I'll just mention that non-interactive one-way aggregation with BLS
signatures solves this problem rather nicely.

On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 10:31 PM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> writes:
> > If you've got one bundle that overpays fees and another that underpays,
> > you can safely combine the two only if you can put a SIGHASH_ALL sig in
> > the one that overpays (otherwise miners could just make their own tx of
> > just the overpaying bundle).
> This is a potential problem, yes :( And I'm not sure how to solve it,
> unless you do some crazy thing like commit to a set of keys which are
> allowed to bundle, which kind of defeats the generality of outsourcing.
> > This could replace SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY at a cost of an extra couple of
> > witness bytes.
> >
> > I think BUNDLESTART is arguably redundant -- you could just infer
> > BUNDLESTART if you see an INBUNDLE flag when you're not already in
> > a bundle. Probably better to have the flag to make parsing easier,
> > so just have the rule be BUNDLESTART is set for precisely the first
> > INBUNDLE signature since the last bundle finished.
> Indeed.
> >> One of the issues we've struck with lightning is trying to guess future
> >> fees for commitment transactions: we can't rely on getting another
> >> signature from our counterparty to increase fees.  Nor can we use
> >> parent-pays-for-child since the outputs we can spend are timelocked.
> >
> > That doesn't quite work with the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions
> > though, does it? They spend outputs from the commitment transaction
> > and need to be pre-signed by your channel partner in order to ensure
> > the output address is correct -- but if the commitment transaction gets
> > bundled, its txid will change, so it can't be pre-signed.
> Not without SIGHASH_NOINPUT, no.
> > FWIW, a dumb idea I had for this problem was to add a zero-value
> > anyone-can-spend output to commitment transactions, that can then be
> > used with CPFP to bump the fees. Not very nice for UTXO bloat if fee
> > bumping isn't needed though, and I presume it would fail to pass the
> > dust threshold...
> Yeah, let's not do that.
> > I wonder if it would be plausible to have after-the-fact fee-bumping
> > via special sighash flags at the block level anyway though. Concretely:
> > say you have two transactions, X and Y, that don't pay enough in fees,
> > you then provide a third transaction whose witness is [txid-for-X,
> > txid-for-Y, signature committing to (txid-for-X, txid-for-Y)], and can
> > only be included in a block if X and Y are also in the same block. You
> > could make that fairly concise if you allowed miners to replace
> txid-for-X
> > with X's offset within the block (or the delta between X's txnum and the
> > third transaction's txnum), though coding that probably isn't terribly
> > straightforward.
> What would it spend though?  Can't use an existing output, so this
> really needs to be stashed in an *output script*, say a zero-amount
> output which is literally a push of txids, and is itself unspendable.
>         <txid1>... <txidN>
> That's pretty large though, and it's non-witness data (though
> discardable).  How about 'OP_NOP4 <N> <ripemd160-of-last-N-txids>'?
> Then the miner just bundles those tx all together?
> Cheers,
> Rusty.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev mailing list

Reply via email to