Realty Check!!
Ram:
I think GOA and GOI is giving mixed signals so far as ULFA is concerned.
First the survey shows 95% of people donot support ULFA. (Then why AXX need to
say it does not support ULFA? Does it make 98% not against ULFA? And does it
help?)
Then Union Ministers seem to be talking big but hollow without any substance.
"First, whatever it takes. Talks, yes, but first we have to beat down this
challenge." union defence minister A.K. Antony's announcement in Guwahati on
January 9, 2007, ended speculations regarding the resumption of the dwindling
peace process and signaled the beginning of a major military offensive in upper
Assam, hailed as the biggest ever since the early 1990s, against the United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). The offensive followed nearly 70 killings
within a span of four days, between January 5-8, 2007, in a systematic and
xenophobic campaign, by ULFA terrorists, targeting Hindi-speaking people in
five districts of Upper Assam: Tinsukia (which accounted for a majority of the
deaths) Dibrugarh, Dhemaji, Sivasagar, and Golaghat. "
People are condemning and appealing to ULFA at the same time. If ULFA is a
terrorist org, GOI need to teat ULFA as such. Why this double talk.
Then GOA Army is saying, "There has been some euphoria regarding the Army
operations in the national media and the decisive dominance these are projected
to achieve, vis-a-vis ULFA, but this euphoria is not shared by the Army. The
Army Chief, General J.J. Singh, has disclosed himself to be a votary of the
'root causes' thesis, and argues that a 'military solution' to the ULFA problem
is not possible'
Looks like ULFA which does not have any support at all, which does not have the
support of AXX (I failed to understand what purpose it serve for AXX to declare
it does not support ULFA) is in control.
The bottomline is if GOI cannot control ULFA, it should negotiate not double
talk and make a mess of Assam any more.
When ULFA was not there, 25 years ago, NE was suffering from under develepment.
Now NE is suffering from under development because of the excuse of ULFA.
What is going on???
Rajen Barua
----- Original Message -----
From: Ram Sarangapani
To: ASSAMNET
Sent: Monday, January 22, 2007 11:00 AM
Subject: [Assam] Assam -The Old Fox Trot - Outlook India
Reading articles like this, it seems there is very little hope for any kind
of peace in Assam in the near future.
and look at this from the article:
There has been some euphoria regarding the Army operations in the national
media and the decisive dominance these are projected to achieve, vis-a-vis
ULFA, but this euphoria is not shared by the Army.The Army Chief, General J.J.
Singh, has disclosed himself to be a votary of the 'root causes' thesis, and
argues that a 'military solution' to the ULFA problem is not possible.
--Ram
The Old Fox Trot
A step forward and two back. Assam continues to demonstrate conflicting
trends towards some of its multiple insurgencies, of which the ULFA seems to
have caused the maximum vacillation and uncertainty in the powers that be.
BIBHU PRASAD ROUTRAY
"First, whatever it takes. Talks, yes, but first we have to beat down
this challenge." union defence minister A.K. Antony's announcement in Guwahati
on January 9, 2007, ended speculations regarding the resumption of the
dwindling peace process and signaled the beginning of a major military
offensive in upper Assam, hailed as the biggest ever since the early 1990s,
against the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). The offensive followed
nearly 70 killings within a span of four days, between January 5-8, 2007, in a
systematic and xenophobic campaign, by ULFA terrorists, targeting
Hindi-speaking people in five districts of Upper Assam: Tinsukia (which
accounted for a majority of the deaths) Dibrugarh, Dhemaji, Sivasagar, and
Golaghat.
ULFA had provided sufficient indication of an obdurate and violent
campaign through a succession of statements preceding the killings. The
subsequent military build up entailed the movement of Army and Paramilitary
Forces (PMFs) stationed in the Lower Assam districts and from other states, to
the violence-torn areas of upper Assam. Some 20 companies of the Army and
paramilitary forces, comprising 2,000 personnel, arrived in upper Assam on
January 10 to reinforce the already gigantic security force (SF) set up there.
Another 3,000 jawaans (soldiers) from the Army's 2nd Mountain Division were
sent to Sivasagar and Dhemaji districts. Similarly, reports indicate that six
to seven companies of the Border Security Force (BSF), comprising about 500
personnel, will soon be withdrawn from north Bengal areas to be deployed in
Assam. The Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, had, in fact, asked for the
deployment of 90 companies of personnel, of which 20 were to be deployed to
provide security to the National Games to be held in Guwahati from February 9,
2007.
