Salaamun Alaykum, Thank you for this, it was a very interesting read..
Wasalaam Linda --- In [email protected], Peace Justice <bejust.pe...@...> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Dear Sir, > One might get some new info. >  > > > > > > Who Are the Afghani Taliban? > Unraveling the Group's Roots, Divisions, and Today's Trend > > > > > > > > By Suhail Shaheen > Former Chief Editor of the Kabul Times > > > >  > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Afghan boys study with a mullah of a cave-mosque, in the Afghan village of > Mulayan, (Reuters photo)The emergence of Taliban was a landmark event in > Afghanistan. It has changed the whole political scene in the country. Soon > after its emergence in Sangsar village in Uruzgan province, under the > leadership of Mullah Omar, the movement captured many Pashtun-dominated > provinces without any remarkable resistance. The war-weary Afghans welcomed > them. They considered Taliban as their saviors from daily armed clashes. > However, after the capturing of Kabul, Taliban faced dug-in resistance from > militias formed of other Afghan minorities like Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara > which continued until 2001. >  > The Roots of the Taliban > > > > > After its invasion by the former Soviet Union, religious scholars in > Afghanistan rallied under the banner of Harakate-Inqilabe-Islami Afghanistan. > (Movement for Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan) led by Maulavi Mohammad Nabi > Mohammadi. He was a religious scholar and former parliamentarian during the > ex-king Zahir Shah government. > His deputy, Malulavi Nasrulla Mansoor, was one of the prominent members of > Khudam-ul-Furqan party during the former king Zahir Shah Regime. He was also > a religious scholar and a Pashtun by ethnicity. Nasrullah Mansoor splintered > from Harakat in 1982, and formed his own faction under the same name of > Harakate-Inqilabe Islami Afghanistan. > The government of Pakistan did not recognize his newly-founded party, so he > turned to Tehran for financial and logistical assistance. Iran was funding > Mansoor's faction through its diplomatic channels based in Peshawar. > The two resistance factions led by Maulavi Mohammad Nabi Mohmmadi and Maulavi > Nasrullah Mansoor formed their own religious students unions, each by the > name of Jamiate Tulabae Afghanistan (Afghanistan Islamic students > Association) and Tanzim Tulaba-ee Harakat (Harakat Students Organization). > Their head offices were situated in Peshawar,but their branches were spread > as far as Balochistan and other cities of North Western Province of > Pakistan. The organizers were considering these students entities as their > future strategic assets. > They prepared them for political leadership in Afghanistan. Maulavi Mansoor > had built a big religious school near Bara, a semiâ€"autonomous area near > Peshawar, in North Western Province of Pakistan where teachers gave religious > education to the students, as well as some classes in English and history. > Another branch of Tanzim Tulaba Harakat operated in Baluchistan. A parallel > faction under the leadership of M. M Nabi Mohammadi had built a grand > religious seminary in Charat Refugees Camp in the vicinity of Peshawar, > Pakistan, where Maulavi Mohammadi was living along with his family. > In 1992, before the fall of Najibulla regime, both factions re-united under > the name of Harakate Inqilabe Islami Afghanistan. By then, the students' > organizations had expanded in terms of numbers and training facilities. >  > The Fall of Najibullah's Government  > > > >  > After the fall of the last pro-Soviet government in Kabul in 1992, > Afghanistan became a gruesome scene of factional fighting. Various armed > factions controlled parts of the capital city Kabul. At least 60,000 people > were killed as a result of armed clashes. > > Fiefdoms emerged all over the country where the word of the commander was a > law unto itself. Unscrupulous gunmen had been imposing arbitrary taxes on > common people, and even raping defenseless women. People were fed up with the > status quo. > They wanted a relief from these anomalies. Mullah Omar rose to the occasion > by launching a resistance movement against these warlords. Soon thousands of > Jamiate Tulaba and Tanzim Taulaba members joined the new movement, forming > the back bone of the newly-founded group. > At the outset, their goal was to save the common Afghans from the grips of > the irresponsible commanders and gunmen. Their major offensisve against > Kandahar took place in October 1994. They had already captured Maiwand > district and Spin Boldack border city near Pakistan. By September > 1996, Taliban captured Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. > Tahir Anwary and Arifulla Arif, the alternate heads of Tanzaim Tulaba became > minister and deputy minister of finance in the Taliban government. > Asadullah Hanafi, another head of Jamiate Islami Tulaba, got