Den 3 maj 2017 16:05 skrev "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high, > especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly > available blocks. Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set? IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set, Z% patch/fill set to deter attacks Then he uses Sybil attacks to obscure what's actually rare and not. Even proof of storage isn't enough, you need proof of INDEPENDENT storage, which is essentially impossible, as well as a way of determining which nodes are run by the same people (all the AWS nodes should essentially count as one).
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