In this scenario how do you ensure the miner solving the block cannot
reapportion the subsidy to himself rather than the pool?
On Jun 17, 2014 2:09 AM, "Raúl Martínez" <r...@i-rme.es> wrote:
> First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes in my writing below,
> I am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledge about it.
>
> ----
>
> We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate.
> While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful.
>
> The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happening
> again.
>
> My proposal is to start thinking about miners that join a pool like
> independent miners and not slave miners, this includes creating a new
> mining protocol that does not rely on the pool sending the list of
> transactions to include in a block. Each individual miner has to collect
> transactions by his own and mine that, this can be achieved by running a
> full node or by running a SPV like node that ask other nodes for
> transactions.
>
> Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a community could
> require all pools to use it (because its better, because is more
> trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it.
>
> Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol to the miner
> about how many transactions to include per block (some pools want small
> blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the minimum
> fee per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbase field
> in the block.
>
> This way is impossible to perform some of the possible 51% attacks:
>
> - A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish mining) (pool clients
> have a SPV or full node that has checkpoints and ask other peers about the
> length of the chain)
> - A pool owner can't perform double spends or reverse transactions
> (pool clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they know
> if they are already included on a block)
> - A pool owner cant decide which transactions not to include (but they
> can configure the minimum fee).
> - A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from
> mining blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independently
> that is from his pool or other).
>
>
> The only thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool and
> drop the hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners.
>
> If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my proposal is not
> valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my proposal is not valid.
>
>
> I want to know if this is possible or its been developed or there is
> already a working protocol that works like this, also I want to read other
> people's ways to address this threat, thanks for reading.
>
>
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