Michael,

While obviously you'll want to block these attacks when you see them, as 
long as you use secure credentials for these remote extensions, you 
shouldn't have to worry too much about this attacker actually managing 
to compromise a SIP account. While you'll probably want to keep the 
extension numerical (though you don't need to), the password should be 
secure. That will eliminate 99% of attacks from being successful, 
limiting it just to a nuisance.

While a dedicated and direct attack (for example: from an employee, 
etc.) against your PBX changes things a bit, almost all attempts are 
random people/groups on the Internet scanning to find any IP that's 
listening on 5060UDP. Once they find you, they will attempt to scan for 
easily compromisable accounts.

These attackers are going to try very simple brute force attacks. They 
don't know if the extension is valid or not, so they aren't going to 
invest too much time trying to brute force every single possible 
password on every single possible account. Even one account could take 
eons to work through every possible combination of characters. They will 
most likely be trying the extension number for the password, 'password', 
'secret', etc. In my opinion, the most common error in that record is 
using the extension number for the password (ie: 1234:1234), which 
happens all too frequently.

You can also use Asterisk's built in peer ACL settings in the sip 
configuration file to prohibit registrations from non-specified IP 
addresses. You should always enable this for all local extensions, and 
if the remote phones will be coming from static IP addresses (or static 
netblocks) you can do that for them as well. If the latter is possible, 
then outside of a security vulnerability in the host system, Asterisk 
itself, or the client location, you can pretty much lock down the pbx 
from remote access attacks.

And as discussed, you can use the firewall plugins to prevent connection 
attempts like this in the future. Including blacklisting the IPs you see 
trying to probe your system.

-James

On 07/20/2010 03:29 AM, Michael wrote:
> I used the sip-voip plugin. It worked fine. However, security is not enough,
> it seems to me. I am experiencing hacker attacks on the open port 5060.
>
> So, I am wondering, what could be a better solution. Maybe would be
> interesting to not use port 5060 for external devices. Then the firewall
> would need to convert it to 5060 for incoming connections. Is this possible?
>
> Thanks
>
> Michael
>
> P.S.:
> Attacks come from 204.119.22.247, trying dozens of username/password
> combinations per second. Just a matter of time until they find a valid
> combination. At the moment, I blocked all external devices (there are only
> two anyway).
>
> Philip Prindeville wrote:
>
>    
>> On 7/11/10 12:13 PM, Lonnie Abelbeck wrote:
>>      
>>> On Jul 11, 2010, at 1:04 PM, Philip Prindeville wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>        
>>>>> Pass EXT->Local | UDP | Source: 0/0 | Port: 10000-20000
>>>>>
>>>>> (The port range here should exactly match your /etc/asterisk/rtp.conf
>>>>> rtpstart-rtpend port range.  Alternatively you can enable the
>>>>> 'sip-voip' plugin, but personally I keep the 'sip-voip' plugin disabled
>>>>> and use the above firewall rule.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Hope this helps.
>>>>>
>>>>> Lonnie
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>            
>>>> The problem with this is it opens up ALL ports 10000-20000, not just
>>>> those that are being used by RTP.
>>>>
>>>> I really, really recommend using the SIP-VOIP plugin instead.
>>>>
>>>> -Philip
>>>>
>>>>          
>>> In practice I use a *much* smaller port range for RTP, rather than the
>>> default 10000-20000.
>>>
>>> Opening a very small UDP port range for RTP is not a problem for me.
>>>
>>> Yes, I know you like the "sip-voip" plugin. :-)
>>>
>>> Lonnie
>>>
>>>        
>> What's not to like about it?  :-)
>>
>> More to the point, I like exposing only the barest minimal attack
>> surfaces whenever I can.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>      
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