A better retarget strategy might be to use the real average time between all of the blocks in the interval so that no blocks are treated specially in the calculation. I agree that this is not important enough to fork the chain over, though. An attacker would have to maintain control for a *very* long time because of Bitcoin's long retarget interval. (Maybe this kind of thing is why the retarget interval is so long?)
I don't like requiring block times to be within minutes of reality. It would be fine if only miners had to keep accurate time, but clients will also need to have good time in order to see if a block will be discouraged. A discouraged block should not count toward confirmations. If relays will also discourage blocks, then they'll need accurate time as well. The network should not be allowed to adjust your time by more than 40 minutes to prevent the timejacking attack, but I don't see a problem with the other time rules. Time is only used for retargets and LockTime, so it only needs to be generally accurate. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ BlackBerry® DevCon Americas, Oct. 18-20, San Francisco, CA Learn about the latest advances in developing for the BlackBerry® mobile platform with sessions, labs & more. See new tools and technologies. Register for BlackBerry® DevCon today! http://p.sf.net/sfu/rim-devcon-copy1 _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
