We  ARE  discussing <Sovereignty/We-settled-here-first/our resources/our  place 
under the sun/WE? Who are WE?-------->
 
So keep this WaterWatch blog in perspective too.
mm


To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Sun, 13 Apr 2008 14:56:16 
+0530Subject: Re: [WaterWatch] Tibet issue





the truth is that we need to keep this issue alive for a very vital reason-more 
than one major river for India flows  through tibet; and the same is the case 
for Pakistan vis-a-vis Kashmir. Also, unlike India, which was rarely a 
political entity, tibet and china were two distinct entities historically .
Rohit  
On 4/11/08, Sankar Ray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 









 think Dr Srinath Raghavan's piece in EPW well-argued. He is one of the best 
scholars on defence/border issues in the Himalayas. Rather Nevile Maxwell's 
India's China War today seems one-sided and inadequately researched. 
Pasted below is the EPW piece.
Sankar Ray
 
The Case for Restraint on Tibet
By Srinath Raghavan 5 Apr 08 (http://epw.org.in/epw//uploads/articles/12103.pdf)
For more than five decades, India has seen Tibet as part of China. If it were 
to now believe otherwise, this would be idle posturing. Worse, such a position 
by the government of India could jeopardise the chances of a settlement of the 
long-standing India-China dispute.
The recent events in Tibet have occasioned much speculation and controversy in 
India. The Indian government responded by curbing a proposed march to Tibet by 
émigrés. New Delhi also issued a measured statement,
reaffirming that Tibet was a region of China and expressing hope that all 
concerned would resolve the crisis by dialogue. The government's restraint, 
however, has ignited a fusillade of denunciation. Senior leaders of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party have described the violence in Tibet as "genocide", and 
have asked the government to raise the matter at the United Nations. Some 
commentators in the media, too, have disparaged the government for failing to 
take a robust stand. India, it is suggested, should shed its timidity, and at 
the very least back the Dalai Lama's call
for Tibetan "autonomy".
Leaving aside the merits and the drawbacks of the Dalai Lama's political 
agenda, there are good pragmatic reasons for India to stick to its present 
policy. For a start, treating Tibet as an "open question" is likely to 
boomerang on India. New Delhi has its own share of thorny issues, not least 
Kashmir. Interestingly, even as critics were demanding a robust policy towards 
Tibet, the Organisation for Islamic Countries described Kashmir as a burning 
problem and called for its resolution in accordance with UN resolutions. The 
Indian government has responded that Kashmir is an internal issue; but it is 
acutely aware of the need to sidestep such calls. In this regard, we should 
note that since the early 1990s China has opposed the internationalization of 
the Kashmir dispute – a position that accords with India's interests. If India 
were to intrude on Tibet in any manner, Beijing could easily shift its position 
on Kashmir. It is unwise to fire a blunderbuss from an exposed picquet.
Furthermore, does the political issue of Tibet (as opposed to the moral one) 
have any real traction on Indian public opinion or indeed the political 
parties? Evidently not. Despite the vicissitudes of Sino-Indian relations, no 
Indian government has ever sought to extend political support to the Dalai 
Lama. Back in 1954, India concluded 
a treaty with China, recognising Tibet as "a region of China". As the then 
foreign secretary explained, this was "a concession only to realism". 
Successive governments have adhered to this stand. The BJP might now strike an 
activist pose, but as foreign minister in the Janata Party government, Vajpayee 
stated in Parliament that "We regard Tibet as a region of China". In 2003, the 
BJP-led government inked an agreement, affirming Tibet as part of China. This 
long-standing policy stems from a realistic recognition that India has no 
leverage on Tibet. It is idle to pretend otherwise.
The most important argument for circumspection relates to the ongoing 
negotiations on the boundary dispute with China, a problem that has marred 
Sino-Indian relations for 50 years. From a historical perspective, it is clear 
that China's sensitivities on Tibet have cast a baleful shadow on the boundary 
issue. When Jawaharlal Nehru signed the agreement in 1954, he knew that the 
Tibetans would be disappointed. Nevertheless, he declined to support separatist 
movements within Tibet. When the Dalai Lama visited India in late 1956, he 
sought Nehru's permission to stay on. Nehru, however, convinced him to return 
to Tibet and to arrive at an understanding with the Chinese authorities. 
Nevertheless, China believed that India was conniving at the activities of 
Tibetan rebels, mainly because of their conspicuous presence in border towns 
like Kalimpong.
 
