[Assam] SA Editorial : Bangladeshi infiltration ; GOI-PCG-ULFA talk results

[umesh sharma]

with a Indo-Bangla border (3000 miles) longer than US-Mexico border (2000 miles) can we say that when US cannot control its border -in an empty desert how can we expect India to do so -with border in heavy jungles.   Umesh   ---------------------------------------------   EDITORIAL » »

Last updated : SUNDAY 2 JULY 2006 http://www.sentinelassam.com/

The Bangladesh Plan It is at once gratifying and amusing to find that the North East Students’ Organization (NESO) has finally woken up to the realpolitik of the prolonged illegal infiltration from Bangladesh into the northeastern States of India. In a recent statement made in Guwahati, Dr Samujjal Bhattacharya, chairman of NESO, told journalists of 14 fundamentalist outfits from Bangladesh that were spreading their tentacles in the northeastern region, taking full advantage of the porous Indo-Bangladesh border. “The silent invasion in the form of influx (from Bangladesh) is effecting a serious demographic change in Asom and the other northeastern States. To top it, 14 fundamentalist outfits are actively working in the Northeast as part of their game plan to make the region a part of greater Bangladesh,” he said. We said at the very beginning that we find the recent discovery of the NESO amusing. This is because for over two decades The Sentinel has ceaselessly addressed this issue and repeatedly pointed out the hazards of permitting this silent invasion from Bangladesh to go on unabated. However, the Centre as well as the State government have maintained an attitude that has not just been insensitive to the vital problem but one that has actively promoted the increase in the number of illegal migrants to Asom from Bangladesh and the resultant orchestrated demographic change in the State. The effect has been nothing short of a harakiri seemingly prompted by a strange death wish — so perverse and bizarre have been the actions of the State government in seeking to pretend that the problem does not exist at all. However, when one views the problem from the perspective of the Congress, it should be abundantly clear that the Congressmen of Asom have no option but to pretend that there are no Bangladeshis in Asom at all, and that every single one of them visible to everyone else is actually an Indian citizen. This is because they are obliged not only to live with their past sins, but to actually legitimize them. In the beginning (in the early 1960s) this illegal immigration from then East Pakistan was something that was mindlessly encouraged by the Congress politicians of Asom because these immigrants facilitated easy and effortless electoral victories for them. Over the years, after lakhs of them were helped to get their names included in the electoral roll of the State and to settle on remote inaccessible riverine land, they became a political force to reckon with, capable of telling chief ministers of the State that their governments could be dismissed in five minutes flat unless they toed the line of the Bangladeshi lobby. To please them, even our immigratioon law was sabotaged. Mr Tarun Gogoi must be given full credit for being the the only chief minister of the State in recent times capable of putting the Bangladeshi lobby in its place — at least for the time being. Having said this, we must assert that the danger of the silent invasion from Bangladesh can be underrated only at great grave peril to national security. The State government as well as the Centre must realize that census figures are not compiled by the AASU or the AGP. Likewise the statistics of the abnormal increase of voters in the State are not figures cooked up by ‘chauvinist elements’. These are figures that have been derived from the Election Commission. The census records say that the population of Asom more than doubled between 1901 (3.29 million) and 1941 (6.694 million), and that the population increased by 343.77 per cent between 1901 and 1971 (14.625 million) when India’s population had increased only by about 150 per cent! Between 1957 and 1962, the voters of Asom increased by 10 per cent from 4.493 million to 4.943 million. In 1970 we had 5.702 million voters. In 1971, the number increased to 6.296 million — an increase of 10.42 per cent in just one year. Since then, the population increase and the increase in the number of voters have been even more alarming. None of this happened because the people of Asom had suddenly become far more fertile than the rest of India. In fact, both the urban and rural fertility rates for any of these periods is a shade lower than the national average. Thus this abnormal increase in population is almost entirely due to illegal immigration. One clear indicator of this is the fact that the Muslim population of Asom has increased at a far higher rate than the Hindu population in the census reports of 1991 and 2001. And these are facts that the Government of India has been at great pains to hide. How it will cope with such figures once the Right to Information Act becomes fully operational, remains to be seen. In any case, if the promoters of illegal immigration seek to pretend that they were not expecting this silent invasion to be geared to expansionist programmes of Bangladesh, they probably consider every citizen of the State to be a simpleton. At least India’s External Affairs Ministry must be aware of the Lebensraum rationale of Bangladeshi intellectuals that is about two decades old. Was it not time to wake up even then?

