Hi,

A query - the info below seems to show that Scheduled Tribe  (ST) people are 
not considered Hindus. Any info about why STs  have problem when  (like in 
Orissa and Assam)  job reservation is an issue  - for Hindu Dalits only.

Umesh

PS: I was looking up info about what happens  to my inheritance from my 
gandparents if I convert to Bahai faith. It seems I will still remain a Hindu 
legally  - since it is not even mentioned in Indian constitution - fine with me 
- since Bahai faith accepts Hinduism principles as true - unlike most other 
faiths.
-----------------------------

http://www.payer.de/dharmashastra/dharmash091.htm   2. Application of  Act
            This Act applies-
                 to any person, who is a Hindu by  religion in any of its forms 
or developments including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat  or a follower of the 
Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj;
                 to any person who is Buddhist, Jaina  or Sikh by religion; and
                 to any other person who is not a  Muslim, Christian, Parsi or 
Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such  person would not have been 
governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage  as part of that law in 
respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this  Act had not been 
passed.
         Explanation : The following persons are Hindus,  Buddhists, Jainas or 
Sikhs by religion, as the case may be:-
                 any child, legitimate or illegitimate,  both of whose parents 
are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion;
                 any child, legitimate or illegitimate,  one of whose parents 
is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is  brought up as a 
member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such  parent belongs 
or belonged;
         any person who is a convert or  re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, 
Jaina or Sikh religion.
            Notwithstanding anything contained in  sub-section (1), nothing 
contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any  Scheduled Tribe within 
the meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the  Constitution unless the 
Central Government, by notification in the Official  Gazette, otherwise directs.
            The expression "Hindu" in any portion of  this Act shall be 
construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu  by religion, is, 
nevertheless, a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of  the provisions 
contained in this section.
--------------------------------