important slot > in the Taliban regime. Other members of the student's orgizanization took up > responsibility as governors, commanders, and high-ranking officials. >  > Taliban's Groups From Inside: > The Taliban could be divided into four sets of groups: >  > 1. Mullah Omar's group > 2. Late Mullah Rabbani's group. > 3. Members of other Afghan resistance parties. > 4. Opportunist elements. >  > 1. Mullah Omar's group: Mullah Omar circle formed a radical but influential > group. They held important government slots and were very influential in > decision-making processes. They had sway over other members. Unfortunately, > this group kept Mullah Omar ignorant of what was happening in response > to some of his decisions and other Taliban's policies. > > Mullah Omar hardly met non-Muslim foreign delegations, and was not watching > television either. He was completely relying on his small clique of > protégés. Moreover, some hard-line religious scholars who tried hard to > influence him time and again, were â€" in part â€" responsible for some > untimely and provocative decisions he made. They encouraged him, for > instance, to: >  > - Share no power with former Mujahideen, and crack down on them; > - Reach no rapprochement with neighbors, particularly Russia and Iran; > - Ban the Afghan television broadcasts although Taliban had allowed > Al-jazeera branch office to operate in Kabul; > - Ban women's education although they clandestinely allowed female students > of the faculty of medicine to continue their education at the 400-bedded > military hospital in Kabul; > - Destroy Buddha Statues. However, Mullah Omar had ordered in 1999 through a > decree that the Buddha Statues should be protected as historical relics. Yet, > in March 2001, he reversed his own decree; > - Slaughter 100 cows, for celebration, after the demolition of the Buddha > Status. > > Distorted information given to Mullah Omar by clandestine hands played a > great role in his decisions whereas some groups misused his nominal consent > to take critical measures of grave consequences. >  > 2. Late Mullah Rabbani's group: Mullah Rabbani's circle constituted the > majority of Taliban. They wanted to put an end to the factional fighting in > Afghanistan, and bring about peace by establishing moderate Muslim regime in > the country. > Prominent figures of these groups did not believe in the export of the > revolution, particularly in the chaotic situation that the country was > passing through. > Some members of this group included prominent figures like Mullah Mohammad > Ghous, former foreign minister of Taliban, and many others. >  > 3. Members of other Afghan resistance parties: The third group comprised of > Taliban who had been members of other resistance parties. When they became > disgruntled with their factions, they joined the newly formed Taliban Islamic > Movement of Afghanistan. They wanted peace for the common people and a Muslim > regime in the country. There were many former commanders and some qualified > people among them, but they held low-ranking posts and had no role in the > policy-making bodies of Taliban. >  > 4. Opportunist elements: > > > > Some opportunists who joined the Taliban were aiming to obtain wealth, fame, > and power.The fourth element is the opportunists who had joined Taliban to > obtain wealth, fame, and power. This group along with some > ultra-enthusiastic elements among Taliban ranks isolated Taliban at world > level, and created a gap between them and the common people.  >  > Mullah Qalamuddin was chief of the Department of Prevention of Vices and > Promotion of Good at the first days of the Taliban government. Unfortunately, > members of his department frequently misbehaved common people. > This distanced the common sympathizers from the movement and even pushed them > toward hostile forces. He issued circular letters on day-to-day basis, and > used to send these letters to media and NGOs. For example, a circular letter > signed by him prohibited women from using high heels shoes. Such actions > caused widespread reaction at home and abroad. > After the fall of Taliban, Qalamuddin joined Karzai government and ran for an > Afghan National Assembly seat, but failed. He is now living in > Kabul. Another ultra-enthusiast was Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, the Taliban > minister of Justice. He also created uproars by his uncalled-for actions. He > is said now to be under detention of Pakistani security forces. > Mullah Mohammad Wali replaced Mullah Qalamuddin, as the Minister of the > Promotion of Good and Prevention of Vices. He continued along the previous > hard line. > In an interview with Afghan Islamic Press Agency, Mullah Wali said that the > Afghan Sikh community members should hoist yellow banners on their houses, > and should carry yellow badges on their chests. > In fact, it was his personal view. There was no decision at Taliban > leadership level or a decree issued by Mullah Omar in this