Finding a Tangible Solution to the ULFA Imbroglio JP Rajkhowa Hopes are raised in the minds of the peace-loving people of Asom, nay the entire Northeast, by the joint statement of the Government of India and PCG representatives, who reportedly had a fruitful discussion on June 22, in order to lay the path for direct talks between the Central Government and the proscribed ULFA. The PCG spokesman described the talks as extremely cordial — with a positive outlook on the part of Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil. Apart from the Centre’s agreement in principle to release the five ULFA leaders from jail in consultation with the State Government, what transpired further in the discussion is not publicly known. This tripartite meeting, chaired by the Union Home Minister himself, is sounded to be the last round of discussion with the PCG, paving the way for direct talks between the Centre and the militant outfit. It is highly probable that apart from discussing the modalities for release of the five jailed Central Committee members of the ULFA and about their establishing open links with the outfit for working out details for direct talks, the meeting deliberated on the key demands of the ULFA — the ‘‘sovereignty’’ issue, holding talks outside India if necessary, presence of UN representative during discussion etc. The meeting also probably discussed on granting of safe passage to ULFA leaders presently holed up in Bangladesh/Myanmar, besides cessation of hostilities on both sides. It was learnt from media reports that the Central representatives expressed serious concern over the recent spate of violence and bomb blasts triggered by suspected ULFA militants in a number of districts of the State in the second week of last month. The PCG felt really very uncomfortable after the incidents had taken place, just a few days before the Delhi talks. So it was the turn of the Central Government to put pressure on the ULFA for exercising restraint. It is not clear from media reports if the PCG also demanded of the Centre to exercise similar restraint by the security forces. One recent demand of the ULFA relates to disclosing the whereabouts of some top ULFA cadres — Asanta Bagh Phukan, Rabin Neog, Bening Rabha and others. It appears from media reports that in the last round of talks, this issue was perhaps not taken up, probably the matter being sub-judice at Gauhati High Court. To the common man, the main issues revolving around the last round were release of five Central Committee members of the ULFA presently lodged in jail and exercise of restraint by the outfit. In any case, in our view it was a positive development, as the direct dialogue process is on after 27 years of militancy, which could ultimately be the harbinger of peace in the strife-torn State. Dr Mamoni Raisom Goswami and other PCG members have certainly done a good job by breaking the ice with the Government of India. Secondly, they succeeded in persuading the militant outfit to come forward for one-to-one talk with the Government of India. The State Government has also taken a proactive approach this time, with the declaration by the Chief Minister, just before the last round, that the State Government had recommended to the Centre for the release of the five Central Committee members of ULFA in order to enable them to sit for direct negotiations. Then the question arises as to why the Centre stated in the joint statement that it would favourably consider the release of the five members of ULFA in consultation with the State Government. Well, this could be for the reason that the State Government recommended the case a few days before the series of bomb blasts and other acts of violence allegedly committed by suspected ULFA cadres. Thus the changed ground situation, primarily at the behest of the ULFA, casts shadows of suspicion on the minds of the policymakers and security analysts in New Delhi about the sincerity of the ULFA for peace initiatives. It is now learnt from media reports that the State Government is considering the release of the five ULFA leaders on parole, for which they are in touch with the Central Government. The State Chief Secretary also expressed the Government’s concern for return of the released persons to the State’s custody after the parole period, as there was a bitter experience in 1991 when ULFA’s general secretary Anup Chetia, who was released on parole in the interest of talks, jumped out of it. It would seem relevant to recall that while the Government of India started the peace initiative with the NSCN(I-M) about ten years back, followed by similar initiatives with rebel groups in Manipur and next with some rebel groups in Asom, the initiation of peace process with ULFA has taken a longer time. There are strong reasons to believe that vested interests were engaged in derailing peace initiatives with the ULFA. Everyone in Asom is fully aware of how the surrender drama was stage-managed in the past in order to break the backbone of the ULFA. Rehabilitation package for the SULFA members practically provided an impetus to the easy-money culture among the youths of the State. Most of the money given as soft loan by banks against State guarantee was never repaid, as a result of which the State exchequer had to bear the liability with the Banks at the cost of ordinary people. It was also common knowledge that a huge amount of money, running into crores of rupees at times, recovered from ULFA hideouts by the security forces during combing operations, were simply misappropriated, instead of depositing into the State coffers. During the heights of counter-insurgency