The euphemistically named 'Operation Clear', involved troops aided by
helicopters executing simultaneous operations in several areas of Assam,
including as Lakhipathar, Saraipung, Namsai, Upper Dihing, Dibru-Saikhowa
National Park, and the river islands in the Sadiya sub-division of Dibrugarh
district. Operations were also launched in Arunachal Pradesh's Bhismaknagar,
Manabhum Reserve Forest and Sonpura in Lohit, the Namchik area in Changlang and
Dambuk in Lower Dibang Valley. Army sources also spoke of a similar offensive
in the Garo Hills region of Meghalaya, which has traditionally been used by the
ULFA as a transit route to and from Bangladesh. On January 9, defence minister
A.K. Antony, also stated, rather optimistically, at least given Bangladesh's
track record, "We will seek the help of Bangladesh and Myanmar in addressing
the issue of ULFA cadres operating from these countries." The BSF has already
rushed four of its battalions to Meghalaya and Assam to man the sensitive
border between the two states as well as the international border with
neighbouring Bangladesh.
The achievements of the relatively massive military mobilization, till
January 12, were, however, at best modest. On January 7, 2007, two-days prior
to the commencement of the Operation, two ULFA militants were killed in an
encounter with SF personnel in the Sivasagar district. Three unidentified ULFA
militants were killed and three others arrested during a counter-insurgency
operation in the Darrang district on January 12. Earlier, on January 11, an
ULFA militant was killed at a village in the Baska district bordering Bhutan,
far from the upper Assam districts, where 'Operation Clear' was ongoing. Five
ULFA militants/ linkmen were also arrested from the Tinsukia, Karbi Anglong and
Udalguri districts.
There has been some euphoria regarding the Army operations in the
national media and the decisive dominance these are projected to achieve,
vis-a-vis ULFA, but this euphoria is not shared by the Army.The Army Chief,
General J.J. Singh, has disclosed himself to be a votary of the 'root causes'
thesis, and argues that a 'military solution' to the ULFA problem is not
possible. Speaking at a Press Conference at New Delhi on January 12, he said:
"All out operations are being undertaken to put the terrorists on the back
foot. But there is no purely military solution. There can never be a time when
we could task ourselves with finishing off the ULFA entirely, wherever they
are." He elaborated, further, "Any counter-terror campaign has to be
multi-pronged. There are political and socio-economic dimensions to the
problem. If we can compel them to come back to the negotiating table, there can
be progress." The fact that the operations to 'smoke out' ULFA cadres wouldn't
be easy, had earlier been underlined by an Army official on January 9, who
stated: "Practically no intelligence on their movements is available from where
they are holed up now, given the fact that there is hardly any human habitation
in these places."
The resumption of all-out hostilities in Assam has reversed the
achievements of the past four years. Beginning 2003, when 505 terrorism related
deaths were reported in Assam, fatalities have registered a steady decline.
According to the Institute for Conflict Management database, 174 terrorism
related deaths were reported in 2006, a 39 per cent decline from the previous
year. With 40 deaths, Kamrup, in which the state capital Dispur is located,
remained the most violent district. Three districts, Kamrup, Tinsukia and North
Cachar Hills, accounted for 111 deaths. And among multiple terrorist outfits
operating in Assam, ULFA remained the most violent accounting for 64 per cent
of the total terrorism-related fatalities. ULFA also accounted for 65 per cent
of the civilian killings and 51 per cent of SF fatalities registered in 2006.
The Congress Party led by Tarun Gogoi was returned to power in the
State Legislative Assembly elections in May 2006. In a statement on December
11, forest and environment minister Rockybul Hussain disclosed in the Assembly
that 114 civilians and 27 SF personnel had died in militancy-related violence
in Assam since Gogoi took over as Chief Minister for his second term. The
civilians killed include 57 persons who were killed in explosions triggered by
militants. A total of 1,214 persons, including 1,031 civilians, 121 personnel
belonging to Assam Police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and other
para-military forces and 62 Army personnel, were killed by various militant
outfits since Gogoi first became Chief Minister in May 2001. Minister Hussain
also mentioned that as many as 1,051 cadres of various militant outfits,
including the ULFA, had been killed in encounters with the SFs since May 2001.