Mayne's treatise on Hindu law &  usage : also containing commentaries on the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Adoptions 
and Maintenance Act, 1956, the  Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956, the 
Hindu Women's Rights to Property  Act, 1937 / John  Dawson Mayne  [1828-1917].  
-- 15th ed. / revised by Ranganath    Misra [1926 - ]. -- New Delhi : Bharat 
Law House, ©2003. -- 139, 1507 S. --    ISBN 8177370677. -- S. 67-74
  wiedergegeben (für die Quellenangaben, vor allem cases, konsultiere man  
dieses Werk).
                Application of Hindu law.—Acceptance of the Vedas with        
reverence: recognition of the fact that the means or ways to salvation are      
  diverse and realisation of the truth and that the number of Gods to be        
worshipped is large, is the distinguishing feature of Hindu religion. The       
 question, who are governed by Hindu law is not easily answered by saying       
 that all Hindus are governed by it.       For, there are classes of Hindus who 
are governed by their customary        laws and not by the Hindu law; for 
instance, those that follow the        Marumakathayam law in Malabar and the 
Aliyasantana law in Kanara and those        Hindu communities in the Punjab who 
are governed by their customary law.       
       On the other hand, some Muhammedan communities, descended from an        
original Hindu ancestry, like the Khojahs, the Cutchi Memons, the Borahs,       
 and the Halai Memons, are, subject to the Shariat Application Act, 1937        
[Online:              
http://www.vakilno1.com/bareacts/muslimperact/muslimpersonalact.htm.        -- 
Zugriff am 2004-01-11] , governed by Hindu law in matters of succession and 
inheritance. 
       Subject to the above exceptions, Hindu law applies to Hindus by birth    
    as well as to Hindus by religion. 
       It is now well settled that a Hindu does not cease to be governed by     
   Hindu law by lapses from orthodox Hindu practice or by deviation or        
dissent from its central doctrines. Several religious sects or bodies had       
 at various periods and under various circumstances split off from the        
Hindu system but their members nevertheless continue to live under Hindu        
law. 
       Of these, the Jains and the Sikhs are conspicuous        examples. In 
Rani Bhagwan Koer v J C Bose [(1903)  30 English        Law Reports, Indian 
Appeals 249] the Sikhs and Jains were        held to be governed by Hindu law 
except to the extent to which it is        varied by custom. 
       The Jains, though generally adhering to the ordinary Hindu law,        
recognise no divine authority in the Vedas, and do not practise the        
SRADDHAS or ceremonies for the dead. Nor do they recognise the spiritual        
superiority of the Brahmins. The Jains in the Madras province who were        
previously governed by the Aliyasantana law of inheritance have now been        
brought under the Mitakshara law by the Jaina Succession Act (III of        
1929), Jain undivided family is included in the expression Hindu undivided      
  family. But it has been held that Jains who do not believe in Vedas are       
 not Hindus. There are differences between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains in some      
  of the essential details of the faith and the religious practices they        
observe. There are also organisational differences in the matter of        
religious trusts between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains. 
       There is not personal law except Hindu law applicable to Buddhists       
 in India. They cannot be governed by Burmese or Chinese Buddhists law.        
They must therefore be governed by Hindu law except where there is a        
change to a Buddhists domicile and an adoption of that law.
       Similarly the Lingayats, a body of dissenters from Hinduism, who        
deny the supremacy of the Brahmins and the validity of caste-distinctions       
 have been held to be a sect of Hindus governed by ordinary Hindu law        
except in so far as it is varied by any custom amongst them.
       A Hindu does not by becoming a Brahmo, or an Arya Samjist        or a 
Dayanandi, cease to be governed by Hindu law; both the Brahmo        Samaj and 
the Arya Samaj are only sects of Hindus for the purpose of the        
application of Hindu law. 
       In Ma Yait v Maung Chit Maung [(1921)  48 English Law        Reports, 
Indian Appeals 553] the question was whether the        Kalais descended from 
Hindus who married Burmese women were a Hindu        community governed by 
Hindu law. It was held that they were not,        but that they were governed 
by the Indian Succession Act on the ground        that there was no continuity 
of Hindu character in their case as they were        away from Hindu centres in 
an alien country in a Buddhist environment and        their mode of life was 
different from that of the Hindu communities in        India. 
       Lord Haldane pointed out that if a man is born a Hindu, deviation from   
     orthodoxy not amounting to a clear renunciation of his religion does not   
     deprive him of his status as a Hindu but that, though contact with other   
     religions may well evolve sects which discard many characteristics of      
  orthodox Hinduism and adopt ideas and rites popularly supposed to belong      
  to other systems, continuity with a religion which is so elastic in its       
 scope as in Hinduism may not be destroyed. The Judicial Committee referred     
   in Bhagwan Kaur's case to the separation from the Hindu communion,        
and in Ma Yait's case to a clear renunciation of the Hindu religion.       
       As the authorities show, neither can be established except by a Hindu    
    becoming a Muhammedan or a Christian or by the combined operation of        
migration, inter-marriage and new occupations.
       When one is born a Hindu, the fact that he goes to a Buddhist temple,    
    or a church, or durgah, cannot be said to show that he is no more a Hindu   
     unless it is clearly proved that he has changed his religion from Hinduism 
       to some other religion. In considering the question of conversion the    
    court must consider the question in the context of Indian society and the   
     place of religious observance in so far as they show what religion the     
   alleged person professes.
       A solemn declaration under the Special Marriage Act by a person that he  
      does not profess the Hindu religion has been held to be insufficient to   
     deprive him of his status as a Hindu. 
       But in Punjab Rao v Mesha Ram [1965 All India Reporter, Supreme        
Cozrt 1179], the Supreme Court held that a        declaration made in public 
that he is converted to Buddhism is        sufficient to make him a Buddhist. 
The Supreme Court observed that in the        face of such an open declaration 
that he has ceased to belong to the old        religion and has accepted 
another religion it should be idle to enquire        further as to whether 
conversion to another religion was efficacious.
       A man cannot alter the law of succession applicable to himself by a      
  mere declaration that he is not a Hindu. He can only alter his existing       