operations in the State, about the time of Lakhipathar operations, it was widely rumoured that so much money was seized (?) during the anti-ULFA raids that some senior officers of the security forces transported the amount out of the State even in gunny bags. Next, there were politicians of opposite camps — pro-ULFA and anti-ULFA. The former tried to use the ULFA’s name, and the latter went against them. Such vested interests are said to have enjoyed extra-constitutional authority, creating terror in the minds of simple, peace-loving citizens, and they themselves and their cohorts were surrounded by foolproof security net. An impression was given that the ULFA had become a dead organization, and it would be meaningless to have a dialogue process initiated. It was believed that the Unified Command structure would be able to deal with the outfit and bring it to the knees. Hence there was no genuine concern for peace initiatives by anyone, nor was there any cajoling by the Centre in the absence of authentic feedback on the ground situation with the rebel outfit. The Bhutan operation seemed to have crushed the vitals of the ULFA and its associates, the NDFB and the KLO. Many of their cadres got killed, many apprehended and the rest were on the run. But miraculously enough, within a couple of months, the ULFA bounced back to health. Some say it was the ISI factor: the outfit got money and materials in plenty to go for fresh recruitment, retrain existing manpower, and refill its arsenal after heavy losses to the Royal Army of Bhutan. And some say that the ULFA had so much money in Bangladesh that even after heavy losses they were financially quite strong. In any case, the ULFA’s backbone was not broken; on the other hand, it started getting some public sympathy and support with the loss of many of its young cadres (misguided!) who happened to be the ‘‘sons of the soil’’. The vested interests again seemed to have advised the Centre to intensify military action against the ULFA; on the other hand, efforts were on to bring the NDFB to the negotiating table, so as to isolate the ULFA and hit it hard. The outfit received a major setback after the Dhemaji blasts, killing innocent schoolchildren, thereby drawing condemnation from one and all. This single but most tragic incident also had the ULFA branded as a terrorist organization. On the psychological front, the ULFA already lost the battle. And then perhaps even the hardcore among the top leadership got the prick of conscience and sent feelers through Dr Goswami to do something for initiating peace efforts with the Centre in a dignified manner. As for the ULFA’s main demands and supplementary demands (if any), our immediate concern should be to start the direct dialogue process on a date to be fixed mutually. This is the time for declaring certain confidence-building measures by both the adversaries, which may be initially done for a month from a date to be mutually announced, paving the path for friendly talks. In our view, which is shared by many patriotic Asomiyas, the ULFA should make a public declaration in the following manner. It must end all hostilities by halting any violent action against the Government of India and the Government of Asom, including the security forces and their establishments, other government establishments and installations — those owned by Central or State agencies, keeping in mind the fact that all such assets are ultimately owned by the public, and it is the collective money of the poor taxpayers which has gone into building those assets. The ULFA should seek an apology from the people of Asom for the acts of violence, which it knows were committed by its cadres, leading to loss of innocent lives. In respect of violent acts, which were not committed by the ULFA, it should condemn all the perpetrators of such incidents and give information to the PCG for necessary action. The outfit should withdraw or declare as ‘‘withdrawn’’ all letters/notes/notices issued on individuals/groups of individuals/organizations/establishments, demanding money in any form or by way of extortion. The Central Government and the Government of Asom should also, on their part, declare cessation of hostilities in all forms against the members of the ULFA and their supporters, linkmen, sympathizers, whatever. All combing operations against the ULFA should stand suspended during the period, provided the ULFA also restrains its cadres. Safe passage should be given to the ULFA leaders to move freely within the State without carrying any unauthorized arms so that they may visit their parents,relatives and friends. Whatever personal security may be needed by any such ULFA leaders, the Superintendent of Police of the district concerned, nearest to their hideouts, may provide the same immediately. All members of the ULFA presently lodged in different jails in the country should be given the status of political prisoners, regardless of the cases or charges against them, and provided with proper medical facilities as may be required. Is it possible, then, to hope for an early political solution to the ULFA imbroglio? (The writer is a former Chief Secretary of Asom)

Umesh Sharma
5121 Lackawanna ST
College Park, MD 20740

1-202-215-4328 [Cell Phone]

Ed.M. - International Education Policy
Harvard Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University,
Class of 2005

weblog: http://jaipurschool.bihu.in/

---

Yahoo! Messenger - with free PC-PC calling and photo sharing.

_______________________________________________
assam mailing list
assam@assamnet.org
http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org