On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 2:47 AM, Peter Todd <p...@petertodd.org> wrote: > Followed by the actual replacement logic. We could change this logic to > instead evaluate if the candidate replacement does not remove or > decrease the value of any existing outputs. Adding outputs is ok. > Changing the set of inputs is also ok, provided that there are no > conflicts with other spent transactions. DoS attacks would be prevented > by only forwarding/accepting into the mempool replacements that increase > the fees paid by at least MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE * size - essentially the same > decision to allow the broadcast of the transaction in the first place.
I _strongly_ prefer this method of addressing this concern. I think you've hit the required requirements: pay at least all the same inputs, increase fee by at least the min_relay_tx_fee*size. The discussion we had on IRC where some were proposing fast expiration would practically lower the security of Bitcoin. While there is complexity and testing required here, getting full branch coverage of this code would be fairly straight forward. Doing this correctly will be easier than child-pays-for-parent and although it does not replace child-pays-for-parent (the two techniques are complimentary in my view) it would reduce the urgency of getting child-pays-for-parent included. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Symantec Endpoint Protection 12 positioned as A LEADER in The Forrester Wave(TM): Endpoint Security, Q1 2013 and "remains a good choice" in the endpoint security space. For insight on selecting the right partner to tackle endpoint security challenges, access the full report. http://p.sf.net/sfu/symantec-dev2dev _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