 status by becoming a member of such a religion as would destroy that        
status and give him a new one. 
       The question is whether a Hindu by proclaiming himself not to belong to  
      the Hindu religion or to belong to no religion can effectively renounce   
     his religion. Hinduism not only comprises religious beliefs and modes of   
     life but also social, moral and philosophical outlooks as well. Therefore  
      a mere investigation into a man's modes of life and religious belief      
  without taking his racial and historical background into account will not     
   be conclusive. As Lord Haldane pointed out, a method which takes account     
   of historical as well as other considerations must be applied and the        
opinion of the community in which he lives may well be a factor. 
       The reasonable conclusion appears to be that the term 'Hindu' in the     
   Civil Courts Acts of the various provinces must be applied to persons who    
    are Hindus either by birth or by religion provided that those who are born  
      Hindus have not become converts to Christianity or Muhammadanism. In 
other        words, if a Hindu, on his conversion to Christianity or 
Muhammadanism,        ceases to be governed by his prior personal law, it is 
because of a        conflict of laws. In the absence of any such conflict, the 
personal law        must continue to apply to him even though he is not a Hindu 
in the stritct        theological sense.
       Conversion does not necessarily result in extinguishment of caste        
and notwithstanding conversion the convert may enjoy the privileges social      
  and political by virtue of his being a member of the community with its       
 acceptance. Even if conversion resulted in expulsion at the hands of the       
 caste people a convert may still be ushered in that caste by the caste        
people on his conversion to Hinduism. Where a Hindu male by caste,        
converted as Christian for educational purpose and was being regarded by        
the male community all along as such, it was held that he never ceased to       
 be a male at any stage and as he is a member of the scheduled caste within     
   the scope of Constitution (SC) Order 1950 his election is valid. 
       Conversely, conversion to Hindu religion of persons of non-Hindu        
origin attracts with it the application of Hindu law. Where a European        
lady or an Indian Christian, after formal conversion to Hinduism married a      
  Hindu by race and religion, the Madras High Court has held that she was a     
   Hindu within the meaning of the Succession Act or Hindu law, and that        
membership of a caste was not a necessary prerequisite for being a Hindu.       
       Hindus who, having renounced Hinduism, revert to it by        
reconversion, with or without the performance of rites of expiation and        
reconversion, would be governed by Hindu law. 
       A person may be a Hindu by birth or by conversion. A mere theological    
    allegiance to the Hindu faith by a person born in another faith does not    
    convert him into a Hindu nor a bare declaration that he is a Hindu        
sufficient to convert him to Hinduism. But a bona fide intention to be        
converted to the Hindu faith accompanied by conduct unequivocally        
expressing that intention, may be sufficient evidence of conversion. No        
formal ceremony of purification or expiation is necessary to effectuate        
conversion. The convert must embrace Hinduism and follow the cultural and       
 spiritual traditions of that religion and take to Hindu mode of life. In       
Guruswamy v Irulappa [1934 All India Reporter. Madras High Court        630] an 
earlier decision in        Administrator-General v Anandachari [19 All India 
Reporter. Madras        High Court 466] where it was held that conversion       
 must be attended by expiatory ceremonies
 was distinguished on the ground        that the conversion was to Brahmin 
community and the need for expiatory        ceremonies was based on the 
practice of such communities. 
       The son of a Hindu father and a Christian mother married under        
the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is a Hindu. A child in India must be        
presumed to have his father's religion, and the corresponding civil and        
social status.
       In Michels v Venkateshwaran  [1952 All India Reporter.        Madras 
High Court 474] it was held that the institution of       caste is peculiarly 
Indian. A member of one of the castes or        sub-castes when he is converted 
to Islam or Christianity ceases to be a        member of any caste. Instances 
can be found in which in spite of        conversion the caste restriction might 
continue. But these are all cases        of exception and  the general rule is 
conversion operates as an        expulsion from the caste. In other words a 
convert ceases to have any        caste. 
       In Suri Dora v Giri (VV) [1958  ll India Reporter. Andhra        Pradesh 
High Court 724] was affirmed on appeal in Giri (VV)        v Suri Dora [1959  
All India Reporter. Supreme Court 318] it was reiterated that caste is the 
result of birth and        not of choice or volition. Though a person who 
belonged to scheduled tribe        was acting as a Kshatriya he could not 
attain the status of a Kshatriya,        when there was no evidence of the 
reactions of the old tribe or of the new        fold. 
       As Christianity does not recognise caste a convert to Christianity       
 ceases to belong to Adidravida caste. A government order stating that        
children born out of inter-caste marriages will be allowed to all        
educational concessions given to schedule castes provided the father or        
the mother belongs to schedule caste, is not sufficient to enable the        
children born in wedlock of such marriages to become schedule caste, so as      
  to avail one-self of the reservations for admission in colleges or        
employments. They must be members of the schedule caste as defined in        
Article 241 of the Constitution and included in the list of scheduled        
castes appended to the notification issued by the President of India and        
should profess Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism or Budhist religion. 
       In Shyam Sundar v Shanker Dev [ [1960 All India Reporter. Mysore        
High Court 27] it was however held that a person        did not cease to be a 
member of the caste to which he belonged by becoming        an Arya Samajist, 
obviously because Arya Samaj is part of Hindu        religion and he could not 
be considered to be a convert to a different        religion. For the same 
reason the Supreme Court [Jasani v Moreswar        1954 All India Reporter. 
Supreme Court 236] held that when a Mahar (scheduled        caste) joined the 
Mahanubhava Pant, the conversion to that sect did        not alter the caste 
status of the person. Though the founder of the sect        did not believe in 
caste there had been no rigid adherence to this        principle among his 
followers in later years. The convert married two        Mahar girls and always 
looked upon himself as a Mahar and identified        himself with that caste.
       The Supreme Court said that three factors are to be considered
       
