Looks scary! On 5/3/11, uttam borthakur <uttambortha...@yahoo.co.in> wrote: > "You might remember a Shekhar Suman gag on Zee TV's Movers and > Shakers several years ago: An angry George W Bush announces that the United > States will bomb the place where Osama bin Laden is found to be > hiding.Hearing this, Vajpayee looks under his bed, pauses, and with a > characteristic flick of his wrist says: "Thank God! He isn't here!"Over in > Rawalpindi, General Musharraf looks under his bed, sighs in relief, and > says: "Thank God! He is still here!"Shekhar Suman, more than most Western > analysts, got the plot right. Keeping Osama bin Laden out of Washington's > hands was vital in order to prevent having to publicly deal with revelations > of how the Pakistani military-jihadi complex not only was connected > with al-Qaeda, but might also have been involved in the conspiracy behind > the 9/11 attacks.Moreover, when the Pakistani military leadership was > getting paid hundreds of millions of dollars per year to hunt bin Laden > down, it made little sense to give > him up quickly. As early as October 2001, a month after 9/11, wags in > Islamabad coined the phrase "al-Faida" (the profit) in anticipation of the > rewards Pakistan would reap for joining the war on terror that it had played > a part in creating. Pakistan was in an international doghouse at that time. > Its economy was crumbling under the weight of sections imposed by the > international community for having carried out nuclear tests in 1998. Its > government, then under General Musharraf's military dictatorship, was seen > as odious, not least for supporting the original Taliban regime in Kabul. It > was barely surviving on Saudi largesse until September 2001, when General > Musharraf's ditching of one set of allies for another changed his country's > fortunes -- from being nearly toast, Pakistan was the toast.Just how much > was the al-Faida worth? According to data compiled by K Alan Kronstadt, of > the US Congressional Research Service, between 2002 and 2010, US > direct overt aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan amounted to $19.6 > billion, of which $13.3 billion was for security-related heads. Obviously, > if there is "direct, overt" aid, there is likely to be "indirect, covert" > aid. There is also the money from other countries and loans from the IMF. > Because the military-jihadi complex dominates the Pakistani political > economy, it is the primary beneficiary of this largesse. Between 2002 and > 2008, my estimate suggests that the business of shipping US and NATO > containers from Karachi to Kabul alone made $500m per year for the military > establishment and $300m per year for the militant groups. Why would they > want the gravy train to stop?They wouldn't, but the Obama administration had > other ideas. It made three changes that caused the Pakistani military > establishment to redo its sums. First, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation > made it harder for the military to capture the funds. It also came with more > strings attached. Second, the Obama administration increased the number of > drone strikes against targets in Pakistan, while increasing pressure on the > Pakistani army to go after the taliban groups in its tribal areas. Finally, > by indicating a timeline for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, > Washington triggered the endgame.With the Obama adminstration taking a > harder line on the Pakistani army, the al-Faida from the war against > al-Qaeda began to be less attractive. At the same time, with a US withdrawal > in sight, Afghanistan began to look more attractive as a prize. For General > Kayani to stand a chance for claiming this prize, it is necessary for > President Obama to prevail over other members of his administration and get > US troops out earlier.Playing the bin Laden card is a brilliant way to > achieve this outcome. Although US officials claim they did it without > Pakistan's knowledge or permission, it is hard to believe he could be found > without the > Pakistani military establishment permitting it.Either way, bin Laden's > elimination provides the right political cover for President Obama to > declare victory and order his troops out of Afghanistan. Once withdrawal > starts, President Obama will be politically dependent on General Kayani to > ensure that it takes place in a manner that doesn't damage his re-election > prospects. Expect the latter to use the leverage to ensure that the > military-jihadi complex gets its proxies into the government in Kabul.As > I wrote on my blog yesterday, "the United States is unlikely to punish > Pakistan for the decade of duplicity, subterfuge and violence that consumed > innumerable lives and astounding amounts of money." President Obama will not > ask why Osama bin Laden was living it up in Abbottabad, a bus stop away from > the Pakistan Military Academy, and not in a cave somewhere in Waziristan. > You won't find Washington too interested in confronting General Kayani on > when bin > Laden moved in there and why his presence went undetected for so > long.Rather, Washington will seek plausible reassurances that after it > leaves, Afghanistan will not play host to terrorists targeting the United > States. It will place some anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistan Afghans into > positions of power in Kabul to balance Pakistan's proxies. It might retain > some troops and drones in Afghanistan just in case it needs to use a stick. > That apart, it will accede to Pakistani demands that Kabul be made over to a > pro-Pakistani regime.In time, the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will > seek to reconquer Afghanistan (called "gaining strategic depth") with > China's support or connivance.We are staring at a return of the 1990s. This > is a bad outcome for Afghans, Pakistanis and Indians. The military-jihadi > complex will gain in strength. Pakistan's civilian government will be more > powerless. It will only be a facade with which to seek foreign assistance. > It will also be > the whipping boy, blamed for the worsening state of Pakistan. Hundreds of > thousands of triumphant militants will need to be given new targets. > Compared to the early 1990s, it is far more difficult today---strategically > and operationally---to push them across into India. Yet, the interests of > the military-jihadi complex and the absence of a miracle job-machine will > pose a serious threat to India's national security. We may be, at best, two > summers away from an escalation of the proxy war in Kashmir and > elsewhere."Nitin Pai is founder & fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila > Institution and editor of Pragati - The Indian National Interest Review, a > publication on strategic affairs, public policy and governance. He blogs > at The Acorn and is active on Twitter too. > Uttam Kumar Borthakur > _______________________________________________ > assam mailing list > assam@assamnet.org > http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org >
-- Sent from my mobile device C 166 LGF Sarvodaya Enclave New Delhi 110017 09910972654 _______________________________________________ assam mailing list assam@assamnet.org http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
