We introduce several concepts that rework the lightweight Bitcoin client model in a manner which is secure, efficient and privacy compatible.
Thea properties of BIP37 SPV  are unfortunately not as strong as originally thought: * The expected privacy of the probabilistic nature of bloom filters does not exist , any user with a BIP37 SPV wallet should be operating under no expectation of privacy. Implementation flaws make this effect significantly worse, the behavior meaning that no matter how high the false positive rate (up to simply downloading the whole blocks verbatim) the intent of the client connection is recoverable. * Significant processing load is placed on nodes in the Bitcoin network by lightweight clients, a single syncing wallet causes (at the time of writing) 80GB of disk reads and a large amount of CPU time to be consumed processing this data. This carries significant denial of service risk , non-distinguishable clients can repeatedly request taxing blocks causing reprocessing on every request. Processed data is unique to every client, and can not be cached or made more efficient while staying within specification. * Wallet clients can not have strong consistency or security expectations, BIP37 merkle paths allow for a wallet to validate that an output was spendable at some point in time but does not prove that this output is not spent today. * Nodes in the network can denial of service attack all BIP37 SPV wallet clients by simply returning null filter results for requests, the wallet has no way of discerning if it has been lied to and may be made simply unaware that any payment has been made to them. Many nodes can be queried in a probabilistic manor but this increases the already heavy network load with little benefit. We propose a new concept which can work towards addressing these shortcomings. A Bloom Filter Digest is deterministically created of every block encompassing the inputs and outputs of the containing transactions, the filter parameters being tuned such that the filter is a small portion of the size of the total block data. To determine if a block has contents which may be interesting a second bloom filter of all relevant key material is created. A binary comparison between the two filters returns true if there is probably matching transactions, and false if there is certainly no matching transactions. Any matched blocks can be downloaded in full and processed for transactions which may be relevant. The BFD can be used verbatim in replacement of BIP37, where the filter can be cached between clients without needing to be recomputed. It can also be used by normal pruned nodes to do re-scans locally of their wallet without needing to have the block data available to scan, or without reading the entire block chain from disk. - For improved probabilistic security the bloom filters can be presented to lightweight clients by semi-trusted oracles. A client wallet makes an assumption that they trust a set, or subset of remote parties (wallet vendors, services) which all all sign the BFD for each block. The BFD can be downloaded from a single remote source, and the hash of the filters compared against others in the trust set. Agreement is a weak suggestion that the filter has not been tampered with, assuming that these parties are not conspiring to defraud the client. The oracles do not learn any additional information about the client wallet, the client can download the block data from either nodes on the network, HTTP services, NTTP, or any other out of band communication method that provides the privacy desired by the client. - The security model of the oracle bloom filter can be vastly improved by instead committing a hash of the BFD inside every block as a soft- fork consensus rule change. After this, every node in the network would build the filter and validate that the hash in the block is correct, then make a conscious choice discard it for space savings or cache the data to disk. With a commitment to the filter it becomes impossible to lie to lightweight clients by omission. Lightweight clients are provided with a block header, merkle path, and the BFD. Altering the BFD invalidates the merkle proof, it's validity is a strong indicator that the client has an unadulterated picture of the UTXO condition without needing to build one itself. A strong assurance that the hash of the BFD means that the filters can be downloaded out of band along with the block data at the leisure of the client, allowing for significantly greater privacy and taking load away from the P2P Bitcoin network. Committing the BFD is not a hard forking change, and does not require alterations to mining software so long as the coinbase transaction scriptSig is not included in the bloom filter.  https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0037.mediawiki  https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763.pdf  https://jonasnick.github.io/blog/2015/02/12/privacy-in-bitcoinj/  https://github.com/petertodd/bloom-io-attack _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev