On 2024-01-25 17:08, Alexander Zubkov wrote:
But I think the problem with no filters is bigger when the RTR server
is out. It is not just the short period of time when the peer can
announce anything. If rpki autoreload is on it will cause all bad
announces that was rejected before to pass the filter now. And if we
turn rpki autoreload off, it might work like a classical filter, but
than we cannot do additional actual origin validation using rpki.
On Thu, Jan 25, 2024, 14:41 Alexander Zubkov <gr...@qrator.net> wrote:
AFAIK in RPKI AS0 means implicit invalid.
On Thu, Jan 25, 2024, 14:31 Maria Matejka via Bird-users
<bird-users@network.cz> wrote:
On 2024-01-25 11:55, Erin Shepherd wrote:
Spitballing slightly here, but could you avoid this problem
by adding 0.0.0.0/0+ <http://0.0.0.0/0+> ::0/0+ AS0 RoAs to
the table and accepting ROA Unknowns?
Obviously the disadvantage here is that if your IRR RTR
server goes down you're basically unfiltered, but it at least
avoids the availability problem
With this, you can just go like
if roa_check(irr, ::/0, 0) = ROA_VALID && roa_check(irr,
net, peerasn) != ROA_VALID then reject;
which should do the work, iirc.
I may have not written it completely. I would add the "::/0+ as 0", or
"::/0+ as 65535" if AS0 is too shady, to the IRR RTR feed itself, not as
a static record.
This way, if the RTR feed fails, the first roa_check fails and the
second one is not performed at all, therefore nothing is rejected. OTOH,
if the RTR feed works, the first roa_check is always true and the second
one matters.
Do I miss something?
Maria
- Erin
On Thu, 25 Jan 2024, at 11:41, Job Snijders via Bird-users wrote:
On Thu, Jan 25, 2024 at 11:13:51AM +0100, Jeroen Massar via
Bird-users wrote:
> a quick stab at generating the slurm file:
why use SLURM though? SLURM doesn't have a 'maxLength' field
like the
regular JSON input formatted in this style has:
https://console.rpki-client.org/rpki.json - which might help
with
aggregation.
More importantly, a risk I perceive with overloading RTR
functionality
to load IRR data into routers is in the realm of fail-safes:
For RPKI-derived data, most ISPs do something along the
lines of:
if (roa_check(rpki, net, bgp_path.last) = ROA_INVALID)
then reject;
For IRR-derived data, you'd have to do:
if (roa_check(irr, net, peerasn) != ROA_VALID) then reject;
The above means that suddenly your EBGP routers/route
servers have a
very hard dependency on the IRR RTR session being up in
order to accept
routes (fail closed), whereas how the RPKI-derived data is
used is in a
'fail open' fashion.
The above friction goes back to RPKI ROAs being defined as
"if ROAs
exist, all BGP routes that do not match any of the ROAs are
invalid"
(following the RFC 6811 algorithm), but for IRR route/route6
objects
such a definition was never established, those predate the
RFC 6811
algorithm.
Kind regards,
Job
--
Maria Matejka (she/her) | BIRD Team Leader | CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.
--
Maria Matejka (she/her) | BIRD Team Leader | CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.
