On Sat 06 Aug 2011 13:25 +0200, Florian Pritz wrote: > On 06.08.2011 13:13, Lukas Fleischer wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 06, 2011 at 01:02:03PM +0200, Thomas Bächler wrote: > >> Am 05.08.2011 23:54, schrieb Lukas Fleischer: > >> > [1] http://projects.archlinux.org/aur.git/commit/?id=1e7b9d57 > >> > [2] http://projects.archlinux.org/aur.git/commit/?id=5ea9fc19 > >> > [3] http://projects.archlinux.org/aur.git/commit/?id=973e4f85 > >> > [4] http://projects.archlinux.org/aur.git/commit/?id=89721137 > >> > >> Those commits are nothing but a charade. The very least you must do is > >> this: > >> > >> 1) ALWAYS force a redirect to https on the AUR login page, never allow > >> the login to be submitted unencrypted. > > > > Thought about that. The problem is that there currently isn't a separate > > login page. Maybe removing the overall login form and creating a > > separate page for that will make things easier. > > > >> 2) Ensure that the cookie is never sent over http, only over https. > > > > We discussed that before, see the other replies. This will be > > implemented. > > Securing the login page itself is quite good and prevents eavesdropping, > but it doesn't take care of MITM attacks. > > If Alice is on http://aur.archlinux.org and clicks on a login link that > points to http://aur.archlinux.mallory.com/login.php the browser won't > complain about anything and Mallory can easily get access to her password.
This is why the redirects are also a charade. If Bob requests http://aur.archlinux.org but is redirected to http://aur.archlinux.frank.org rather than https://aur.archlinux.org he is probably expecting http anyways and may not bat an eye.