regard. However, > it created widespread hue and cries, damaging the image of the Taliban > regime. These Taliban ultra-conservative officials along with other > opportunist elements among the ranks and files of Taliban added to the > defamation of Taliban. > Even up to this day, the Taliban leadership has not launched investigation to > find out whether these persons were acting by themselves or were acting by > instructions from some foreign intelligence agencies. > There is a strong possibility that some secret actors had role in the > provocative actions which contributed to Taliban failure to rise as a strong > model of a Muslim regime for the Ummah. > The other blunder of Taliban was that its leadership focused more on > defeating the Northern Alliance forces led by commander Ahmad Shah Massoud > rather than on reconstruction and development projects. People wanted peace, > but after peace, they wanted economic prosperity and employment. Taliban did > not meet these demands. > International community, Muslim countries, and religious scholars did not try > to engage Taliban. Their engagement would have helped Taliban to frame more > popular and pragmatic policies. > > In this case, Mullah Omar would not have taken the above-mentioned decicions. > However, the Muslim world just left him to a small clique of hard-line but > sycophant elements. Neighboring countries specially the Muslim ones must be > blamed for this neglect. Unfortunately, this mistake is being repeated anew. >  > After Their Ousting > > > > > The Taliban were not familiar with the tactics of underground struggle. After > the fall of Kandahar, Taliban leaders and low-rank members spread all over > Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf countries and even some went to Europe. > The Taliban structure of organization fell down. Before the inception of the > American attacks, they had not chalked out a comprehensive strategy to keep > their organization intact in case of defeat. It was only in 2003 that some > leaders of Taliban set to re-organize the resistance anew. However, they > could only launch sporadic attacks. > Only in 2004-2005, the resistance gathered momentum. Still, the Taliban have > not been able to win back all their former members from their private > life. About 20-30 percent of former Taliban members have opted to continue > their private life giving up any political participation up to this day. > This percentage would have been further high, had the US extremist policy of > detaining and prosecuting them not pushed the Taliban ranks and file to rally > once again around their leadership. The Taliban leaders are now greatly > relying on new recruits. >  > Today's Trend > Still, there are some personality cults among Taliban, like the protégés > of Mullah Omar, Mullah Obaidulla; former defense minister, Mullah Brother, > Mullah Jallaluddin Haqani, and others. However, the current Taliban > leadership is more pragmatic and mellowed.  > "We would like to live up to the expectations of the people. We want to be in > contact with our people through their representatives, elders, notables and > religious scholars. No doubts there are problems facing the nation, but these > are the grave outcome of the war. On our behalf, we would try to alleviate > their sufferings as far as we can," Mullah Brother said in a recent > interview. > This is a new trend in Taliban's popular policy. They are usually reputed > for monopolizing power and not catering to the demands of the masses. > Mullah Mautasseim Agha Jan, the head of the Political Commission envisages > further share for the Afghans in a national government. > > "Upon the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Muslim Emirate will have > consultation with all important circles of the Afghan issue to reach an > understanding about a mechanism of political set-up in Afghanistan," Agha > said. > However, military commanders who are waging the current armed battles are > rigid in their approach regarding core issues. Monopolizing power in their > hands and not catering to people's needs are their mistakes, which will keep > them away from the masses. They believe in military solution of the Afghan > issue rather than diplomacy. > > > > > > > Suhail Shaheen is a former Chief Editor of the Kabul Times and a freelance > Journalist based in Afghanistan. He can be reached through > politics.inde...@... > http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1245846053438&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout > > > For any personal reply, please reply me bejust.pe...@... > Join me @facebook! > Thanks a lot for your time. > BeJustPeace > N.B.: I never mail any advertisement or spam - so if you get somethine like > this from this account, please forgive me as sometimes, people may spam using > my ID. Wish you all the best. RESPECT. > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "bangla-vision" group. 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