   reaction of the old body; 
   the intentions of the individual himself and 
   the rules of the new order. 
       If the old order is tolerant of the new fold and sees no reason to       
 outcaste or excommunicate the convert and the individual himself desires       
 to retain the old ties, the conversion is only nominal for all practical       
 purposes. 
       In Khazan Singh v Union of India [1980 All India Reporter. Delhi        
High Court 60], it was held that the theory of        acceptance by the 
community is not applicable to the case of conversion        by adoption. Where 
a Jat was adopted by a member of the Scheduled        Caste, it was held that 
the adoptee has to be treated from the date of        adoption as if he was 
born in the adoptive family for all practical        purposes. The adoptee 
acquires on adoption as in the case of birth the        caste of the adoptive 
parents without anything more to be done by him or        others. Just as it is 
not open to a caste to refuse to recognise a new        born in the family of 
one of its members as belonging to the caste, it is        not open to the 
caste to sit in Judgment over the statutory status enjoyed        by the 
adoptee.
       A further question arises as to whether a convert from Hinduism will     
   on reconversion to Hinduism regain his original caste. In Arumugam        v 
Rajagopal  [1976 All India Reporter. Supreme Court 939] it was held that on 
reconversion to Hinduism a person        becomes a member of the caste to which 
he originally belonged. In a recent        decision of the Supreme Court in 
Kailash v Maya Devi  [1984        All India Reporter. Supreme Court 600] the 
Supreme        Court had to decide the question whether the old caste of a 
person or his        progeny who belonged to the scheduled caste or tribe but 
embraced        Christianity or Islam or any other religion would revive on his 
or his        progeny's reconversion to Hinduism. The Supreme Court held that 
the main        test would be whether the reconvert had a genuine intention to 
abjure his        new religion and to go back to his old fold and adopt the 
practices and        customs of the said fold without
 any protest from the members of his        erstwhile caste. It is not 
necessary that there should be direct proof of        the expression of the 
views of the community, and it would be sufficient        if no exception or 
protest is lodged by the community members. If a child        is born he is 
incapable of choosing his religion until the age of        discretion. After he 
has grown up and is able to decide his future, he        ought not to be bound 
by what his parents have done. If by his clear and        conclusive conduct he 
reconverts to his old faith his caste automatically        revives. 
       In Anbalagan v Devarajan [1984 All India Reporter. Supreme Court        
411. Voller Wortlaut des Urteils siehe: Anhang B], the Supreme Court held that 
a person        regains his caste unless the community does not accept him. The 
Supreme        Court went to the extent of holding that it would be more 
accurate to say        that he never lost his caste when he embraced another 
religion. This        observation runs counter to the views expressed by the 
courts including        the Supreme Court in the cases referred to earlier. The 
Supreme Court went        on to observe that the practice of caste is so deep 
rooted that 
                "its mark does not seem to disappear on conversion to different 
         religion. If it disappears, it disappears only to reappear on          
reconversion. The mark of caste does not seem to really disappear even          
after some generations after conversion. In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil          
Nadu there are several thousands of Christian families whose forefathers        
  became Christians and who, though they profess the Christian religion,        
  nonetheless observe the practice of caste. There are Christian Reddies,       
   Christian Kammas, Christian Nadars, Christian Adi-Andhras, Christian Adi     
     Dravidas and so on. The practice of their caste is so rigorous that        
  there are inter-marriages with Hindus of the same caste but not with          
Christians of another caste. Now if such a Christian becomes a Hindu,          
surely he will revert to his original caste, if he had lost it at all.          
In fact this process goes on
 continuously in India and generation by          generation lost sheep appear 
to return to the caste-fold and are once          again assimilated in that 
fold. This appears to be particularly so in          the case of members of the 
scheduled castes, who embrace other religions          in their quest for 
liberation, but their disabilities have clung to them          with great 
tenacity. We do not think that any different principle will          apply to 
the case of conversion to Hinduism of a person whose          forefathers had 
abandoned Hinduism and embraced another religion from          the principle 
applicable to the case of reconversion to Hinduism of a          person who 
himself had abandoned Hinduism and embraced another religion".       Apart from 
conversion, the courts had occasion to consider the        effect of marriage 
