Regarding the "Post-Quantum Address Recovery" part (I haven't read the
other parts), you may be interested in my message to the list from last
month and the rest of the thread:
This is an approach which aims to avoid the issues that you've
mentioned in your blog post.
On Tue, 2018-02-13 at 01:13 +1100, Tristan Hoy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Hi all,
> Recently I've been exploring what a post-quantum attack on Bitcoin
> would actually look like, and what options exist for mitigating it.
> I've put up a draft of my research here: https://medium.com/@tristanh
> In summary:
> 1) None of the recommended post-quantum DSAs (XMSS, SPHINCS) are
> 2) This is a rapidly advancing space and committment to a specific
> post-quantum DSA now would be premature
> 3) I've identified a strategy (solution 3 in the draft) that
> mitigates against the worst case scenario (unexpectedly early attack
> on ECDSA) without requiring any changes to the Bitcoin protocol or
> total committment to a specific post-quantum DSA that will likely be
> superseded in the next 3-5 years
> 4) This strategy also serves as a secure means of transferring
> balances into a post-quantum DSA address space, even in the event
> that ECDSA is fully compromised and the transition is reactionary
> The proposal is a change to key generation only and will be
> implemented by wallet providers.
> Feedback would be most appreciated.
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
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