Peace efforts with the ULFA appeared to have got off the blocks with
the August 13, 2006 decision by the union government to announce a unilateral
ceasefire, confining the SFs to barracks. Prior to this, in September 2005,
after the ULFA formed an 11-member People's Consultative Group (PCG), to
prepare the groundwork for dialogue with the government, New Delhi called off a
tactically important operation in upper Assam's Dibru-Saikhowa National Park,
when the Army had surrounded key ULFA functionaries of the '28th Battalion',
the only functioning 'battalion' of the outfit, believed to consist of 350
cadres. Amidst strong objections expressed by the Army, who believed that the
group was exploiting the truce to reinforce, no operations of strategic
consequence were undertaken by the SFs after September 2005, as New Delhi hoped
to wean ULFA away from violence through its 'magnanimity'. ULFA, however,
continued to attack, kill and extort without pause.
Subsequently, on September 22, 2006, National Security Advisor M.K.
Narayanan conveyed to the ULFA-backed PCG member, Indira Goswami, that the
union government would not extend the suspension of counter-insurgency
operations against the outfit any further. The subsequent official announcement
of September 24 declaring resumption of counter-insurgency operations against
the ULFA drew down the curtain on a year-long process in which both the
government and the ULFA were, at best, reluctant partners. The tardy and
laborious experiment, which at no point of time in its year-long existence,
demonstrated any signs of success, did, however, end up revitalizing a
dwindling ULFA, much as the Army had warned.
There is significant evidence that ULFA continues to operate under the
grip of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Bangladeshi
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). Investigations into the
November 21, 2006, blast in Jalpaiguri in North Bengal, which killed seven
persons and injured over 60 others, revealed that ULFA 'commander-in-chief'
Paresh Baruah had visited Pakistan in recent months to firm up a training
schedule for the outfit's cadres. Subsequently, a team of 15 cadres visited
Pakistan in October and received training. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh
himself confirmed these ominous linkages in his November 28-statement to a 12-
party delegation from Assam led by former Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar
Mahanta, when he stated that New Delhi was ready for talks with the ULFA as and
when it comes out of the clutches of the ISI.
Peace efforts with the ULFA did overshadow the peace process with the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) which, since May 25, 2005, has
been under a cease-fire agreement with the government. The process of
negotiations has, however, been delayed. While the Assam government maintains
that the outfit is yet to provide a charter of demands, the NDFB accuses the
state government of a lackadaisical attitude towards the outfit. The stalemate,
however, has led to an institutionalization of a racket of extortion, abduction
and terrorist activities by the NDFB cadres who are, under the cease-fire
agreement, supposed to have been confined within the limits of designated
camps. On May 27, the first round of talks between the union government and the
NDFB was held in New Delhi where both parties agreed to extend their cease-fire
beyond May 31, 2005. Further, on November 29, both sides met again to extend
the cease-fire beyond December 1, 2005. This, however, appeared to have little
impact on the activities of the outfit. The following incidents reported in
2006 provide an index of the NDFB's activities in the state under the 'cease
fire agreement'.
January 16: Hindi-speaking villagers, under the banner of the Assam
Bhojpuri Yuba Chhatra Parishad, sought the protection of the state government
against the extortion drive by NDFB militants who allegedly had distributed
demand notes, ranging from Rupees 30,000 to Rupees 50,000, signed by a
self-styled "collection-in-charge" 'Lt.' D. Dethsrang, along the border of
Nagaon and Karbi Anglong districts.
April 22: Eight NDFB cadres, who were arrested from Guwahati in the
Kamrup district, confessed during interrogation of their involvement in
extortion from state officials.
April 25: NDFB cadre B. Daithan was killed and five other militants
wounded at Sapatgram in the Dhubri district of lower Assam, when the police
retaliated against militants who were enforcing closure of shops and other
business establishments in the area.
May 22: The dead body of a villager, Babul Kalita, suspected to have
been killed by the NDFB, was recovered by the Police from Daudwigami under
Harisingha police outpost in the Udalguri district.
May 29: Five SF personnel, who were abducted by suspected NDFB cadres
on May 21 from the Udalguri district, were found dead at Belsiri Nala under
Bhairabkunda police outpost in the dense jungle of West Kameng district of
Arunachal Pradesh bordering Assam and Bhutan.
June 25: Civilians in the Daranga area of Baska district captured two
NDFB extortionists. A branch of the state Bank of India in the same locality
had closed down following NDFB threats and extortion notices.
June 26: Two NDFB cadres, while attempting to extort money from a
businessman, were killed in an encounter with SF personnel at an unspecified
place under Dokmoka Police Outpost in the Karbi Anglong district.