on a person's religion and caste. Here again the        Supreme Court adopted 
the test of acceptance by the community. In Horo        v
 Jahnara [1972 All India Reporter. Supreme Court 1840] a non-Munda woman 
married a Munda (a tribal). As she was        accepted by the elders of the 
tribe, she was held to be a member of the        tribe. However in Urmila Ginda 
v Union of India [1975 All India        Reporter. Delhi High Court 115], it was 
held that a        high caste woman marrying a scheduled caste man cannot apply 
for posts        reserved for scheduled caste though she did not marry merely 
with this        motive, as the court was of the view that to allow her to do 
so would        defeat the very purpose of the Constitution. It is submitted 
that this        decision is not correct. If a person marries a scheduled caste 
and is        accepted by the community as a member of the caste, there is no 
reason why        he or she should not be regarded as a member of the scheduled 
caste for        all purposes.
       In Neelima (D) v Dean, P.G. Studies Agricultural University        [1993 
All India Reporter. Andhra Pradesh High Court 229] the        Andhra Pradesh 
High Court had to consider whether a Brahmin girl who        married a boy 
belonging to the schedule tribe and a Vaysya girl who        married a boy 
belonging to backward classes could be considered as        belonging to the 
schedule tribe and to the backward class respectively.        Relying on a 
number of decisions the court held that the woman became a        member of the 
family of the husband on marriage. The court further went on        to hold 
that the woman acquired the caste of the husband. The court        
distinguished the cases which held that it was necessary that the        
community should accept the persons concerned as a member of the caste and      
  it is not open to a person to acquire a caste by unilateral action as they    
    dealt with cases of reconversion of Hinduism, or a change over
 simpliciter        whereas the cases under consideration were cases of 
marriage, and the        question whether there was acceptance for the 
acquisition of caste or        tribe by the caste or tribe concerned is 
irrelevant. It is submitted that        while the conclusion that a woman 
becomes the member of the family of the        husband is correct in view of 
the long catena of decisions relied on, it        does not follow that she 
acquires the caste of the husband. It is well        settled that a person may 
change his or her caste by volition provided        that caste accepts him or 
her into its fold. There is no reason why this        principle should be 
restricted to cases of reconversion or to change of        caste simpliciter 
and should not be applied to a case of marriage. No        authority was relied 
on to reach the conclusion that the wife acquired the        caste of the 
husband automatically. From the circumstance that she is        treated as the
 sapinda of the husband it does not follow that she acquires        the caste 
of the husband as sapinda relationship has nothing to do with        caste but 
based on the circumstance that the husband and wife "together        beget one 
body". Reference was made to Khazan Singh's case, where        it was held that 
an adopted son acquired the caste of his father and no        sanction of the 
community is required to treat him as a member thereof.        The case of a 
marriage is not equivalent to that of adoption, as the        adopted son is 
deemed for all purposes to be the son born of the adoptive        parents and 
so he acquires the caste by reason of his birth. Where a        person of one 
religion marries a person of another religion he or she does        not cease 
to belong to his or her religion. There is no reason why a        different 
principle should be applied to castes or tribes in the case of        marriage.
       In any case there is no justification for the decision in regard to a    
    brahmin woman marrying a person belonging to schedule tribe. Sri J.V.       
 Suryanarayana amicus curiae pointed out that under Hindu Law there are        
only castes and tribes and no schedule castes or schedule tribes which are      
  the results of the Constitution, schedule castes order and schedule tribes    
    order under Article 341(1) and submitted that if a person is permitted to   
     enter into the caste or tribe covered by those orders by virtue of        
marriage, it amounts to an alteration of the presidential orders which is       
 not permissible. This argument was not met in the judgment.
       In Rakheya Bibi v Anil Kumar Mukherji [1948 All India        
Reporter.Calcutta High Court 119] it was held that it is        open to the 
court to go into the question whether the conversion was a        bonafide one 
or a mere devise adopted for ulterior purposes. Dessenting        from the 
decision in Ayesha Bibi v Subodh Chandra Chakrabarthy        [1945 All India 
Reporter. Calcutta High Court 405] the        court observed 
                "It may be that a court cannot test or gauge the sincerity of   
       religious belief; or where there is no question of the genuineness of a  
        person's belief in a certain religion, the court cannot measure its     
     depth or determine whether it is an intelligent conviction or ignorant     
