If there is a benefit in producing larger more-fee blocks if they propagate
slowly, then there is also a benefit in including high-fee transactions
that are unlikely to propagate quickly through optimized relay protocols
(for example: very recent transactions, or out-of-band receoved ones). This
effect is likely an order of magnitude less important still, but the effect
is likely the same.
On Jun 12, 2015 8:31 PM, "Peter Todd" <p...@petertodd.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 01:21:46PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> > Nice work, Pieter. You're right that my simulation assumed bandwidth for
> > 'block' messages isn't the bottleneck.
> >
> > But doesn't Matt's fast relay network (and the work I believe we're both
> > planning on doing in the near future to further optimize block
> propagation)
> > make both of our simulations irrelevant in the long-run?
> Then simulate first the relay network assuming 100% of txs use it, and
> secondly, assuming 100%-x use it.
> For instance, is it in miners' advantage in some cases to sabotage the
> relay network? The analyse say yes, so lets simulate that. Equally even
> the relay network isn't instant.
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
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