O'Ram:
I am sure glad you found Kamal's solution exciting :-). Only problem
is "--- that local/national politics gets in the way of what the
GOI/Army might really want to do. "
That I am sure is a shame, isn't it? IF only they could go in and
wipe them out with one slick operation , with a nice code name like
Shock and Awe or Jai Bajrangbali or some such terminology!
But that is how asymmetrical warfares are fought, and won by rebels,
insurgents and even 'terrorists'. Remember Nelson Mandela and his
band of 'terrorists', and Dick Cheney 's opposition to letting
Mandela out of the South African White Supremacists' prison? They
were terrorists!
Terrorism, incidentally is not limited to the underdogs. Examples
are all around you, if you only open your blinders out a little bit
to take a peek. But semantics go only so far, as I hope you have
noticed. Remember how long ULFA has been 'terrorists' and has been
in the US sh**t list with the august company of that Hinduttwa
standard-bearer RSS ( or is the VHP)?
Lets turn this around, does he or other sympathizers or the ULFA
think that the GOI or India will just >vanish into the thin air,
just because they want to wish it away?
*** Unfortunately turning that around won't take you, the unaffected
or the affected and the protected anywhere. Because, if past and
recent experience is any guide, ULFA knows WHAT works. And what
works, will hurt a lot of people. Your people and mine.
That is why those who care, and the care is not limited to shedding
tears over the internet with nothing coming out of it other than
showing the world how -so-caring we are, ought to raise their voices
for SINCERE negotiations, with the aim to find a political settlement
of the nightmare.
There will be ample time to debate who the good guys and heroes are
and hang those marigold garlands on their necks and who the bad guys
are to call them cowards and satisfy the sports-spectators' yen for
cheap thrills.
c-da :-)
At 12:48 PM -0600 6/12/07, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
Well said KJD. There are several issues one needs to take vis-a--vis
SB's nuance of TRADERS (and C'da's) regarding that these traders
want some negotiation.
First of all, insurgents do not want to be classified as Terrorists
- if one happens to read across the board (not just the
anti-establishment (Read Govt.)) research and conflict resoultion
papers about armed groups, a clearer picture emerges.
Many problems are associated with that label. That is why pro-ULFA
sympathizers are trying very hard to pass off the ulfa as a"freedom"
or "insurgent" group.
The problems that arise are: once included in the sh**t list (like
ULFA in the the US list) its difficult even if peace comes about to
get off that list.
No country can overtly side with terrorists.
Second, countries do not want to "negotiate" with NON-State groups
like the ULFA. Any solutions found cannot be assigned to a group
whose make up (and accountabilty) is highly suspect. Remember the
ulfa released by the GOi - they promptly took up arms again.
The more a country keeps talking to such groups, the more they are
given legitamacy and recognition - and thats what these groups and
their sympathizers want.
C'da keeps asking "do they want the ULFA to just disappear?"
Lets turn this around, does he or other sympathizers or the ULFA
think that the GOI or India will just vanish into the thin air, just
because they want to wish it away? Do they think, that Delhi and the
GOA is filled with less than intelligent officials who have no clue
what and how to deal with groups like the ulfa?
I would say this - that local/national politics gets in the way of
what the GOI/Army might really want to do. That is what makes them
go soft.
IMHO - some talks should definitely be there - but the GOI must be
adamant that certain things like lay down the arms, and the "S" word
be off the table.
>It is nave to think that rebel groups would simply give up the
battle and surrender >once they lose militarily to government
forces. After all, even the most >elementary lesson of armed
conflicts suggests that military power is only one >factor among
many in determining outcomes.
Maybe that the "army" is only a part of the soltuion, But no govt.
can sit by quietly, while a group of thugs go on a rampage.
But it looks like when an "insurgent" group seeks only violence as
it main arsenal, then that is the response they should be ready for,
instead of having their supporters fan out and cru Uncle!
Incidentally, the Khalistan demand in the Punjab started with a
bang, continued with violence, they even blew up an Air India
flight, and then they are all gone with a wimper. The GOI got its
way. The Russians (I think) have also got the better of the
Chechnian "insurgents". The Chinese, just shoot all the "insurgents"
when
they start giving a bit of trouble.
I would like to ask experts here - how many of these low-intensity
armed conflicts (whether their cause is legitimate or not) have
actually become a "country" (in the modern era - within the last 50
years of so)? What are the ultimate payoffs? It would be interesting
to find out.
--Ram
On 6/12/07, kamal deka
<<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: kamal deka <<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Jun 12, 2007 12:50 PM
Subject: Re: [Assam] Protests against Ulfa in Assam
To: Sanjib Baruah <<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
I don't want to descend to the level,inhabited by the
semi-literates,like those retards, representing various trade unions
of Assam ,who demanded negotiation
between ULFA and the Govt. because of unfortunate death of innocent
civilians.Negotiation on what ? In regard to kissing good-bye to
Assam? No Govt. of this world has the ability to protect every
single citizen of the country from terrorist's attack,but every
nation has the option of not compromising with the terrorist's
demands.Passivity is judged by the terrorists as weakness.Every
Govt.has the capacity to hurt and punish the terrorists and in the
process the Govt. must be prepared to take a few bruises.To pin all
hopes on parleys regarding a demand purely detrimental to the
country,is suicidal.True,the satisfaction of public needs is the
sole justification of Government.But,even if 100 people (
those innocents,who got killed by the terrorists) are part of the
public,they are a very minuscule part of it and therefore
expendable.Sounds horrendous,but look at tiny Israel,the country
with a different attitude.That's why they exists against all
odds,surrounded by hostile Arab nations.They don't breast-beat over
the possible death of 0.000001% of the population.I tell you,those
desi folks make me sick.