     and superficial fancy. But a court can and does find the true intention    
      of men lying behind their acts and can certainly find from the          
circumstances of a case whether a pretended conversion was really a          
means to some further end. We can see no reason to hold that it is in          
the nature of things impossible for a court of law to determine whether         
 the conversion was bona fide".               They referred to the decision of 
the Privy Council in Skinner v        Skinner [1970] where the Judicial 
Committee observed that the change of        religion must be made honestly and 
without any intent to commit any fraud     
   upon the law. It was held by the Calcutta High Court that if conversion is   
     resorted to merely with the object of creating a ground for some claim of  
      right, the court must hold that no lawful foundation of the claim has 
been        proved. To go through a mock conversion and set it up as a basis of 
the        right is to commit fraud upon the law. In this connection it may be  
      noticed that in Perumal Nadar v Ponnuswamy Nadar [Calcutta High        
Court] it was observed        that for conversion there must be a bona fide 
intention complied with        conduct. Similarly, in Kailash v Maya Devi [1984 
All India        Reporter. Supreme Court 600] it was said that there        
must be a genuine intention to abjure the religion and completely        
disassociate himself from it. In Khazan Singh v Union of India        [1980 All 
India Reporter. Delhi High Court 60],        where a Jat was given in adoption 
to the member of a scheduled tribe it        was
 held that he was entitled to apply for the post of a sub-inspector        
under the quota reserved for scheduled caste. The court held that Khazan        
Singh acquired the scheduled caste status by adoption and the question of       
 motive for conversion was of no consequence. If the adoption was lawful it     
   was not permissible to refuse to give legal effect because the course was    
    adopted in order to obtain a post in Government service. It is submitted    
    that as pointed out by the Calcutta High Court in Rakheya Bibi v Anil       
 Kumar Mukherji [1948 All India Reporter.Calcutta High Court 119] where the 
adoption gives a special legal status, to go        through a mock adoption and 
set it up as a basis for claiming that status        is to commit fraud upon 
the law. In appropriate cases the court has the        right to go into the 
question whether the adoption and the consequent        conversion is bona fide 
or not.
       In Ameena Shapir v State of Tamil Nadu, [1984, Madras High        Court] 
a Hindu woman embraced        Islam and married a Muslim belonging to the 
Labbai community which        was included in the list of backward classes, she 
was accepted by the        members of that community, it was held that she was 
entitled to a post        reserved for backward classes even though as a Hindu, 
she belonged to a        forward community; the wife must be held to belong not 
only to the        religion her husband belongs but to the community as well. 
The court        differed from the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Khazan 
Singh v        Union of India. The learned judge observed: 
                "I should go to the extent of saying that even if a high caste 
woman          marries a person belonging to scheduled caste just for the sake 
of          obtaining a reserved post what is wrong in it"?               It is 
submitted that this observation may not be correct if she went        through a 
mock marriage as held in Rakheya Bibi v Anil Kumar Mukherji        [1948 All 
India Reporter.Calcutta High Court 119].        But if the marriage is genuine 
the mere fact that she got an advantage by        such marriage may be 
immaterial. It is also submitted that the observation        that the wife by 
marriage belongs to the religion or community of the        husband is contrary 
to several decisions. It is settled that a person does        not lose her 
religion by marriage. The actual decision may however be        supported on 
the ground that the wife was accepted by the community to        which her 
husband belonged as a member of that community."
       [Mayne's treatise on Hindu law &  usage : also containing commentaries 
on the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the  Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 
1956, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property  Act, 1937 / John  Dawson Mayne  
[1828-1917].  -- 15th ed. / revised by Ranganath        Misra [1926 - ]. -- New 
Delhi : Bharat Law House, ©2003. -- 139, 1507 S.        -- ISBN 8177370677. -- 
S. 67-74. -- Dort Quellennachweise]
          
---------------------------------
  5    

Umesh Sharma

Washington D.C. 

1-202-215-4328 [Cell]

Ed.M. - International Education Policy
Harvard Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University,
Class of 2005

http://www.uknow.gse.harvard.edu/index.html (Edu info)

http://hbswk.hbs.edu/ (Management Info)




www.gse.harvard.edu/iep  (where the above 2 are used )
http://harvardscience.harvard.edu/



http://jaipurschool.bihu.in/
       
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