was watching the movie for the umpteenth time - about CIA and USAirForce in SE Asia's war -- engaging in heroin manufacture alongwith the local army to finance the war. We hear so many reports from NE India about army/defense officials engaged in very very lucrative timber trade where one tree of teak or sal brings in Rs 10 lakhs ($25,000). Ofcourse Supreme Courth recently banned all timber cutting in forests but who will check the corruption. Maybe there are vested interests who do not want the war to stop.
I was reading about large-scale change -which brings a re-distribution of power. Some lose power hence are opposed to reforms. is that the case of the defense and their opposers - the ULFA. Both lose power -so when one is hesitant and ready to stop - the other makes sure that war doesn't go away.
Umesh
umesh sharma <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
umesh sharma <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I am glad Ajai Singh is not ruling India or else it would have become like Pakistan.Umeshfrom the article:"Assams governor, Lieutenant General Ajai Singh architect
of
two counter-insurgency operations against ULFA publicly opposes
negotiations. What is there to negotiate with them? he asks. Instead,
he
favours instilling fear in the rebels so that they cannot dictate
terms.
By contrast, Assams elected chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, has been
strongly
supportive of negotiations."
Sanjib Baruah <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060220/asp/opinion/story_5850159.asp
The Telegraph (Calcutta) Monday, February 20, 2006
HOW THE STALEMATE MACHINE WORKS
Sanjib Baruah
The obvious lesson of Kakopathar is that counter-insurgency operations and
negotiations towards peace do not go together, writes Sanjib Baruah The
author is at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and Bard College,
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
The developments in Assam over the past few days have made one thing
clear: that reports in recent years of the United Liberation Front of
Assam losing influence have been highly exaggerated. At least that is not
the case in those parts of rural upper Assam the home ground of ULFAs
exiled top leadership and the site of the recent unrest.
For a number of days, pro-ULFA slogans and sentiments have been in open
display as villagers of the Kakopathar region blocked a national highway,
stormed army pickets, vandalized vehicles and even dug up the highway to
protest against the custodial killing of a fellow villager by the Indian
army. That the army describes the victim as an ULFA hit-man has had no
effect on the publics sense of outrage. Nine persons were killed in a
police firing of protesters. ULFA called an Assam bandh on February 13,
protesting against the Kakopathar firing and its chairman, Arabinda
Rajkhowa, compared the incident with the Jalianwalla Bagh massacre.
The backdrop to these developments might initially seem awkward. The
second meeting between the government of India and the ULFA-appointed
peoples consultative group had just taken place in Delhi where the
government even promised confidence-building measures to facilitate what
could some day be called a peace process. However, important differences
exist on the government side on whether to negotiate with ULFA. No less a
person than Assams governor, Lieutenant General Ajai Singh architect of
two counter-insurgency operations against ULFA publicly opposes
negotiations. What is there to negotiate with them? he asks. Instead, he
favours instilling fear in the rebels so that they cannot dictate terms.
By contrast, Assams elected chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, has been strongly
supportive of negotiations. Singh and some others in the security
establishment would probably interpret Kakopathar as no more than a
temporary setback. But if a single incident could become a trigger to such
public anger and _expression_ of pro-ULFA sentiments, one can hardly have
confidence in the security establishments reading of the ground situation
and its recipe for bringing about peace.
Indias track record of ending internal armed conflicts is quite poor.
Today the world has numerous intra-state armed conflicts, and everywhere
they last long on average about seven years as opposed to six months for
international wars according to one count. However, the duration of
intra-state armed conflicts in India and in the rest of south Asia have
been much longer than the world average. The Naga war despite the
nine-year old ceasefire will soon enter the sixth decade, making it one
of the worlds oldest armed conflicts.
There are many reasons why most of our conflicts have been long-lasting.
But one common factor seems to suggest itself. Those who study armed
internal conflicts emphasize the role of a mutually hurting stalemate
felt by conflicting parties as a necessary condition for pushing
conflicts in the direction of a negotiated settlement. These theorists
argue that when parties realize that further military escalation would not
produce victory and that the costs of the status quo are unacceptably
high, a conflict becomes ripe for resolution.
But in India, even when conflicts have been terribly hurtful, localized
suffering has not easily translated into high costs for the government
side. Doing something about conflicts in the Northeast may be important
for our national-level politicians, but no government has fallen because
of the way it has handled or mishandled them. And after decades of
counter-insurgency and attention to security, we have further cushioned
our decision-making elites from the hurting effects of a stalemate.
In a new two-tiered order, the top echelons of the bureaucracy, the army
and the political establishment who live and travel with very high levels
of security are now the security haves. Under these conditions, despite
enormous suffering by civilians, those who favour a military solution or
rather a victors peace tend to win policy arguments. They seem to believe
that given the obvious military superiority of the governments side, all
armed groups can be eventually bullied into submission. This of course has
meant, in effect, stalemated long-duration armed conflicts and the costs
being paid almost entirely by the security have-nots.
One obvious lesson of Kakopathar is that counter-insurgency operations and
efforts toward a negotiated peace do not go together. Kakopathar
underscores the absence of a solid coalition on the government side in
support of negotiations. What has made the two meetings with the PCG
possible is simply an electoral calculation that in post-Illegal Migrants
(Determination by Tribunals) Act Assam, the ethnic Assamese vote might
matter to the Congress more than usual. Appearing to be on the side of a
negotiated peace with ULFA might give the Congress an edge over the Asom
Gana Parishad among this segment. But since this posture does not have to
be maintained beyond the elections, there is no need to try to build a
stable political coalition to support a negotiated peace. Thus the serious
differences between the governor and the chief minister can just be put
aside. Were we serious about a negotiated peace, there might have been
pressure for the governor to resign. After all, there could be no better
confidence-building measure than making a civilian, and someone untainted
by counter-insurgency operations, the next governor.
Decisions made under these political conditions can only reinforce the
existing stalemate. Daniel Ellsberg had coined the term stalemate machine
to describe the American political logic of successive presidents
committing just enough resources to Vietnam so as not to violate two
critical domestic political rules of thumb: to not lose South Vietnam to
the communists before the next election and not commit US ground troops to
a land war in Asia. Pretending to work towards a negotiated peace with
ULFA while carrying on counter-insurgency operations is an Indian version
of a stalemate machine.
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1-202-215-4328 [Cell Phone]
Ed.M. - International Education Policy
Harvard Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University,
Class of 2005
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1-202-215-4328 [Cell Phone]
Ed.M. - International Education Policy
Harvard Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University,
Class of 2005
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