July 5: Suspected NDFB militants killed two cadres of the erstwhile
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), Thanderu Basumatary alias Hargila and Bijoy
Basumatary, at Langhing in the Karbi Anglong district.
November 16: Two unidentified NDFB cadres were shot dead by Assam
Police at Langkin Manikpur in the Karbi Anglong district.
The January 6 attack by the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation
Front (KLNLF) in which seven polling personnel were killed and another 10
injured, including four policemen, in the remote Donghap area under Howraghat
Police Station, brought back attention to the peripheral insurgencies in Assam,
mostly confined to district limits of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills.
KLNLF militants exploded an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and opened fire
during a bid to influence the elections to the Karbi Anglong Autonomous
Council. KLNLF is a breakaway faction of the United People's Democratic
Solidarity (UPDS), which is under a ceasefire agreement with the union
government since May 2002. Both the UPDS and KLNLF accounted for five
militancy-related deaths in 2006. Delay in substantive dialogue with the
government has frustrated the UPDS which, on September 11, 2006, announced the
suspension of peace talks. The outfit, however, maintained that it would honour
the cease-fire. Militancy-related incidents involving the UPDS/KLNLF in 2006
included:
January 9: UPDS 'Publicity secretary', Tongeeh Nongloda, was arrested
from Dilai in the Karbi Anglong district for reportedly carrying a 9mm pistol.
April 10: The UPDS 'defence secretary', Thong Teron, was killed during
an exchange of fire at Satgaon under the Dongkamokam Police Outpost in the
Karbi Anglong district, by security personnel guarding Sing Teron, an executive
member of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council. Subsequently, the UPDS
militants killed two persons in retaliation in the Tongkory area of the
district.
June 15: The Bokajan Police recovered the dead body of a KLNLF cadre,
Mirjeng Teron alias Bhupen Teron, from an interior village in the Karbi Anglong
district. Teron had been abducted by at least six UPDS militants from his
residence at Japarajan.
November 13: At least seven suspected UPDS militants were arrested in a
counter-insurgency operation at Kaniya Bey Village near Diphu in the Karbi
Anglong district, for violating cease-fire rules.
The Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) and its renegade group, the Black Widows,
accounted for 31 fatalities in the North Cachar Hills district in 2006. Headed
by Jewel Garlossa, the Black Widows remained the most violent peripheral
militant outfit in Assam. On October 6, 2006, at least 13 Railway Protection
Force personnel were killed in an ambush by Black Widow militants in the North
Cachar Hills district. Previously, on July 26, 2006, Black Widow militants
triggered a grenade explosion targeting CRPF personnel, killing three civilians
and injuring three others at a railway station at Maibong in the North Cachar
Hills district.These incidents were a direct fallout of the growing
sophistication in the quality of weaponry in the group's possession. On March
28, 2006, the North Cachar Hills district police recovered three rocket
launcher shells, two pistols, nine magazines, one revolver and an unspecified
amount of ammunition from a married couple, Afhringdaw and Dipali Warisa,
linked to the Black Widows. Internecine clashes between the DHD and the Black
Widows continued. On April 28, the 'deputy commander-in-chief' of the DHD,
Naizing Daulagapu, was shot at and wounded by suspected Black Widow militants
at Upper Dibbarai under the Haflong Police Station.
Islamist militancy remained at a low ebb. No fatalities in 2006 were
attributed to the groups like the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam
(MULTA). However, periodic intelligence inputs did provide details of a 'silent
mobilization' by the Islamists. On July 18, 2006, Guwahati City Police arrested
a self-styled 'commander' of the MULTA, Nur Islam alias Lambu, from the Ambari
area. He confessed subsequently that 20 MULTA cadres had used Shillong and Lad
Rymbai in the Jaintia Hills of Meghalaya as their routes to escape into
Bangladesh in recent past. Similarly, on December 24, an arrested Black Widow
militant made revelations about the linkages between the People's United
Liberation Front (PULF), a Manipur-based Islamist outfit and the MULTA.
In all, Assam continues to demonstrate conflicting trends towards some
of its multiple insurgencies, and of deterioration in others. Such divergence
is a natural reflection of the vacillation and uncertainty that has marked
government policies and initiatives, both at the centre and in the state.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict
Management. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia
Terrorism Portal.
web | Jan 16, 2007
Casualties In Terrorist Violence In Assam
Civilians
SF
Terrorists
Total
2003
212
12
281
505
2004
194
24
136
354
2005
149
10
83
242
2006
96
35
43
174
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