On 3/09/2018 11:47 AM, Chris Ford wrote: > > Paul, > > > I agree with you in general as to the point that if we are happy with the > premise of > the current TIA Act that LEAs should be able to intercept communications with > a duly > authorised warrant, then extending that to encrypted services seems a > reasonable > extension to keep up with technology. > > > However, the current intercept regime is very difficult if not impossible for > a bad > actor to exploit. The intercept points are within the Carrier and CSP > networks, out > of reach of most people. When we move to intercept end-to-end encrypted > services you > either need to break the encryption (which thankfully does not seem to be the > path > anybody is proposing), OR, you need to access the clear text at the end point > itself. The problem I have with this is that the end point is out in user > land, > often accessible to anyone on the internet, and now exposed to exploit by bad > actors. > ..And this is it. The new legislation is NOT about encryption, primarily, despite what we thought before the draft was released. They've explicitly acknowledged they can't 'break' encryption, and do not want to weaken encryption. They want the sent and received message text, stored in the device after/before the encrypted transport.
Its actually a 'device malware' bill - a bill to enable general police forces to achieve things that previously only shadowy four-letter agencies could do - implant malware and modify the function of any end-user device, handset, modem, laptop, tablet, printer, connected TV, Amazon Alexa/Google Home/etc. Actually it goes further - rather than implant the malware themselves once they've achieved physical access, this 'device malware' bill enables them to ask nicely for assistance, and then to require, the device suppliers and manufacturers to build and implant the exploit for them. Why should AS** develop an exploit, when they can ask Apple or Netgear or Samsung nicely to develop and install the exploit for them. We've spent decades educating users that the green padlock on a website means something, and that 'IOT devices' such as your average Smart TV might be easily hijacked and be recording and watching the home through its microphone and embedded webcam. This bill makes government-authorised modified firmware with exploits that the network and software industry have spent billions developing virus scanning apps to detect and eradicate. Paul. > > -- > > Chris Ford | CTO > > Inabox Group Limited > > > Ph: + 61 2 8275 6871 > > Mb: +61 401 988 844 > > Em: [email protected] > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > *From:* AusNOG <[email protected]> on behalf of Paul Wilkins > <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, 3 September 2018 11:31:14 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [AusNOG] Dutton decryption bill > > Bradley, > The Common Law has always allowed judicial scrutiny of our privacy. There's > always > been the right for judicial search warrants to override what's considered > one's > private domain. I'm supportive of this bill where it extends judicial > oversite to > the cyber domain, which is a gap that exists only because legislation/common > law has > lagged behind technology. While at the same time realising that conversations > conducted over the internet, even if encrypted, are more properly regarded as > public > conversations, than say one you might have in your living room. Whether > government > is going to regulate the internet, the boat has sailed on this long ago. The > hard > line privacy advocates are simply going to be left out of a conversation > democracy > needs to have over not whether the internet should be regulated, but how. > > What's interesting in this bill is that it goes beyond extending judicial > writ, > allowing law enforcement emergency powers the right to surveil suspects. This > will > be authorised by law enforcement, without judicial or governmental oversite. > I think > this probably goes too far. The best outcome for everyone, to protect > privacy, and > to empower law enforcement to enforce laws and to protect citizens rights, > would be > to limit the scope of these new powers to judicial writ. > > Kind regards > > Paul Wilkins > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
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