I always maintain that the travesty of the demand by the ULFA is
that they want the freedom to secede exclusively for themselves.In
that case,the Govt. will have to hold dialogue,conducted in an
atmosphere of terror every ten years or so in order to meet the
demands of new generations,at whose whims the boundaries of the
country can be defined and redefined.Would it very be difficult to
imagine the chaos,it would create,if such recipe were to be applied
in a multi-ethnic society as Assam's ?
KJD
On 6/11/07, Sanjib Baruah <<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
<http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070612/asp/opinion/story_7908619.asp>
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070612/asp/opinion/story_7908619.asp
NEVER A MOMENT TO BREATHE EASY
Sanjib Baruah
Telegraph (Calcutta) June 12, 2007
After yet another bloodbath carried out by Ulfa, Sanjib Baruah ponders
whether negotiations can still hold the magic answer in Assam
The public protests in Assam against the killing of innocent civilians by
the United Liberation Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good
news. However, it would be premature to read them as a sign that a big
change is round the corner, since another kind of reaction is also
visible. An umbrella body of 30 trade associations, representing groups
that bore the brunt of Ulfas attacks, has strongly come out in support of
unconditional talks with Ulfa.
The implications of this response are ambiguous. It is a contrast from the
way similar groups had reacted when Ulfa targeted Hindi-speaking labourers
last winter. The call then was for more security, for increased presence
of the army, and for tougher counter-insurgency operations. The Ulfa may
have reasons to be quite pleased with this turn of events.
Counter-insurgency experts might see the support for talks among new
groups as Ulfas devious game-plan. Indeed, this explains why some people
feel that, with growing evidence of Ulfas isolation, there is even less
reason for the government to talk to it now than before.
This view, however, ignores the logic of asymmetric warfare. Insurgents
everywhere choose tactics that play to their strengths, not to their
weaknesses, vis--vis governments. It is nave to think that rebel groups
would simply give up the battle and surrender once they lose militarily to
government forces. After all, even the most elementary lesson of armed
conflicts suggests that military power is only one factor among many in
determining outcomes.
Thus, when tough security barriers go up to protect VIPs and strategically
or symbolically important public places, it is only to be expected that
insurgent groups would turn to soft targets. The people can be excused for
being shocked and surprised by such insurgent tactics, but those in charge
of devising official strategy cannot claim to be equally surprised. They
must be able to outsmart insurgent leaders, and anticipate how the logic
of asymmetrical warfare plays out.
There is a difference between the way governments as institutions may want
to respond to insurgent demands, and those who bear the brunt of their
threats and actions might. Such a difference becomes apparent in a
situation like a kidnapping, when a government position of never
negotiating with terrorists does not resonate with the families of
victims. Insurgent groups can try to leverage this intrinsic asymmetry.
There is plenty of evidence of insurgent groups making civilians pawns in
their conflicts. A study at Uppsala Universitys Peace and Conflict
Research Department found that in hundreds of low-intensity armed
conflicts worldwide, attacks on civilians are a tactic of choice by armed
rebel groups engaged in asymmetric warfare with government forces.
According to Lisa Hultman, the author of this study, by targeting
civilians, rebel groups signal both their resolve to continue the battle
and their willingness to pay high costs in order to pursue victory against
a militarily stronger adversary.
This finding is in keeping with a long intellectual tradition of military
thought that sees war as a violent form of bargaining. Insurgent groups,
of course, realize that in attacking civilians, they run the risk of
alienating their primary audience, from whom they draw their core support.
The protests against Ulfas actions underscore that risk. At the same time,
the return for such grave risks can be quite high. Targeting civilians in
a foreign country is not quite the same as targeting civilians at home.
Yet the terrorist attacks by al Qaida on the Madrid trains in 2004 must
count as one of the most spectacular examples of political gains derived
from an attack on civilians. The attacks caused a rift between the people
of Spain and their elected government, and precipitated the withdrawal of
Spanish troops from Iraq.
What then are our policy choices in Assam today? The failure of two
decades of counter-insurgency speaks for itself. At the same time, it is
hard to argue that negotiations hold the magic answer at this stage.
Insurgent groups do not usually fight long and costly battles against
impossible military odds, for what someone once called the mere privilege
of quitting. Ulfa is unlikely to be an exception.
There is, however, a sense of deja vu about the current situation which is
disturbing. Assam has been in similar situations before. Indeed
counter-insurgency in the North-east is replete with instances of history
repeating itself. Indian officials in charge of counter-insurgency never
tire of repeating the clich that there are no military solutions, and that
a solution ultimately would have to be political. Yet there is little sign
of any change in a strategy that seeks to establish the military
superiority of the government in the expectation that it would force
insurgent groups to accept peace on its terms. There is little evidence of
an ability to respond to the adaptive capabilities of its adversaries, and
to their ability to constantly take conflicts to new realms. Still, no one
except the civilians of the region has had to pay a price for this long
history of policy failure.
The author is at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and the Indian
Institute of Technology, Guwahati.
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