Authors,
While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary)
the following questions, which are also in the source file.
1) <!-- [rfced] The AlgorithmIdentifier type defined in [RFC5912] includes
an "&" character before "Params". Please review and let us know if the
ampersand should be included in the first block of sourcecode.
In addition, the first line extends 3 characters beyond the margin. Please
let us know how the line can be broken.
Current:
AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=
SEQUENCE {
algorithm ALGORITHM-TYPE.id({AlgorithmSet}),
parameters ALGORITHM-TYPE.
Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
}
>From [RFC5912]:
AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=
SEQUENCE {
algorithm ALGORITHM-TYPE.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
parameters ALGORITHM-TYPE.
&Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
}
-->
2) <!-- [rfced] The following sentences makes it seem like this ASN.1 is
copied from [RFC5280], but this exact source code doesn't appear to be in
[RFC5280]. Perhaps the intent is to indicate the use "1988 ASN.1 syntax"?
Current:
As shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509
certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that
contains the actual signature.
Certificate ::= SIGNED{ TBSCertificate }
SIGNED{ToBeSigned} ::= SEQUENCE {
toBeSigned ToBeSigned,
algorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE {
algorithm SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM.
&id({SignatureAlgorithms}),
parameters SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM.
&Params({SignatureAlgorithms}
{@algorithmIdentifier.algorithm})
OPTIONAL
},
signature BIT STRING (CONTAINING SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM.&Value(
{SignatureAlgorithms}
{@algorithmIdentifier.algorithm}))
}
Same issue occurs here:
Current:
Signatures are also used in the CRL list ASN.1 representation from
[RFC5280] below. In a X.509 CRL, a signature is encoded with an
algorithm identifier in the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a
signatureValue attribute that contains the actual signature.
CertificateList ::= SIGNED{ TBSCertList }
-->
3) <!-- [rfced] May we rephrase this as "deliver a secure implementation
with greater ease"? In addition, to what does "it" refer - perhaps it
should be "they"?
Original:
While deliberate
design decisions such as these can help to deliver a greater ease of
secure implementation - particularly against side-channel attacks -
it does not necessarily provide resistance to more powerful attacks
such as differential power analysis.
-->
4) <!-- [rfced] Should "key pair" be "keypair" here as used elsewhere in
the document?
Original:
Non-repudiation refers to the assurance that the owner
of a signature key pair that was capable of generating an existing
signature corresponding to certain data cannot convincingly deny
having signed the data, unless its private key was compromised.
-->
5) <!-- [rfced] [FIPS204] FYI: We have updated the date for this reference
from August 2023 to August 2024. We also replaced the original URL
(https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography) with the one
that points to the most recent version of FIPS 204
(https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf).
-->
6) <!-- [rfced] [CSOR] FYI: We updated the date for this reference from 20
August 2024 to 13 June 2025 to match the date provided at the URL.
-->
7) <!-- [rfced] [CDFFJ21] Please review. The original date for this
reference is 2021. The version of this paper in the Cryptology ePrint
Archive was updated in October 2023 (see the "Note" at this
URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1525).
The 2021 version is available for free from IEEE -
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9519420
Should this reference point to the updated (2023) version at the Cryptology
ePrint Archive or to the 2021 version of this paper?
-->
8) <!-- [rfced] [NIST-PQC] FYI: We have updated the date for this reference
from 20 December 2016 to 28 July 2025 to match the date provided at the URL.
-->
9) <!-- [rfced] Please consider whether "traditional" has a universal
meaning as used here:
Instead of defining the strength of a quantum algorithm in a
traditional manner using the imprecise notion of bits of security,
NIST has instead elected to define security levels by picking a
reference scheme, which NIST expects to offer notable levels of
resistance to both quantum and classical attack.
-->
10) <!-- [rfced] We are having trouble understanding "then" in this
sentence. Does it indicate a later step or perhaps it should be deleted
altogether?
Original:
The second and third examples would not be detected by
implementations that do not regenerate the public key from the
private key, or neglect to then check consistency of tr or t_0.
