I agree with this.
Some combinatorics shows that 3 persistent connections instead of 8 results in
a low success rate of the entry-peers fingerprinting attack.
> it should not disconnect any nodes which were addnode, and it should not
> disconnect whitelisted peers
I agree ('Addnodes' are already excluded in the example code from the pull
request)
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 04:51:34PM -0700, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> It was pointed out to me that my concern wrt partitioning is unclear. Imagine
> an attacker starts up a moderate number of sybil nodes. He also connects to
> every other available listening peer and fills up their inbound capacity.
>
> In the current network this kind of activity would only disrupt newly joining
> peers. But nodes which were still online would remain connected to each other.
> With excessive rotation the entire network could become connected exclusively
> via the sybils.
>
> —
> Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub.*
>
--
Ivan
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