https://tineye.com/search/f274c3b49edcca9a6d83994a43629445a5ea5a23/
On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 11:12, Matt Palmer <[email protected]> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:56:12AM +1000, Paul Wilkins wrote: > > Now I would say that for instance, if the eSecurity Director posts the > CRC > > of a file as being "abhorrent violent" content, and your company doesn't > > expeditiously take down that material, expect problems down the pike. I > > doubt a CRC check alone is sufficient. > > Given that a CRC changes if you modify any bit of the file, and common CRC > implementations have a space of either 16 or 32 bits (65,536 and ~4 billion > possible values, respectively), "insufficient" doesn't even begin to > describe such a scheme. > > > I'd say a fingerprinting system to > > match altered copies of the subject file should be implemented. > > Once again with this magical "figerprinting" scheme. Nothing like what > you're describing actually exists. Further, there's no point in each > company coming up with their own scheme for calculating this magical > fingerprint, because if the eSecurity Director wants to say "take down > everything like this fingerprint" they have to use the *same* scheme to > come > up with the same fingerprint. > > > It doesn't have to work in all cases. > > It won't work in *any* case. > > > I am not a lawyer. This is not expert advice. > > Yes, I think that is quite evident. > > - Matt > > _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog >
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