>>leaving auto-execute on. You meant switching it on?
As far as I know, auto-execution of python scripts when loading .blend files is turned off by default in SVN trunk. And I'm glad it is. Cheers, Erwin On Mar 24, 2010, at 6:30, Roger Wickes <[email protected]> wrote: > So, a little logic to this paranoia, and hopefully a process of > elimination. Also, > confirmation of what security we do have in place already, to make > everyone rest easier. > I agree that while however slight, the chance of having your PC > wiped by a malware script > is troubling because there is no recourse against the evildoer. That > there is money made > from it is no doubt. I discovered that I had malware sending my hard > drive contents to Russia. > > We can all agree that having a pop-up stop and force you to > confirm automatic script > executionisn't automatic script execution > and therefore defeats the purpose of the option in the first place:) > > > So if your all your scripts, like all programs installed on your PC, > are all from trusted sources, > you can enable auto-execute. Just like when I start OpenOffice, my > OS does not popup and > ask me if I want to execute OpenOffice. That would be just as > painful as the current > set of delete confirmation popups in Vista. > > The only way for a script to become part of the blender install is > for a trusted dev > to accept the patch. There has never been a case where malware patch > has been > accepted, and highly unlikely to ever be. Commit rights are only > granted to trusted devs. > > That leaves the possibility of someone hacking SVN, someone with > commit rights, or > somehow hacking into the blender.org or graphicall.org servers and > inserting a bad > script (or compiled C code) without detection. That is a server > security issue, not a sandbox problem. > There is both physical access and username/password security > protecting them. > > So that leaves someone posting a script in like BA that no one knows > and it may > or may not do something bad. In that case, you are getting a program > from an untrusted source. You can be a trusting person and just run > it, or, > since you got a new blend file from an untrusted source, you disable > auto > script > execution and open it up. Look at it, see what it does, and execute it > if you like. > > Just as likely is someone building an evil Blender and posting the > build somewhere for people > to download. That is the general problem with software available for > the internet, > and the only way to stop that is user education, unexpired > certificates, and OS protection. > > If it is malware, community response will be immediate and vengeful, > for either Blender exe > or scripts. AFAIK scripts cannot be signed; they are text files. > Perhaps pyc files can be, but > distributing source is the practice. > > That really leaves only one remaining possibility. I think you guys > are worried about the noob > that is one of the very first to find the malware, and then proceeds > to > run un-human-readable stuff (compiled code, pyc files) on their PC, > or blindly runs source py files and does not read them or cannot > understand them, > or downloads and opens a blend file, leaving auto-execute on. > > That is the same issue as downloading any kind of > program and running it; it is impossible to protect a user from > their own stupidity. > Therefore, there is nothing further that can reasonably be done, and > no additional processes > or procedures need to be implemented. > > Therefore, the safest route is to ship Blender with auto-execute > turned off, and let the user decide > to turn it on, or instead, run scripts after reviewing them. Either > way, the process and existing > security measures guard the pipeline and the contents of the pipe. > > --Roger > > > > _______________________________________________ > Bf-committers mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers _______________________________________________ Bf-committers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers
