Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-bess-srv6-services-10: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bess-srv6-services/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thank you to Joseph Salowey for the SECDIR review. Thank you to the authors for the implementation report pointer (draft-matsushima-spring-srv6-deployment-status) I support Alvaro Retana’s DISCUSS position. I also support Warren Kumari’s DISCUSS position. In particular, discussing the magnitude of the exposure of an internal topology due to a BGP leak would be helpful to document. ** Section 8. It would be worth repeating the two key security assumptions from RFC8402: OLD SRv6 operates within a trusted SR domain with filtering of traffic at the domain boundaries. NEW SRv6 operates within a trusted SR domain with filtering of traffic at the domain boundaries. Likewise, there is an assumed trust model such that any node adding an SRH to the packet is assumed to be allowed to do so. _______________________________________________ BESS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/bess
