We are trying to mitigate one of the issues described in RFC6126: > As defined in this document, Babel is a completely insecure protocol. Any attacker can attract data traffic by advertising routes with a low metric.
We're concerned about this mostly because a node could advertise a low metric, attract traffic, and then charge for it. One avenue we've thought about is to run the link cost calculation end to end across the entire route to a given destination. This could give a "second opinion" of what the metric to that destination should be. This could be used as a way to detect nodes that are cheating. For example: if (A)--2--(B)--3--(C)--1--(D) = 5 then (A)----------5----------(D) = 5 A performs the link cost calculation between herself and D to find out if B or C are cheating. Have you thought about this at all? What's your opinion? -Jehan On Sun, May 22, 2016 at 11:16 PM, Juliusz Chroboczek < [email protected]> wrote: > > This is more a theoretical than practical question right now, but is it > > possible for a node to verify the ETX metrics of its neighbors? That is, > > compute the ETX between myself and a given destination, and use it to > confirm > > that the additive ETX metric to that destination computed by the > neighbor is > > correct. > > Could you please explain? I'm not sure I'm following you. > > -- Juliusz > >
_______________________________________________ Babel-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/babel-users
