive
due to the government of India's delay in holding the second round of
talks with her Group.
The first round of talks, attended by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
and Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, was held in New Delhi on October
26, 2005. The delay in holding the next round was being interpreted by
PCG members as part of New Delhi's 'lack of sincerity' in the ULFA peace
process. The PCG is supposed to prepare the grounds for possible direct
talks between the ULFA and the government of India. On Monday the 23rd,
Goswami informed South Asia Intelligence Review, National
Security Advisor M.K.Narayanan had, in the wake of the latest series of
ULFA attacks, communicated to her that the second round of talks would
be held on February 7, 2006.
ULFA's decision to step up its offensive ahead of Republic Day is not
surprising, and remains consistent with the past record.What is
surprising, though, is the rebel group's capacity to strike across the
state across a widely dispersed area in such a large number of
coordinated attacks – including major attacks in the capital, Guwahati –
with the intelligence machinery and the security forces being able to do
precious little to prevent such attacks.
The choice of its primary target is not unexpected. ULFA had slapped
a INR Five billion ($112 million) extortion demand on the Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) in the first week of January 2006, at a
time when the oil major was planning to invest INR 33 billion in
exploration and other activities in Assam, implied that ULFA was bent on
sending out a real tough message that it is a force to reckon with. By
launching a string of grenade and bomb attacks, it has sought to
demonstrate its fire power and strike potential. Another significant
aspect of the current series of attacks is that ULFA has actually laid
an ambush on security forces after a considerable period of time. One
policeman was killed when ULFA militants ambushed an Assam Police party
near Borpathar in the eastern District of Golaghat on January 22.
The string of ULFA attacks since January 20, 2006, have been rather
daring raids, going well beyond the planting of improvised explosive
devices (IED) stealthily at soft targets. Instead, cadres have carried
out grenade attacks, venturing close to their targets, including police
posts, at significant personal risk, demonstrating a hitherto absent
sense of confidence and determination. The January 20 grenade attack in
front of the main entrance to the heavily-guarded Guwahati Refinery
caused injuries to 10 people, including Central Industrial Security
Force (CISF) personnel on duty.
Again, on January 22, ULFA cadres chose to lob grenades at a check
post in Guwahati, manned by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). At
least three CRPF men were wounded. Then, there was a grenade attack near
the high-security Police Reserve in Guwahati, leading to injuries to at
least two police officers. A few others were wounded when an IED,
planted on a stationery bus near the Police Reserve went off as
policemen and a crowd had gathered after the grenade attack.
The delay on New Delhi's part in holding the second round of talks
with the ULFA-appointed PCG could well be part of the government's
strategy to protract the process till the Assam Assembly elections are
over by May 2006. Holding a second round of talks earlier would have put
New Delhi under pressure to hold the third round before the polls,
requiring some specific commitments on the outcome – and such
commitments, or their lack, could have impacted on voters. Delhi's
vacillation on this is, consequently, not difficult to understand within
the given political context.
The failure of the security and intelligence establishment to notice
the rise in militant movement and preparations, and the longer term
failure to stop or cut off access to the supply of explosives to ULFA
is, on the other hand, difficult to comprehend or accept. For more than
15 years now, security forces have been engaged in counter-insurgency
operations in Assam, and they have periodically claimed to have 'broken
the back' of ULFA. They are yet to identify and stem the source of
explosives to the organization, or to clarify whether the bombs are
being manufactured within Assam, or are being procured ready-made from
an external source.
How is such an abundance of hand grenades available in the state? And
how can these explosives and grenades be moved about across the state,
and into the state capital, with apparent ease, at a time when the
authorities are at the highest levels of alert as they gear up to thwart
ULFA's diktat for a boycott of Republic Day celebrations, and the threat
of violence on that date?