Perhaps A:
The second and third examples would not be detected by
implementations that do not regenerate the public key from the
private key and then neglect then check consistency of tr or t_0.
Perhaps B:
The second and third examples would not be detected by
implementations that do not regenerate the public key from the
private key or that neglect to check consistency of tr or t_0.
-->
11) <!-- [rfced] Should "pre-hash" and "prehash" be consistent throughout?
For example:
Original:
Pre-hash operation:
...
Figure 2: Computeμ prehash operation
-->
12) <!-- [rfced] The following lines extended beyond 72 characters. We
folded the lines as follows. Please let us know if any corrections are
needed.
Original:
# The functions `BytesToBits` and `IntegerToBytes` are defined in FIPS 204.
Current:
# The functions `BytesToBits` and `IntegerToBytes` are defined
# in FIPS 204.
Original:
# ... identical to FIPS 204 Algorithm 7, but with Line 6 replaced with
Current:
# ... identical to FIPS 204 Algorithm 7, but with Line 6 replaced
# with
-->
13) <!-- [rfced] We are having trouble parsing "defaulting is Externalμ to
false". Please review.
Original:
ML-DSA.Signμ_internal(sk, M', rnd, isExternalμ=false):
# μ can be passed as an argument instead of M'
# defaulting is Externalμ to false means that
# this modified version of Sign_internal can be used
# in place of the original without interfering with
# functioning of pure ML-DSA mode.
-->
14) <!-- [rfced] Please review <tt> throughout the document for correctness
and consistent use. Please see the list of <tt> use at the following
location:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881tt2.txt
The list has been alphabetized and entries are listed only once (that is,
if <tt> is used multiple times for the same term, it is only listed once).
Note that we did not review each item on the list. These are our notes and
questions on the items we checked:
a) <tt>expanded</tt> - Should instances of <tt>expanded</tt> be
<tt>expandedKey</tt>?
For example:
For each security level,
we show the seed-only format (using a context-specific <tt>[0]</tt> primitive
tag with an implicit encoding of <tt>OCTET STRING</tt>), the
<tt>expanded</tt>
format, and <tt>both</tt> formats together.</t>
b) <tt>seed</tt> - Should occurrences of "seed-only format" be
"<tt>seed</tt> format"?
For example:
For each security
level, we show the seed-only format (using a context-specific [0]
primitive tag with an implicit encoding of OCTET STRING), the
expanded format, and both formats together.
b) <tt>OCTET STRING</tt> - seems to be used consistently in <tt> outside of
code
c) <tt>OneAsymmetricKey</tt> - Below are examples where "OneAsymmetricKey"
does not appear in <tt>:
<t>When encoding an ML-DSA private key in a OneAsymmetricKey
object, any of these three formats may be used, though the seed format is
<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for storage efficiency.</t>
Note that these are the sizes of the raw keys, not including
ASN.1 encoding overhead from OneAsymmetricKey and SubjectPublicKeyInfo
wrappers.
d) <tt>PUBLIC-KEY</tt> - seems to be used consistently in <tt> outside of
code
-->
15) <!-- [rfced] Please review each artwork element and let us know if any
should be marked as sourcecode (or another element) instead.
We updated a number of instances of <artwork> to <sourcecode type="asn.1">.
Please review closely and let us know if any corrections are needed.
Please let us know if any instances of <artwork> should be <sourcecode> and
whether type="" should be set. The current list of types is available at
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types>. If it
does not contain an applicable type, then feel free to let us know. Note
that it is also acceptable to leave the "type" attribute not set.
-->
16) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online
Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature
typically result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.
Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should
still be reviewed as a best practice.
-->
Thank you.
RFC Production Center
On Oct 8, 2025, at 5:54 PM, [email protected] wrote:
*****IMPORTANT*****
Updated 2025/10/08
RFC Author(s):
--------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC9881 (draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-13)
Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm
Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)
Author(s) : J. Massimo, P. Kampanakis, S. Turner, B. Westerbaan
WG Chair(s) : Russ Housley, Tim Hollebeek
Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Paul Wouters
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