http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1479557.cms
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has bounced back, after being on the margins for a while. A Bhutanese army crackdown in December 2003 broke the back of this militant group.
Over 800 cadres were neutralised - killed in action, arrested or handed over to security forces. The ULFA leadership in Dhaka
was demoralised. Within Assam, ULFA had turned unpopular and its dictates were ignored, unlike in the 90s. But now ULFA appears to have recovered.
Its call for dawn-to-dusk Assam bandh on February 13, to protest against police firing in Tinsukia on February 10 in which eight persons including five women were killed, evoked widespread response.
The protestors were demons-trating against the death on February 5, of an alleged ULFA supporter in army custody. How did this turnaround happen?
After the Bhutan operation, ULFA lost its main bases for launching operations in Assam
. Except for two leaders, namely, Paresh Baruah and Arvinda Rajkhowa, safely ensconced in Bangladesh, other top leaders of ULFA were either arrested or killed in action. According to home ministry statistics, about 3,000 Assamese militants, including ULFA and Bodos, surrendered in 2003, and over 400 were either killed or arrested.
There were numerous incidents of common folks taking action against ULFA cadres. ULFA was reduced to a terrorist group, attacking soft and civilian targets to assert its presence.
The All Assam Students Union (AASU) became increasingly critical of ULFA. The time had finally come to
further isolate ULFA as a terrorist outfit and extinguish its support base.
Surprisingly, a formal letter of invitation was issued by national security advisor M K Narayanan on December 7, 2004
, urging ULFA to come forward for negotiations. This was like giving a life-support system to a dying patient.
Security forces slackened operations against ULFA. The months that followed, leading to the first round of negotiations in October 2004, helped ULFA reassert itself as a voice of the people of
Assam which it had ceased to be. It managed to reorganise its support base and extend its activities.
An emboldened ULFA detonated 50 explosions across Assam in the first half of 2005. Paresh Baruah began to insist on negotiations without preconditions.
New Delhi, in its anxiety to commence talks, agreed to negotiate even with the so-called representatives of ULFA leadership, called the People's Consultative Group (PCG).
ULFA refused to give up its demand of sovereignty of Assam and once again the rhetoric of direct talks, permanent solutions, sovereignty, ceasefire and safe passage came back into currency.
It was astonishing that the prime minister decided to drop in during the first round of negotiations between the PCG and NSA on October 26, 2005
.
He reportedly told PCG members that he was willing to listen to all their concerns. This allowed ULFA to project
itself as a body representing the aspirations of Assamese people.
In the second round of talks held on February 27, 2006
, an emboldened ULFA demanded release of its leaders before even consi-dering direct talks between the ULFA leadership in Dhaka and the Indian government.
The incumbent Congress government was trying to notch up some achievements in Assam with no demonstrable progress in terms of development.
The so-called peace talks and timing of the proposal to amend the foreigners' Act to create tribunals for identification of illegal immigrants came across as electoral ploys.
Whether these measures enable the Congress to emerge a winner in the assembly elections or not, their impact on the state's security will be adverse.
The government should be firm with ULFA on some issues: ULFA must agree to give up the issue of sovereignty of Assam; talks will only be held with the top two leaders of ULFA, namely, Baruah and Rajkhowa, and not with their proxies; and ULFA cadres must either surrender arms or agree to confine themselves to designated camps like NSCN (IM) and NSCN (Khaplang) cadres in Nagaland and give up violence.
This will test the bona fides of ULFA and show whether it is willing to engage in meaningful talks.
The writer is former special secretary, RAW.
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