On 04/28/2014 07:32 AM, Sergio Lerner wrote: > So you agree that: you need a periodic connection to a honest node, but > during an attack you may loose that connection. This is the assumption > we should be working on, and my use case (described in > http://bitslog.wordpress.com/2014/04/25/smartspv-a-better-simplified-payment-verification-for-smartphones/) > assumes that.
No, that's sortof tangential. What you are solving is some higher level application on top of SPV proofs, compact or otherwise. SPV proofs have many broad applications, such as 2-way pegs where proof-of-work is used to reach consensus over the most-work side-chain header, and a non-51% attack is detectable from observed difficulty and interblock times. Do you need an honest peer to learn about the best chain? Yes. Do you need to *trust* that you have an honest peer? No, because a non-51% attack against you is probabilistically detectable with existing tools. Maybe SmartSPV is useful, maybe not. The application domain is not something I've been concerned with in the past. But what you describe is a higher-level protocol that uses block headers to determine which chain to trust. My simple point from the start has been that you can use back-link commitments and compact SPV proofs to accomplish what you want fewer messages, less bandwidth, and equal security. The two proposals are not in conflict with each other. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Accelerate Dev Cycles with Automated Cross-Browser Testing - For FREE Instantly run your Selenium tests across 300+ browser/OS combos. Get unparalleled scalability from the best Selenium testing platform available. Simple to use. Nothing to install. Get started now for free." http://p.sf.net/sfu/SauceLabs _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