In March 1959, following an uprising in Tibet, the Indian government decided to 
give refuge to the Dalai Lama. Then, as now, some opposition parties – notably 
the BJP's precursor, the Jan Sangh – clamoured for a tougher stance towards 
China and championed Tibet's political case. Beijing took a grim view of these 
developments in India.
 
Tibet and Border Dispute
In retrospect, it was unfortunate that the latent boundary dispute came to the 
fore at the same time. In exchanges with
China, the Indian government claimed the McMahon Line as the eastern boundary. 
This Line had been drawn in a tripartite conference between Indian, Chinese and 
Tibetan representatives in Simla in 1914. China had subsequently repudiated the 
Line. But in 1959, New Delhi argued that it was valid because Tibet had 
possessed "treaty-making powers" at the time of the Simla conference. This 
argument, of course, could be used to bolster Tibet's case for independence. 
The confluence of these events in early 1959 led the Chinese mistakenly to 
believe that India was plotting to detach Tibet from China. 
Thus, in May 1959 the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, told ambassadors of 
communist bloc countries that India sought to
make Tibet a "buffer" state: "This is the centre of the China-India dispute". 
Later, during discussions with Nehru in April 1960, Zhou observed that there 
was a link between India's territorial claims and its position on the Tibetan 
rebellion. By the summer of 1962, Zhou was explicitly telling the Indian chargé 
d'affaires that New Delhi was colluding with the CIA in arming Tibetan rebels 
against China. Earlier that year India had set in motion the so-called forward 
policy, whereby small bodies of troops were stationed in areas claimed but 
unoccupied by China.
Beijing linked the forward policy with India's perceived efforts to make Tibet 
an independent state. The evidence now
emerging from Chinese archives shows that this misperception was a crucial 
factor in China's decision to go to war in 1962. China's mistrust on this count 
has only increased with the passage of time. There is, for one thing, the 
self-styled "Tibetan government-in-exile" based in India. Established in the 
early 1960s, the government- in-exile has ramified into a sizeable body.. The 
Indian government has not recognised the government-in-exile and has averred 
that it would not allow the organization to undertake political activities. But 
the Chinese are sceptical of India's disavowals.
 
As premier Wen Jiabao recently stated, Tibet remains a "sensitive" issue in 
China's relationship with India. Hence, as part of any satisfactory solution to 
the boundary dispute, India will have to reassure China adequately that it has 
no designs on Tibet. The latest round of boundary negotiations, which began 
with the appointment of political  representatives in 2003, has reached an 
important stage. India and China are reported to have exchanged proposals for 
an overall settlement, encompassing all three sectors of the boundary. 
Beijing's recent statements, stressing its claims to Tawang, indicate that 
bargaining has begun in earnest. It is naïve to expect China to drop its claims 
on Arunachal Pradesh at this stage. Has India forsaken its claims to Aksai 
Chin? Both sides will only relinquish them when a deal is struck. To be sure, 
India cannot give up any populated areas; but short of this there is room for 
compromise.
China, too, can accommodate India's interests in the Ladakh sector. Reaching 
such an accord will take time.But it is imperative at this stage not to stoke 
China's concerns over Tibet, and so scuttle the negotiations. It bears 
emphasising that both sides have taken nearly five decades to get to this 
point. Irresponsible posturing on Tibet will only queer the pitch.  
Srinath Raghavan ([EMAIL PROTECTED] academy.mod.uk) is with the defence studies 
department, King's College,
University of London, London.

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