> On Jan 25, 2022, at 8:50 AM, Benny Pedersen <m...@junc.eu> wrote:
> 
> On 2022-01-25 17:45, Greg Choules wrote:
>> Hello.
> 
> Authentication-Results: lists.isc.org;
>       dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; 
> unprotected) header.d=isc.org header.i=@isc.org header.b=q/vOEba5;
>       dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; 
> unprotected) header.d=isc.org header.i=@isc.org header.b=ozeUkO/Z
> 
> dont know why it failed

I may as well answer this since other people chimed in on the test message.  
I'm Dan Mahoney, ISC's sysadmin who runs most of our mail systems, and, 
coincidentally, also do some work with the Trusted Domain Project on opendkim 
and opendmarc.

The headers you cite are lying to you.  :) The message passed DKIM on the way 
IN to lists.isc.org <http://lists.isc.org/> (the dedicated vm that runs our 
lists), but then, when the message got to the mailman python scripts and then 
shot back out via the MTA, they had an altered body and no longer passed, and 
the header was rewritten to say "fail".  (This is visible from the logging on 
the servers, but nowhere else).

The solution here, is that lists.isc.org <http://lists.isc.org/> should only be 
running in "signer" mode, and not verifying anything (we verify messages on our 
MXes, and make the decisions there to reject if dmarc says to do so).  The only 
things that lists.isc.org <http://lists.isc.org/> will sign are things that it 
generates itself (i.e. things from the lists.isc.org <http://lists.isc.org/> 
domain).

> 
> will my dkim fail aswell ?

Re: DKIM failure, both SPF and DKIM is well known to be broken by mailing 
lists.  So if you're running a dmarc-enforced domain with a policy of P=reject, 
it's possible that mail you send via a list will be rejected.

Altering the body or headers at all (whch lists do) will often break the 
hashing.  For this reason, most recent versions of mailman have an option to 
rewrite your mail from:

From: "Benny Pedersen" <you(at)example.com <http://example.com/>>

...to...

From: "Benny Pedersen via bind-users" <bind-users(at)lists.isc.org 
<http://lists.isc.org/>>
Reply-To: "Benny Pederson" <you(at)example.com <http://example.com/>>
Cc: bind-users@lists.isc.org <mailto:bind-users@lists.isc.org>

...but only in the event you have a restrictive DMARC policy.  I've argued that 
it should be possible to do so for *any* dmarc policy, even p=none, but that 
option is not present in mailman 3, at least.

Here at ISC, we have a little bit of a cheat -- messages *we* send to 
bind-users will pass SPF, because lists.isc.org <http://lists.isc.org/> is in 
our SPF list.

The upcoming "better" solution for this is ARC: basically a way for 
lists.isc.org <http://lists.isc.org/> to assert "This thing passed muster when 
it entered our borders, trust us".

-Dan Mahoney

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